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Do or DoNo: Financing Inequality in Hartford, Connecticut Through the Downtown North Redevelopment Project

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Table of Contents

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Abstract

Post-industrial cities across the United States continue to reel from the effects of neoliberalism, which prompted a loss in their manufacturing base and a reduction of federal aid to municipalities. As a result, cities have become more creative and entrepreneurial in their redevelopment strategies. Oftentimes, these strategies include public-private partnerships and financial instruments to fund and build projects. A growing body of literature analyzes the effects of financialization. This work adds to this collection. I argue that local contexts, particularly the spatial, economic, and institutional arrangements of a city heavily determine the effectiveness of a finance-based redevelopment project. I illustrate this point through a study of Hartford, Connecticut's Downtown North Redevelopment Project, referred to as DoNo. I argue that Hartford's specific landscape of inequality, both within the city itself, and between the city and surrounding neighborhoods, interacted with DoNo's financial scheme to maintain the status quo of inequality in the city. In this way, Hartford's specific context set the parameters for DoNo's ability to bring positive, meaningful development to its communities. DoNo simply did not pay close enough attention to Hartford's landscape to effectively overcome the city's economic challenges and divisions. This work combines theoretical analysis with Hartford's lived experiences to articulate this point. Overall, this work calls for agents of redevelopment and municipalities to pay greater attention to local contexts in order to make more informed decisions regarding redevelopment projects.

Chapter 1

“Take Us *Out* of the Ball Game”: An Introduction to DoNo, Hartford, and Urban Financing

> “Take us out of the ball game. Take us out of the park. Don’t buy us some peanuts and cracker jacks, not ‘til Hartford is back in the black” (Office of Mayor Pedro E. Segarra 2014b).

Passionately sung to a jam-packed room in the Hartford Public Library, this song provided a bit of comedic relief to an intense public forum that took place in the fall of 2014. The discussion centered on the merits of a development project in the city of Hartford: DoNo. With a silly sounding name, DoNo has become a local hot-button issue. This quote hints at the discontents many residents expressed, and continue to express, regarding the project.

“Take us out of the ball game. Take us out of the park.” The “us” references the people of Hartford, the capital city of Connecticut. Spatially, Hartford is fragmented into a collection of relatively distinct subsections, see Figure 1. The two interstate highways, I-84 and I-91, running through the city effectively bisect the landscape into North and South Ends. The Downtown District, Hartford’s most profitable census tract, is located just below the highway interchange (Census Reporter 2019). The Downtown District includes high rise office buildings, interesting restaurants, and even a concert venue. Take the next highway exit and one finds a very different and rather desolate landscape. This area, officially known as Downtown North before 2014, encompasses 81 properties on 123.1 acres, 16% percent of which were vacant as of 2008 (City of Hartford Redevelopment Agency 2008, 1). Unused parking lots covered most of the remaining region. In fact, then Mayor Pedro Segarra accurately referred to the area as “sea of parking lots” (Gosselin 2020).



Figure 1: Hartford's Subdivisions. The North East subdivision is most commonly referred to as the North End, but the surrounding areas of Blue Hills and Upper Albany are treated and behave similarly. The Downtown North Redevelopment Project is located at the tip of the Downtown area, comprising roughly the triangle between Clay Arsenal and North Meadows (Hartford Maps).

Hartford eyed Downtown North for redevelopment as early as 2008. In that year, the City of Hartford Redevelopment Agency released a comprehensive survey of the area and its potential to act as a bridge between Hartford's central business district, the Downtown Area, and its generally poorer North End (City of Hartford Redevelopment Agency 2008, 5). The "park" in question came into play in 2014 as Mayor Pedro Segarra stood on the steps of City Hall on a sunny, June day to announce his newest achievement: he had saved baseball for the state. According to Segarra, the AA team for the Minnesota Twins, formerly known as the New Britain

Rock Cats, completed their contractual obligation to the city of New Britain and was poised to leave Connecticut. Mayor Segarra, seizing the opportunity to catalyze development in his city, offered to build the team a new, professional-grade stadium if they set their roots in Hartford (Office of Mayor Pedro E. Segarra 2014a). These roots were to be planted at 1214 Main St., amongst the sea of parking lots. After building the stadium, Segarra would then redevelop the expanses of asphalt. Segarra imagined retail, office, and residential spaces on the remaining parcels of land in Downtown North. This entire project came to be known as DoNo, a hip, shortened version of Downtown North. In the words of Mayor Segarra, the city of Hartford felt comfortable that DoNo was a “reasonable plan” to “increase vibrancy in the area” (Office of Mayor Pedro E. Segarra 2014a).

Figure 2: Downtown North. The Downtown North delineated above was divided into seven parcels. The interchange between I-84 and I-91 is shown at the bottom right of Downtown North (Utile).

Many residents took issue with Segarra's comments and overall vision for the area. While no one denied the need for more development in the north end of Hartford, the choice to finance first the stadium, then the rest of DoNo, remained a contentious issue. Here lies the biggest controversy regarding the project. During the public debates, many argued that Hartford simply did not have the financial resources to pay for the stadium. Some thought that even the owners of the Rock Cats should pay for the construction (Office of Mayor Pedro E. Segarra 2014c). Others believed that developments of such magnitude would be better spent elsewhere, such as the public library. The opening song sums up these sentiments with the lyric "not 'til Hartford is back in the black."



Figure 3: Renderings of DoNo's proposal. The baseball stadium anchors the project, surrounded by retail, housing, and office buildings (Office of Mayor Pedro Segarra 2014c).

Many cities across the United States consider building downtown stadiums. Similar debates could occur in cities like Detroit, Pittsburgh, Minneapolis, or Los Angeles, as issues regarding the financing of municipal development projects arise across the county. Each year cities break ground on new, expensive projects with hopes of improving their social, economic, and cultural situations in specific districts. Each project requires unique financing arrangements that create diverse outcomes. DoNo is just one example. Looking at the particulars of DoNo's financing agreement, what it committed Hartford to do, at what costs, and whose cost to bear, provides valuable insight into the nature of financed-based development projects in post-industrial American cities. This work pays close attention to Hartford's specific urban landscape. Doing so reveals interesting patterns regarding the consequences of finance-based developments and calls into question their ability to enact positive change for local communities.

The Devil is in the Details: Can Urban Financing Create Positive Change for Cities?

Municipalities generate revenue from a variety of different sources, including taxes, federal and state governmental aid, and other miscellaneous fees collected by the local government. The configuration of these different funding sources in local budgets looks different now that it did in the middle decades of the twentieth century. In 1970, federal aid accounted for approximately 15% of municipal revenues and state aid accounted for around 22% (Pagano and Hoene 2018, 4). In 2012, those percentages hovered at 6.4% and 18%, respectively (Pagano and Hoene 2018, 4). With this significant decrease in intergovernmental transfers, municipalities must generate most of their revenue, around 75% from taxes and fees. Of that 75%, property taxes account for the majority of municipal revenue, with income taxes comprising the smallest portion of the average city's budget (Tax Policy Center 2017). This shift matters because the amount of tax revenue, and where that revenue comes from, affects a city's ability to pursue development projects.

Neoliberalism, the international economic phenomena, explains this shift in municipal revenues. At its most basic definition, neoliberalism prioritizes free, global markets over governmental meddling in the economy. Becoming the dominant doctrine in the 1970s with the administration of Ronald Reagan, neoliberalism restructured state and federal economic policies to no longer provide substantial amounts of aid to municipalities (Monbiot 2016). At the same time, neoliberal policies accelerated deindustrialization. Previously, many American cities, such as Hartford, Salem, and Detroit, bustled with manufacturing. These cities housed middle class industrial workers and their families. However, as countries began outsourcing their industries during the height of the neoliberal era, manufacturing became less prominent in the United States (Monbiot 2016). Factories turned off the lights, leaving cities and previously middle class workers without income. These cities are referred to as post-industrial, referring to the urban landscape left in the wake of a once industrial hub.

The decline in income taxes in part explains the contemporary emphasis on property taxes. Together with the lack of governmental assistance and the decrease in middle-class working opportunities, cities look to the land to generate revenue. With less outside assistance, these urban governments become more independent, giving rise to the term "entrepreneurial city" in urban-geography. The entrepreneurial city attempts to create new opportunities, branding, and experiences to improve the lives of the people within the city and to attract people to come visit to generate income (Roberts and Schein 1993, 22). This often involves new construction or renovation of existing buildings. However, finding the revenue for these developments remains a challenge for cities already reeling from the loss of their industrial base. From this predicament grows the popularity and diversity of municipal financing.

Financial markets have grown tremendously throughout the last few decades, particularly between 2001 and 2007, and have developed a variety of different financial instruments (Weber 2010). The general principle behind financing is to generate revenue through the trading of stocks, bonds, or other intangible assets. For cities, financing has become an indispensable tool to pay for their desired development projects. In fact, many cities have come to use financial instruments with more frequency, as seen by greater municipal debt and the privatization of public assets present in urban budgets (Weber 2010). By engaging financial markets, cities, either on their own or through private companies, gain upfront access to capital that they otherwise would not have. Investors are attracted to municipal financial instruments because they are relatively less risky than commercial bonds and stocks (Weber 2010). Taking the market's attraction to municipal debt with the cities' need for capital, an interesting dynamic is produced. Cities become financialized. The term financialization describes the process by which cities become increasingly more integrated into financial markets (Weber 2010). In doing so, new financial instruments are created for capital and, in turn, become critical tools fueling the revitalization of post-industrial cities. They have become fixtures of urban policy; however, sometimes with unsavory consequences.

These consequences hold profound implications for the health of municipalities, and thus deserve academic attention. This work is guided by the question: how do financial instruments interact with urban landscapes and to what effect? Hartford's Downtown North Redevelopment Project serves as the case study. In particular, this work adds to the growing body of literature regarding the effectiveness of financial instruments in helping post-industrial cities acclimate to a new, modern purpose. I will focus on financing of the baseball stadium in Hartford through the newly created Stadium Authority. Authorities like these are commonplace in post-industrial development projects. As quasi-public entities, they exist between the realms of government and finance, and provide an useful entry point into understanding how public-private partnerships negotiate the logic of financial capital into the municipal fold.

Ultimately, this work argues that while financial instruments hold significant power for municipalities, a city's local economic, social, and political contexts remain the primary determinants of the outcome of the project. Using the case of Hartford's Downtown North Redevelopment Plan, I argue that the financial arrangement used to build the stadium benefited those who historically benefit in Hartford's particular landscape, at the expense of those who are most marginalized. Put another way, the public-private partnership simply injected economic power and risk into the community, which fell neatly along existing lines of spatial inequality. This means that Hartford's specific relationship with its constituents and the state of Connecticut essentially predetermined the outcome of the stadium and the rest of DoNo. These relationships make it difficult to be optimistic about the ability of financial instruments to overcome these barriers and provide real, meaningful development for Hartford. This is not to say that Hartford is hopeless or that financing can never be a useful tool for redevelopment. This work instead proposes that local landscapes hold the key to understanding the efficacy of financing arrangements, and that more attention should be paid to understanding local contexts before a city commits to a public-private partnership or finance-based redevelopment project.

Why I Study Hartford (and Why Others Should As Well)

Hartford stands as Connecticut's capital city, but one living outside of the state might not know that. On the list of fun, interesting Northeastern capital cities, one likely will not list Hartford. Just take it from former Governor Dannel Malloy's spokesperson, when making a pick for Amazon HQ to locate in Connecticut back in 2017. She states, "situated between New York and Boston, home to great schools and world-class universities, and boasting a high quality of life, Connecticut would be a great home for a second Amazon headquarters" (Singer 2017). From this quote, one might gather that the best thing about Connecticut is not its own cities, but its strategic positionality amongst others. Mayor Luke Bronin, in his pitch, referred to Hartford as a "nice corridor," again evoking the idea that the city's best quality is essentially being pathway to somewhere else (Singer 2017). Putting its lack of flare aside, Hartford is also far smaller than many other Northeastern cities, with a total population of 122,105 people (United States Census Bureau 2019a). This dwarfs in comparison to the 692,600 people living in Boston and 179,883 people living in Providence, the capital city of the smallest state in the country (United States Census Bureau 2019d,e).

Despite being smaller and less memorable than other cities, Hartford is extremely complex. For example, Hartford's skyline is adorned by an impressive golden-domed capitol building nestled in between high-rise office complexes. These buildings house the many white-collar workers who commute into Hartford's insurance and finance cluster, which is one of the largest in the country. Meanwhile, thirty percent of Hartford residents live below the federal poverty line (United States Census Bureau 2019b). To put that into perspective, about one out of every three people living in the city makes less than $12,760 a year (based on per capita income). In comparison, the poverty rate reported in Connecticut and the United States in 2019 both hovered around 10% (United States Census Bureau 2019a). This economic disparity has manifested itself within the structure of the city. Hartford has a violent crime rate of 10.92 per 1,000 people, almost 8 points higher than the state average (Neighbor Scout 2020). A person in Connecticut, on average, has a 1 in 482 chance of becoming a victim of a violent crime, step into Hartford and those odds become 1 in 93 (Neighbor Scout 2020). Hartford very much is a tale of two cities, except both realities exist within the same municipal boundary.

Overall, Hartford serves as the case study for this work because its spatial division provides an interesting window into understanding how gentrification, segregation, and regionalism are entangled with urban finance. Additionally, Hartford's use of and, in fact, its reliance on financial instruments speaks to why more research is needed on this topic. As a poor city with much to lose, Hartford finds itself enmeshed in financial markets that heavily affect the city's present and future. It is the small, relatively unknown cities that struggle most with attracting customers and investors alike. This means they are the most likely to risk and, unfortunately, most likely to lose. In this way, the benefits of studying Hartford are twofold. First, this work offers to Hartford theoretical frameworks and academic discourse that it has not previously been privy to in a substantial manner. Second, it calls for the increased need and reward of studying smaller, often overlooked cities.

Theory and Methods, and A Note on Positionality

This work adds to the growing body of literature on post-industrial development. To do so, it builds a theoretical framework, which will be discussed in the next chapter. This framework delves deeper into the grounded urban experiences of the post-industrial city and how financial markets affect the landscape. The framework consists of four main pillars. The first is neoliberalism. I explore how municipalities respond to and internalize neoliberal ideology. This gives language to this work's emphasis on specific urban contexts. Next, I track the rise of financialization within the city and, in particular, the advent of the public-private partnership. This discussion provides insight into the precarity of financial markets in municipal settings. Then, I shift to stadiums. In summarizing the literature on stadiums, I situate Hartford's proposal amongst general theory, particularly regarding the costs and benefits of stadium builds. The final pillar is gentrification. I discuss how gentrification inevitably arises in the post-industrial city and how city policies actually encourage it. Combined, these four pillars provide the foundation for this work's exploration into the Downtown North Redevelopment Project.

I also borrow from the fantastic local news sources and residents diligently engaged in discourse surrounding the project. This information is critical to understanding Hartford's spatial inequality and current landscape. Whenever possible, primary sources are used to understand both the factual information regarding the city and the motivations of different actors. For example, the work includes quotations directly from planning documents, public meetings, and press releases regarding DoNo. *The Hartford Courant* and other local newspapers help to fill in the gaps, providing additional information about the timeline and execution of Downtown North's redevelopment. Additionally, this work uses historic articles and excerpts to piece together the city's long and complex history.

At this time, it is important to acknowledge my own positionality as the author of this work. For twenty years, I lived in Southington, CT, a suburb of Hartford that is approximately a thirty minute drive from Dunkin Donuts Stadium. As a kid, my memories of the city are of pointing out the golden-domed state building on road trips and hearing stories from my parents, who once called Hartford home. In many ways, the city's reputation as a place of poverty and violence precedes it. There exists almost an unspoken, but nonetheless agreed upon understanding of what Hartford is among its residents. Unfortunately, the narrative often stops there. As a long time resident of the area, I became interested in delving deeper into understanding Hartford's spatial landscape, in hopes of adding complexity to the all too simple and unkind narrative. As will become apparent by the end of Chapter 3, residents in Hartford often are spoken over and generalized. Because of this, I attempt to tread carefully and respectfully into a discussion of the systemic problems in Hartford. It is a fundamental goal of this work to let the voices of Hartford's historically silenced residents shine through and guide this narrative. This is why each chapter title includes a quote from either a Hartford resident or Mayor Segarra because, really, this is their project.

Chapter Outline

From here, the work will proceed as described below.

The next chapter constructs the theoretical framework used to analyze the DoNo's financing agreement. To do so, focuses on the four pillars mentioned above: neoliberalism, financialization, stadiums, and gentrification. This provides readers first with a rudimentary understanding of how theorists are thinking about these issues. More importantly, the framework gives this work the tools and language to articulate its central argument regarding Hartford's financial agreement.

Chapter 2 explores Hartford's spatial inequality. I provide a historical analysis of the many social, political, and economic factors that led Hartford to being one of the most racially and economically ostracized communities in the state. Understanding Hartford's landscape of inequality is critical to the work because these equalities provide the basis for, and determine, I argue, the outcome of DoNo's financing arrangement.

Chapter 4 synthesizes the previous two sections. The chapter analyzes the financing of DoNo's first build. In exploring the creation of and fallout from Hartford's bond agreement, I demonstrate how DoNo's financing first exposed and then threatened to widen the city's unequal landscape. Finally, I look at DoNo in 2021. I argue that DoNo's current predicament proves the ineffectiveness of the bond agreement at enacting real change. However, this work also looks at DoNo's most recent iteration which, in some ways, pays closer attention to Hartford's landscape.

Chapter 5 reiterates the main points of this work and why they remain important topics of study and exploration by urban governments. I leave off with a discussion of potential solutions regarding how to better finance post-industrial development projects.

Chapter 2

"We are Comfortable that this is a Reasonable Plan": Theoretical Framework for Understanding Post-Industrial Urban Finance

Post-industrial cities across the United States exist in spatially, culturally, and economically complex arrangements. This work argues that these arrangements provide crucial insight into determining the outcome and feasibility of development projects. Before exploring Hartford's case, an orientation into the theoretical conceptualizations of the post-industrial city proves helpful. Many scholars engage critically with the post-industrial city and the compounding effects of neoliberalism, financialization, stadium builds, and gentrification on the urban landscape. Their work underpins this one.

This chapter puts a few of these urban theorists in conversation with each other. From this conversation emerges a framework for interrogating development projects and the role of the private sector across urban landscapes. First, this work first explores how to contextualize the vast differences in lived experience felt by post-industrial cities under a regime of neoliberalism. This leads to a discussion of financialization and the rise of the futures market in the urban economy. Next, I explore the nature of the post-industrial development project, particularly the stadium. Finally, the work looks at one of the most profound effects of financialization and post-industrial development: gentrification.

The Blurring of Public and Private: Neoliberalization and the Rise of Financialization

Neoliberalism serves as a fundamental ideology in American political and economic policy. Traditionally speaking, neoliberal policy argues for a reliance on free markets with a retrenchment of state and national governance (Brenner and Theodore 2013, 2). The United States adopted these policies in earnest under the leadership of Ronald Reagan (Monbiot 2016).

These policies included privatization, large tax cuts for the wealthy, and outsourcing of many manufacturing industries (Monbiot 2016). The combination of outsourced manufacturing and a lack of governmental aid left cities that once boomed with industry literally and figuratively in the black. These cities are haunted by their past, in name and in landscape.

While this narrative remains generally true, it offers a simplistic story of the urban economy and landscape. Many scholars, particularly Brenner, Theodore, and Smith, complicate the traditional narrative of urban neoliberalism. In its place, they offer a nuanced understanding of how neoliberal ideology embeds itself within urban logics, which proves useful to this work's inquiry.

Brenner and Theodore reconsider the hegemony of neoliberalism as a policy description. The authors argue that places cannot adequately be defined as either neoliberal or not, but instead find themselves along a continuum of neoliberalization (Brenner and Theodore 2003, 6). From this, posit that any intellectual project focusing on neoliberalism must be attentive to the ways in which societies evolve and bend towards neoliberal ideology. They find it more useful to think of neoliberalism as a process, rather than a static ideology. Going further, the work draws attention to the fact that neoliberal policy does necessarily juxtapose governmental policy (Brenner and Theodore 2003, 6). Instead, the authors argue that unwinding the complexities of neoliberal spaces means looking at the ways in which institutions have been changed by and to make way for international capital and other forms of neoliberal policy (Brenner and Theodore 2003, 16). The vocabulary of neoliberalization allows for a careful look at how cities' own structures meld with neoliberal ideologies. In Hartford, the creation of the Stadium Authority serves as a primary example.

Additionally, they note that neoliberalism is path-dependent, meaning neoliberal landscapes cannot be generalized (Brenner and Theodore 2003, 14). This negates the notion that neoliberal policies look the same across all urban spaces. Instead, Brenner and Theodore argue for a localized, spatially attentive analysis of neoliberal space, which they call actually existing neoliberalism. Actually existing neoliberalism focuses on the particular arrangements of a city and how they have been altered by neoliberal policies. In essence, this concept forms the backbone of this work: that local contexts matter. My argument assumes that cities exist in a state of actually existing neoliberalism, which informs the detailed discussion of Hartford's landscape. The work springboards off this concept to argue that local contexts not only matter, but also greatly inform urban futures, especially when using financial instruments.

Brenner and Theodore also view urban spaces as "laboratories" for neoliberal policies (Brenner and Theodore 2003, 21). This means that cities exist as nodes of creation, not as simply reactionaries to federal mandates. Smith's work agrees with this assessment. Smith argues that the urban economy is rising in prominence, while the national economy becomes increasingly less defined (Smith 2003, 83). This shift, which Smith and others refer to as new urbanism, necessitates a more nuanced framework for examining the power of cities. Smith notes that usually spaces become "global cities" when they perform a certain level of function for the global economy, such as New York City with finance. However, Smith argues that cities acting within neoliberal new urbanism necessarily interact with the global economy, making them inherently global cities (Smith 2003, 90). They do so to generate revenue and stoke capital surplus and social reproduction. Taken together, these works emphasize that the urban economy has become increasingly independent and entrepreneurial, and exist as distinct from state and federal economies.

This framing underscores the importance of the public-private partnership (PPP), a common occurrence in the post-industrial city and the arrangement for Hartford's DoNo project. PPPs became popular because of neoliberal policies that made traditional streams of revenue unavailable to cities. Struggling post-industrial cities, now forced to act entrepreneurially and in need of redevelopment, turned to the private sector. From this, the PPP was born. PPPs blend financial markets and political institutions to actualize redevelopment projects. Scholars refer to this blurring as financialization (Weber 2010). Financialization changed how municipalities function and balance their budgets. It also serves as the primary interest of this work. Understanding the mechanisms behind municipal finance, especially the PPP, and its effects remain critical to the crux of this work's argument.

PPPs exist in a variety of forms. Hartford used bonds for the stadium, other areas use tax-incremental finance or leasing agreements. Cities create unique arrangements to leverage their assets for development. At their core, these arrangements rely on the same principle: the time value of money. As Weber describes, the time value of money essentially is the principle that any amount of money one has now will be worth more in the future because of interest (Weber 2020). This means that for those paying for redevelopment upfront, the investors, the future is where they make their money. This makes the future of the city of the utmost importance to investors and at the forefront of any PPP.

Weber's older, but aptly titled article "Selling City Futures: The Financialization of Urban Redevelopment Policy" explores the risks involved in PPP arrangements. First, the less financially secure a city is to begin with, the more risk they must assume attracting investors. As Weber explains, cash-strapped cities with poor credit and a worse economic reputation must prove their worthiness to investors in order to fund projects that the city hopes will increase revenue, but that they simply cannot afford without financial schemes (Weber 2010, 252). As a result, these cities often are forced to accept less than ideal contracts with investors, usually including high interest rates and other municipal burdens (Weber 2010, 252). Doing so makes them more attractive to investors, who will cash in off of higher interest payments. This illustrates that a city's prior economic landscape remains fundamental to evaluating the success of the project, as will be seen in Hartford.

Additionally, Weber also explores three specific types of risk associated with financialization, all of which arise from specific local situations amplified by the injection of capital. The first risk is completion risk. This refers to the risk incurred if a project is never completed (Weber 2020). This poses problems for municipalities because it means they lose out on the proposed development and, depending on the financial arrangement, might be left in a worse economic situation (Weber 2020). Valuation risk is the second worry. Once a project reaches completion, the valuation of the land might fluctuate, causing instability in local real estate markets. Relatedly, the third risk is tax-related. This is the idea that a completed project will alter the way the city taxes their properties, again introducing instability into the market (Weber 2020). Overall, Weber illustrates that financialization comes with some opportunities, but also profound risks not equally felt across cities. Weber's work underpins mine in that it draws attention to the division of risk and reward in urban development projects, and how local landscapes affect such allocations.

Stadiums: A Common Post-Industrial Solution

Some cities, including Hartford, use PPPs to build sports stadiums in an attempt to solve their post-industrial economic crises. A discussion of the literature regarding the intended purposes and actual consequences of stadium-fueled development frames this work's discussion of DoNo. According to the literature, stadiums become popular urban solutions for a number of reasons. Put nicely by Ahlfedt and Maennig, stadiums act as iconic architecture for urban spaces, meaning their structures stand as distinct across the cityscape (Ahlfeldt and Maennig 2010, 630). The building of a stadium makes a space visually unique. It provides the city with a landmark, which in turn adds to the city's identity, legibility, and branding, which are all important traits in the post-industrial city. Stadiums become a site to see and a symbol of the city (Ahlfeldt and Maennig 2010, 630). This is important in the post-industrial city where consumption itself is the product. This consumption has the limiting factor of time. While a person might purchase many different products that are alike, a person usually chooses to visit locations that they deem interesting and unique because the time they spend at these places is also valuable to them. Sports stadiums, which are interesting and unique, provide that edge to municipalities, acting as anchor institutions to spark local tourism. This makes them, in theory, good investments for the post-industrial city.

The implementation of stadiums remains more complicated. Many authors argue that the particular landscape of a city heavily influences the outcome of the stadium. First, local politics play an important role in determining where stadiums get built. In a study examining the outcomes of PPPs to build sports stadiums, Delaney and Eckstein arrive at a framework for understanding the popularity of the particular build. The authors argue that the presence of a growth coalition in cities strongly determines whether or not a stadium will be proposed and built (Delaney and Eckstein 2007). They define growth coalitions as a consortium of public officials, private interests, and even the media, promoting the feasibility of the project and convincing locals to get on board (Delaney and Eckstein 2007). In practice, these actors work to champion governmental and resident support for a stadium. They add fervor to the project, which makes its construction more likely.

Other authors argue that local contexts matter not only in the location of stadiums, but in their ability to positively impact an area. Generally, stadium literature agrees that they are not effective development agents. For example, Delaney and Eckstein summarize many empirical studies that all conclude that the costs often outweigh the benefits for stadiums (Delaney and

Eckstein 2007). They themselves state that sports stadiums provide initial increases in consumption, known as the honeymoon phase, but fail to deliver long term consumer and governmental surplus (Delany and Eckstein 2007). Ahlfeldt and Maennig agree that there exists little empirical evidence to support the claim that stadiums' iconic architecture provides a greater level of economic growth to a city (Ahlfedlt and Maennig 2010).

However, some authors are not willing to completely disregard the feasibility of the stadium as a tool for economic development. They stipulate that, in order for stadiums to be successful, more attention must be paid to the politics of the planning and financing of the stadiums. For example, Chema argues that the success of a baseball stadium depends on its integration within the urban fabric (Chema 1996). He notes that stadiums that are more connected to the central metropolitan area of a city are more likely to achieve positive economic results (Chema 1996). Doing so, he argues, requires a complex look at the city's demographics and economic patterns. Similarly, Irizarry posits that stadiums have the ability to provide economic growth if they are properly financed. For this to happen, she argues, the entity with the most economic power should bear the most risk in the private-public partnership (Irizarry 2017). This would be the developers, investors, or sports franchises themselves. This way, if a problem arises from the construction or operation of the stadium, the risk bearing entity has the capital to create solutions or at least avoid economic ruin. However, as Irizarry states, this usually is not the case. Most often, cities themselves are responsible for assuming the risk of the stadium, meaning they are financially responsible for any potential shortcomings in the stadium's ability to pay for itself (Irizarry 2017). To determine which party can shoulder more risk requires a deeper look into the details of each entity, including the municipality, financing instrument, and private company.

Overall, Hartford's reliance on a baseball stadium to catalyze development in the Downtown North region fell into many of the traps seen above. The rhetoric employed by Mayor Segarra, the developers, and baseball executives emphasized the project's ability to create revenue. This might have been true under different circumstances. However, The city simply did not pay close enough attention to its economic and social situations, as authors above instruct, leading the project to join the long list of stadiums financed by desperate municipalities that did not pay off.

The Effects of Stadiums and Similar Projects on the Urban Landscape

Oftentimes, stadiums gentrify. In fact, post-industrial cities commonly struggle with gentrification. Broadly, gentrification refers to the changing characteristics of neighborhoods due to a migration of new, usually wealthier people into the area (Smith 2003, 91). These people become attracted to the new amenities, such as a stadium, housing complex, or Main Street revitalization. Their increased presence in the area often leads to increased housing and food prices and demographic changes. While gentrification as a practice is not new, Smith notes that it was previously seen as sporadic and really a side effect of urban redevelopment projects (Smith 2003, 93). During the 1990s, this began to change. With the increasingly neoliberal atmosphere and newfound competitive nature of urban space, gentrification became, and continues to be, central to urban revitalization (Smith 2003, 93). Smith describes this as gentrification being "generalized" into the urban fold (Smith 2003, 99). This means that cities, in a way, intend to gentrify.

By centralizing policies that intend to gentrify, cities accomplish two goals. First, capitalizing on the new wealth in the area gives cities access to the revenues needed to fill the gaps left by a lack of state and federal funding (Smith 2003, 99). Additionally, this income becomes a source of productive capital for the city, making it better equipped to act as a site of global production (Smith 2003, 99). In this way, gentrification and urban renewal act both as a response to the neoliberal atmosphere and perpetuates it. Cities with factories and production facilities that lay dormant after deindustrialization must turn to the production of consumption to balance their budgets and stay relevant. This is why gentrification necessarily comes with urban renewal, because cities can no longer make money from selling rich people products, now done cheaper elsewhere. Instead they must entice wealthy people to come and spend money in their economy. To keep up, cities tailor their landscapes and policies to facilitate this new, gentrification based economy, making it no longer a side effect, but a goal, of redevelopment.

The scholarship of Richard Florida provides context for how gentrification becomes generalized. Florida argues that the key to sustained urban economic growth lies in the ability of a city to attract the creative class (Florida 2014, 197). According to Florida, the creative class, such as artists, tech workers, and entrepreneurs, fuel economic growth through their spending power (Florida 2014, 197). These are the people most likely to cluster in urban spaces, so cities must grow their amenity base to attract their talent before it goes elsewhere (Florida 2014, 198). To accomplish this, Florida argues that cities must focus on three factors: technology, tolerance, and talent (Florida 2014, 198). For Florida, the recipe for creating a solid economy means creating an interesting, fun place to live for educated, wealthy people, and providing them the means to make a living and spend their money in the city. Practically, this translates into cities catering to a class of people that do not currently live there. Cities must alter their landscapes, and the gentrifying class will move in and increase revenues, so says Florida. Many cities following Florida's advice now contend with the resulting gentrification. One *Guardian* article from 2017 refers to him as "the ultimate champion of gentrification (Wainwright 2017). A key takeaway from Florida's suggestions is that cities, under his advice, must prioritize their attention for different groups of people based on their spending power.

These theories underpin the latter section of this work's argument. Financialization and gentrification are closely related because they rely on the same principle: the future. The private sector depends on cities building a more profitable future to be able to secure a return on their investments. Gentrification provides a viable way to envision a wealthier future, through the creative class. Reading Smith and Florida's work calls upon readers to examine how post-industrial cities inherently promote gentrifying policies for these ends. This gives this work the language to argue that Hartford's financing agreement for the baseball stadium committed Hartford to produce a more profitable future, through the rest of DoNo, and to understand how that future further divides the city.

Conclusion

The literature discussed above provides this work with a foundation for understanding how stadium-finance perpetuates inequality in Hartford. The theorists add nuance to traditional understandings of post-industrial cities, and they call for added emphasis into the particular spatial arrangements of cities, their institutions, and residents. Additionally, we learn that from these financial arrangements emerges the likelihood of gentrification, which can further exacerbate spatial inequalities. From this, a framework emerges emphasizing that neoliberal financing arrangements are not only embedded in local contexts, but that these contexts matter, a lot.

Chapter 3

"I Can't Leave Hartford Because No One Wants to Buy My House": Understanding the Landscape of Spatial Inequality in Hartford

In 1870, the *New York Times* named Hartford America's richest city (Dougherty 2020). In 2021, it consistently ranks among the poorest (World Population Review 2021). Hartford's fall from economic grace tells a story of profound inequality, both within the city and between Hartford and surrounding municipalities. Hartford's landscape of inequality derives from economic disparities across distinguished, persisting racial lines. Some census data helps to put this into perspective. Hartford itself is largely non-white. In 2019, 37.7% of the city identified as African American and 44.3% as Hispanic (United States Census Bureau 2019b,c). Only 31.3% of Hartford residents identified as white (United States Census Bureau 2019b). This starkly differs from the demographics of the cities surrounding Hartford. In Hartford County, 74.8% of people identify as being white (United States Census Bureau 2019c). African Americans and Hispanics make up 15.8% and 18% of the population, respectively (United States Census Bureau 2019b,c). Ultimately, Hartford exists as an enclave for non-white people in the county. Tangible inequities associate themselves with this reality. The area median income in Connecticut generally is $75,148, in Hartford it is $36,278 (United States Census Bureau 2019a,b). Hartford's area median income also declined more rapidly in the last three decades than it did in Connecticut generally. Additionally, Hartford residents tend to hold lower paying jobs, such as office and administrative support, healthcare support, and food preparation and service jobs at higher rates than their Hartford County counterparts (DataUSA).

These trends continue inside Hartford's city line. While white people make up the minority in Hartford, they generally live with better means. The dissimilarity index proves useful in quantifying this divide. The index measures the relative unevenness between two groups and is the most common measurement of segregation and unequal opportunity (Eaton 2020, 7). With a rating of 1 being entirely unequal between white people and other groups, Hispanics in Hartford were given a score of .62 and Black people a score of .71 (Eaton 2020, 7). This illustrates that the minority groups lead fairly distinct, unequal, lives from white people in Hartford. These inequities also manifest across space. The North End of Hartford tends to have higher percentages of Black residents, while the South End tends to house more of the Hispanic population (MAGIC 2012). This creates a very clear racial divide across the city.

Harford's spatial inequality did not happen overnight. Multiple actors, institutions, and policies conditioned the city through centuries of racialized, political, and neoliberal processes that cultivated in Hartford's racially segregated and economically clustered neighborhoods. This chapter explores the making of this landscape. In doing so, this chapter examines three distinct periods in the city's history: the rise of industry, selective deindustrialization, and the making of a post-industrial city. Each section demonstrates the ways in which policies motivated by capitalism and racism worked together to produce Hartford's landscape. This chapter provides necessary context for understanding how the North End of Hartford emerged from the 2000's as a primarily Black and under-resourced enclave in a minority-majority and under-resourced city. Analyzing the building of this landscape remains crucial to the next chapter's discussion of how DoNo finances inequality across these very lines.

The Rise of Industry and Spatial Division

While there exists no official start date for the beginning of Hartford's unequal, racialized landscapes, 1614 is a good place to start. For centuries prior, the Eastern Pequot Tribal Nation called the area that would one day be called Hartford home (CT State Library 2017). In 1614, the first Europeans, Dutch traders, stepped foot in future Hartford (CT State Library 2017). This marked the beginning of a centuries long, horrible genocide that succeeded in robbing the Pequot of their land and autonomy. By the turn of the nineteenth century, the land had fully been transformed from an indigenous homeland to a seat of white, American enterprise. Presently, the Eastern Pequot Tribal Nation retains only a small swath of land, on a reservation in North Stonington, Connecticut (Jackson 2020). The decline of native populations in the area signals Hartford's first attempts at segregating minority communities and depriving them of resources. This would become a pattern.

Hartford's enterprise consisted of two distinct industrial clusters: insurance and manufacturing. The city's tale of two industries transformed Hartford's physical and economic landscapes, creating the inequalities still seen today. Insurance began in Hartford first. Given its strategic position along the Connecticut River, Hartford existed as a landscape of flux, with traders and sailors of all sorts gathering in the city's local taverns and inns to rest (Woodward 1879, 1). Within these gatherings, a desire to protect maritime cargo and voyages arose. Acting on these desires, sailors began informal underwriting around the middle of the eighteenth century (Woodward 1879, 10). In these rudimentary agreements, sailors would come together and agree to share both the risks and rewards of each other's voyages to minimize individual risk.

Local entrepreneurs formalized this activity as a lucrative career in the late eighteen hundreds. The openings of Hartford and Union Banks in 1792 facilitated this by providing local underwriters formal lines of financing and capital (Woodward 1). This actually marks Hartford's first entanglement with financial markets, which would, again, become a greater pattern in the city. As a result of these formal institutions, the years following 1792 saw informal and formal underwriting accelerate in popularity, given the ease and legitimacy with which people could join the field. Throughout the 1800s, Hartford's insurance industry expanded into a powerful cluster. Companies, such as Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance, moved to the region, while existing companies expanded their insurance markets, eventually including fire, health and life insurance (Woodward 1879, 118). Through an artful handling of multiple crises, including an embargo on foreign goods in 1807 (Baranoff) and the New York City Fires between 1835-1845, the insurance companies of Hartford proved their resilience and staying power (Woodward 1879, 119). By the end of the century, Hartford became synonymous with insurance (Mahoney 2015).

As Hartford's insurance sector continued to prosper, the city began to develop a diverse manufacturing cluster. The onset of the Civil War thrust Hartford into the industrial spotlight. The Samuel Colt Patent Firearms Manufacturing Company was the first factory to open its doors in Hartford in 1855 (Baics 2001, 50). Transitioning from the national war effort to the Industrial Revolution, factories continued to crop up across the city. By 1880, more than 800 factories dotted Hartford's landscape (Baics 2001, 50). They produced everything from sewing machines to bicycles to bottles of vodka, making Hartford's industrial portfolio incredibly diverse (Swift 1995). Weed Sewing Machine, Pope Manufacturing, Pratt & Whitney Machine Tools, and Underwood Typewriter are just a few of the companies that called Hartford home during its industrial era (Ryan 1996). The cluster's diversity of production gave it power and stability throughout the century. The combined riches from insurance and manufacturing won Hartford the title of America's richest city in the 1870s (Dougherty 2020).

In spite of the immense wealth generated in Hartford, its citizens did not equally experience the spoils of industry. The turn of the century (1870-1930), proved to be a pivotal period for creating and cementing inequalities that would persist indefinitely in the city. During that period, Hartford witnessed a profound shift in demographics due to available manufacturing jobs. First, European and Russian workers filled these ranks. In the coming years, Hartford's foreign born population exponentially increased with the arrival of Irish, Italian, German, Swedish, and many other European citizens (Baics 2001, 51). Census data from the 1890s illustrate that these populations, who at the time were still predominantly white, usually resided on Hartford's East Side (Baics 2001, 51). The foreign population on the East Side continued to expand in the coming decades, becoming known as the city's foreign quarter (Baics 2001, 58). Residents of the foreign quarter experienced awful conditions. They lived in incredibly crowded and ill-maintained tenements, with 14.8 people per dwelling at its worst (Baics 2001, 58). As unskilled, foreign born, and poor, this population was sequestered to the outskirts of the city and kept in far inferior conditions to the native, wealthier sections of Hartford. In this way, the East Side became one of Hartford's first separate, but unequal, communities.

The city of Hartford's desire and ability to segregate populations they deemed undesirable only increased in the twentieth century with an influx of Southern African Americans. The Great Migration, which began in 1910, brought Southern Black workers to Hartford in search of higher wages and job security provided by tobacco fields and industry jobs (Close 2013). Hartford businesses welcomed the migration, looking to fill their ranks with cheaper labor than what white, unionized workers could provide (Close 2013). At the time, African American workers earned 30-40% less than their white counterparts, while experiencing harsher working conditions in factories and farms (Thornton 2017). Despite capitalizing on their labor, white city of Hartford residents did not want these new immigrants living amongst them. According to Lewis, Hartford residents associated Southern Black people with crime and misconduct (Lewis 1999). Generally, Black people born and socialized in the North received less spite (Lewis 1999). This led to Black immigrants locating on the East Side, in the city's pre-existing ghetto, or on the outskirts of Hartford where housing was the cheapest (Tuckel et.al 2007, 718).

Soon after, the city of Hartford and surrounding towns launched several initiatives to relocate Black residents out of the suburbs and traditionally white neighborhoods to the North

End. For example, 1924 saw West Hartford, a wealthy suburb of Hartford, enact the area's first municipal zoning law (Dougherty 2020). This ordinance mandated that two-family homes only be built if sat on a particular amount of land (Dougherty 2020). In subtext, this law essentially made building multi-family homes largely unrealistic in West Hartford due to the land requirement. This meant that lower class families, who usually could only afford to live in such arrangements, would be confined to the city of Hartford itself. Ordinances like these, tasked with keeping cities "orderly," continued throughout the early nineteen hundreds (Dougherty 2020). Additionally, the city of Hartford used scare tactics, such as rising taxes, threat of foreclosure, and demanding proof of occupancy to remove Black tenants from Hartford's southern, and at the time, whiter, neighborhoods (Tuckel et.al 2007, 715).

The city also practiced more explicit forms of segregation, such as blockbusting and redlining. During the 1930s and 1940s, banks routinely denied Black citizens mortgage loans (Dougherty 2020). If given the ability to buy a home, Black citizens were required to do so in certain sections of town (Dougherty 2020). These policies culminated in Black residents being relegated largely to the North End by the middle of the century. Once there, slumlords took advantage of the already precarious situation these families faced. Poorly constructed and crowded housing complexes, much like the ones previously seen in the foreign quarter, started to arise (Close 2013). City policy allowed this to happen, and turned a blind eye to the safety and health issues arising from these living arrangements (Close 2013).

When 1948 rang in the official end of redlining and blockbusting, made illegal by the federal government, the city of Hartford and surrounding areas no longer needed those tools (Dougherty 2020). Hartford's suburban neighborhoods successfully pushed people of color into the city proper, while Hartford's government further isolated them in the North End. This succeeded in creating a racialized ghetto within an already racialized city.

Selective Deindustrialization and Cementing Unequal Landscapes

The 1960's ushered in a period of rapid transformation for many aspects of Hartford's landscape. The combination of new political, economic, and social relations worked to create new institutions and geographies. This cemented some of the most fundamental divides present in the city. Paying particular attention to the compounding effects of shifting forms of capitalism and its entanglements with race, this section demonstrates how Hartford and surrounding areas continued to isolate and underserve the North End.

The most notable transition occurred within a greater current of economic change for the United States. Generally, manufacturing in the United States began to decline around the middle of the century. In Hartford, manufacturing jobs declined from its high of nearly 200,000 in 1950 to just 20,000 by 1970 (Bisson 2016, 2). In the decades following 1970, the factories that once lined Hartford's main streets grew empty and eventually fell to ruins. The closure of the Samuel Colt Factory in 1994 marked a symbolic end of this chapter of Hartford's history (Julien 1994). Touted to be the oldest, fondest story of Connecticut manufacturing, even the gun factory could not afford to keep its roots in Hartford. By the end of the twentieth century, Most of Hartford's middle class workers had lost their employment (Julien 1994). This was especially difficult given that many of those employed in the factories were Black and also received limited post-high school education, if any. In effect, deindustrialization worsened the position of already vulnerable populations in Hartford. Meanwhile, the insurance industry continued to thrive, as the United States economy transitioned mostly towards service. White collar workers continued to enjoy the job security and high salaries that came with these types of jobs (Bisson 2016, 3). This shift in employment opportunities reinforced the pre-existing economic divide. Those who worked on the factory floor, low-skilled, foreign, and African Americans workers, lost their livelihoods while the white, wealthier residents retained their employment.

At the same time, the entire city of Hartford became racially, politically, and economically segregated from Hartford County during the last half of the twentieth century. During the 1970s in particular, Hartford experienced a dramatic wave of white flight (Bisson 2016, 2). White flight refers to the movement of white, generally wealthy people to the outskirts or suburbs of an urban area. In Hartford, people often moved to the surrounding towns in Hartford County such as West Hartford, Avon, and Farmington. The motivations and means by which this transition occurred are worth analyzing because they helped to reinforce the ostracization of Hartford, and particularly the North End.

First, the completion of two major highways, I-84 and I-91 in the 1970s, facilitated white flight (Department of Transportation). The highways made it far easier for those working in the city to commute in and out each day (Lis 2012). Additionally the Department of Transportation built an interchange between the two highways within Hartford (Department of Transportation). This interchange physically bisected the city, which created a tangible barrier between the North End and the rest of Hartford. The area just below the interchange is Hartford's central business district. Most people who commute into Hartford head there. Just above the interchange is Downtown North, the area that would soon become a sea of parking lots due to disinvestment, and farther up, is the North End. The sea of parking lots exists as a physical manifestation of the damage of this interchange. People simply stopped coming to North Hartford. The highway routed commuters either through Hartford, or directly to the central business district (Department of Transportation). In effect, this highway prioritized the needs of commuters and Hartford's most profitable parts, such as those in the central business district, over the North End.

Secondly, the codification of a specific Connecticut phenomena, known as home rule, greatly exacerbated the effects of white flight. Home rule mandates that Connecticut towns be responsible for their own services and budgets, instead of a county government (Diller 2017, 1). This system officially began in 1960 with the abolishment of the county government system (Diller 2017, 2). Connecticut legislators dissolved county governments because they were seen as redundant, given that many municipalities already preferred the home rule system. Previously, county governments were able to collect county taxes, similar to state taxes, and share sales tax revenue across municipalities (Watson 1998). After 1960, however, municipalities remained wholly responsible for raising their own capital. This left the city of Hartford, already struggling with white flight and deindustrialization, to fend for itself financially without the help of its wealthier suburbs in Hartford County. Not only did this reinforce current inequities, but also created an economic need for Hartford to engage with the private sector and financial markets to make up the difference.

Overall, the last decades of the twentieth century strengthened the spatial divides within and around Hartford. These policies, while less overtly discriminatory than the ones discussed in the previous section, nonetheless helped to maintain the status quo of inequality surrounding Hartford and the North End.

The Making of the Post-Industrial City: Hartford Today

During the 1970s and 1980s, Hartford made its first attempts at recovery from the post-industrial fallout. The city engaged in urban renewal, a specific brand of redevelopment employed during this period. Broadly, urban renewal used federal funds and eminent domain to remake the less picturesque parts of cities in an attempt to boost the economy and keep cities from falling to ruins (Gans 1965). However, many urban renewal projects have come to be seen as failures (Gans 1965). In Hartford specifically, they often exacerbated economic and racial issues within the city. Although Hartford became increasingly more diverse in population by the year, insurance CEOs and bank executives held most of the power during the urban renewal age. In fact, they created a group known as “the Bishops,” that set the agenda for urban renewal projects (Gosselin 2017). The Bishops’ hoped to rebuild the downtown area, but only to suit their needs as heads of important industries in Hartford. They schemed to develop only the major corridors of the city, such as the Main Street in the Downtown area (Flanagan 2018, 20). Additionally, they sought to isolate Puerto Rican and other ethnic minorities from these redeveloped areas (Flanagan 2018, 20).

The Hartford Civic Center exists as the first and most iconic example of selective urban renewal in the city. The project was spearheaded by Aetna, a large insurance company located in Hartford. Some referred to the company as “Mother Aetna” during the Bishop era because of how influential its executives were on Hartford’s redevelopment (Gosselin 2017). The Civic Center opened in 1975 primarily as a sports arena for the Hartford Whalers, but also held a variety of events (Gosselin 2017). The Civic Center intended to generate revenue and cultural significance for Hartford’s downtown region through entertainment and sports, another trend in Hartford’s development history. However, this first attempt fell short. In 1978, the roof of the Civic Center collapsed, leaving the building unusable for two years (Gosselin 2017). The Civic Center project is emblematic of this era of Hartford’s development for a few reasons. First, the blatant exclusion of minority groups from the planning and benefits of redevelopment speaks to the continued spatial inequities in Hartford. Second, the role of the “Bishops” demonstrates Hartford’s continued prioritization of wealthier individuals. Finally, the collapse of the roof is symbolic of the structure issues present within Hartford that rendered the Civic Center poorly constructed and ineffective.

In the twenty-first century, the city continued to try out a creative economy approach, as prescribed by Florida. The city attempted to attract sports teams with new facilities. For example, the city, along with help from the Connecticut State Bond Commission and the Regional Development Authority, opened Rentschler Field and Dillion Stadium all in the 2010s (Gosselin 2017) (Cooper 2019). Using these agencies meant that Hartford alone did not shoulder the burden of redevelopment, but, in exchange, they did not own the properties. With these projects, Hartford's insurance and financial executives did not play large roles. This is because Hartford's insurance cluster weakened during this time. For example, The Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company merged with MutualMass in 1996, and moved its headquarters to Springfield, Massachusetts (Stowe 2003). Travelers Insurance Company merged with St. Paul Companies in 2002 to be headquartered in St. Paul (Stowe 2003). Even Aetna, once the kingpin of Hartford's service sector, has threatened to leave Hartford (Gosselin 2017). This meant that wealthy businesses no longer exist as sources of funding for economic development.

Hartford's history of inequalities leaves the city in a vulnerable economic position and leaves limited options for funding its own redevelopment. White flight and a culture of commuting continue to wreak havoc on Hartford's tax base. In a 2016 study, researchers found that over 80% of people working in Hartford commute in, meaning they do not live in the city (Flanagan 2018, 11). The average wage of a commuter is $80,000 (Flanagan 2018, 11). Meanwhile, those who commute out of the city for work earn a mere $40,000, illustrating a clear discrepancy between workers from the city and workers from the suburbs (Flanagan 2018, 11). This also gives an indication of the difference in income taxes collected in Hartford versus the surrounding suburbs. Additionally, Hartford continues to be short changed by the state's Payment in Lieu of Taxes (PILOT) program. This program allows municipalities to recover some of its lost revenue from tax-exempt properties, which in Hartford, totals 60% of properties

(Flanagan 2018, 22). However, the state of Connecticut severely underfunds the program, resulting in more than $376 million dollars in losses between 2011 and 2018 (Pilon 2019). This clearly demonstrates the human and infrastructural disinvestment in Hartford via the state government. Taken together, it illustrates how little tax revenue Hartford earns. Taken together, these factors force the city to rely on state or regional networks of support, giving them administrative control over the construction and operation of the projects or turn to the private sector through PPPs.

Conclusion

Ultimately, Hartford's spatial inequalities resulted from centuries of deliberate segregation, economic restructuring, and political decisions. Together, these inequalities succeeded in converting the once richest city in the country, to one of the poorest and most segregated. Hartford's prolonged economic turmoil guided Hartford to the private financial market for redevelopment support. Understanding the inequalities that precede them remains crucial to enacting positive change when attempting to redevelop under-resourced parts of the city.

Chapter 4

"We Can't Afford a Stadium, Some of Us Can't Even Afford a Home": How the Financing of DoNo Manifests Across Hartford's Divisions

The redevelopment of Hartford's Downtown North Region provides an illustrative example of the effects of increased financialization on a spatially polarized city. This chapter examines the financing of the first stage of DoNo's development and how the particulars of the deal mapped across Hartford's landscape of inequality and, actually, sought to exacerbate it. First, the work will situate the financial plan for the construction of DoNo Phase I, the baseball stadium. Next, I will explore the noted ways in which the financing of the baseball stadium exists along preexisting fault lines of inter and intra-urban divisions. Then, I demonstrate how DoNo's financing necessarily exacerbates social and economic inequality in Hartford. Finally, the chapter ends with a discussion of DoNo's future and how the city's reconceptualized plan might better deal with Hartford's unique contexts. Overall, I argue that Hartford's specific institutional, social, and economic arrangements prove to be important factors for how successful DoNo would become. Without paying attention to these contexts, Hartford's public-private partnership simply finances inequality.

Bonds and Baseball: An Analysis of DoNo's Financing Arrangement

The Downtown North Redevelopment Project intends to convert six parcels of vacant land just North of Hartford's highway interchange into over 1.5 million square feet of development (Office of Mayor Pedro Segarra 2014b). This development includes retail, office, and residential space (Planning and Zoning Commission 2008). The baseball stadium, now named Dunkin Donuts Stadium, anchors DoNo. It was the first project to be built and financed. On January 26, 2015, the city assembled the Hartford Stadium Authority, which received the task of funding the construction and maintenance of the baseball stadium (Hartford City Council 2015, 1). This arrangement is not uncommon for development projects in the state. Connecticut statutes allow municipalities to inaugurate public authorities to handle parks and other public projects (Connecticut General Statutes). With that responsibility, the group received the power to issue bonds and enter into agreements with developers, among other duties (Code of Ordinances). The group consists of five members, in which only one has been elected by the general population. That would be the City Treasurer, who is elected to a four year term. Also on the committee is the city's Chief Operating Officer, who is appointed by the Mayor. The City Council appoints the other three representatives whose only prerequisites are to hold "a background or experience in the fields of law, finance, accounting, marketing or public relations, sports or recreation, and construction" (Code of Ordinances). The members do not have to be Hartford residents (Code of Ordinances). Finally, the President of the City Council and Mayor may attend meetings, but may not vote (Code of Ordinances).

The Stadium Authority chose to pay for the stadium with municipal bonds, specifically lease revenue bonds. Lease revenue bonds allow for an initial sum of money to be collected from bond sales to purchase a property (Howard 2020). The money garnered from increased revenues of the property will, in theory, cover the interest payments due on the bonds. In the case of Hartford, the Stadium Authority issued $62,450,000 worth of lease revenue bonds on February 17, 2015 (DC Bonds 2015, 1). The bonds were issued with a 5% interest rate, meaning when the bonds were due, at their maturity date, the initial amount of the bond plus interest would be paid (DC Bonds 2015, 1). The bonds come to maturity in 2042, but buyers have the option to redeem the bonds in 2036 (DC Bonds 2015, 25). The bonds received an A+ rating, putting them in the upper-medium echelon according to the value of the bonds (DC Bonds 2015, 1). This means that crediting agencies gave their approval that these bonds would be a good investment for investors, indicating their trust that Hartford would not default on interest payments.

This brings to light an important aspect of the bond deal: the relationship between the Stadium Authority and the city of Hartford. The Stadium Authority blurs the lines between private enterprise and public body. The Authority assumes full responsibility of creating and selling the bonds (Code of Ordinances). The debt does not count towards Hartford's municipal debt, nor does it affect the city's bond rating (Code of Ordinances). This gives the Authority a wide berth in terms of setting the parameters for the stadium's financing. However, ultimately, the bond issuance must be voted on by the City Council (Code of Ordinances). The Council gave their approval in February 2015 via a simple majority vote (Stroller and Carlesso 2015). The bond issuance required a Council vote because the deal created financial responsibility for the city. The deal requires the city, not the Authority to pay approximately $4 million dollars a year in interest payments and other fees, including wages for lawyers and consultants, for 26 years (Haar 2015). Hartford planned to use increased sales and property taxes from the development to make these payments. However, the city remains obligated to make the payments regardless of the success of the stadium (DC Bonds 2015, 6). The city agreed to financial obligation because the city needed the capital for redevelopment. Once paid off, the Stadium Authority, which currently leases the property to Hartford, will transfer its ownership to the city (DC Bonds 2015, 14). Once transformed, the city will be able to extract revenue and property tax from the stadium.

There existed really only one other option for Hartford to finance the stadium, given the city's financial predicament. This would be a lease agreement between the developer and the city, instead of between the Stadium Authority and the city. In this arrangement, the developer, DoNo LLC, would purchase the property, and the city would pay annual lease payments to the developer. The city rejected this plan because it would cost approximately $22 million dollars more in the long run than issuing municipal bonds (Haar 2015). The savings accumulate because municipalities can borrow at lower interest rates than private companies (Haar 2015). For a cash-strapped city such as Hartford, savings like this matter. However, as will be discussed below, carrying the burden of increased debt obligations through the Stadium Authority left the city in an economically and socially precarious place.

Exposing the Divisions: DoNo's Financing Across a Cartography of Inequality

The issuance of bonds by the Stadium Authority preserved structures and practices that led to the North End being the most economically and socially disadvantaged section of the city and Hartford as one of the poorest municipalities in Connecticut. This occurred because the bond agreement did not take local contexts into account. Instead, the agreement simply injected the risks and rewards of finance across preexisting power relations.

The very first step in the financing process, the decision to create a public stadium authority to issue bonds, allowed the city to have access to a large amount of capital without involving the public. The city was able to issue the bonds through the Stadium Authority without the seal of approval from Hartford residents. This happened because Hartford's City Charter does not require a referendum vote for any type of bond issuance (City Charter 2002, 51). According to the "Official Statement" released by DC Bonds regarding Hartford Stadium Authority's lease revenue bonds, under city charter bonds are issued only through a simple majority of City Council members (DC Bonds 2015, 63). As a result, the Stadium Authority had the ability to leverage large amounts of international capital without a public referendum. The public could only stop the issuance of the bonds if, within thirty days of the bonds issuance, a petition signed by three percent of the electorate is presented to the City Council, which would cause the city to issue a referendum on the bonds in the next election (DC Bonds 2015, 63). This option, however, remained elusive and complicated. Given that it was never mentioned in the three public hearings regarding the project, citizens might not have even been aware of that part of the legislation. No matter the explanation, this effectively silenced Hartford residents. This is problematic because not only are Hartford residents, particularly North End residents, most directly affected by the stadium, all of Hartford remains responsible for the interest payments.

Had the issuance of bonds for the baseball stadium been put to a referendum, the project's future likely would not have been so certain. Many residents passionately opposed DoNo and its accompanying baseball stadium and said so in their public statements during the hearings (Office of Mayor Pedro Segarra 2014b,c,d). Some voiced concerns regarding the financing arrangement, which required the city of Hartford, and its taxpayers, to back the bonds in the event the revenue from the stadium could not cover the interest payments. Mrs. Tillman, for example, who likened Hartford to a toilet bowl without enough money to pay for toilet paper, points to a disconnect between Hartford's expensive vision and whimpering wallet (Office of Mayor Pedro Segarra 2014b,c,d). Others, who may not have explicitly named the financing as their main complaint, might have used the ballot as a referendum for the project as a whole. The creation of the Hartford Stadium Authority and the powers bestowed upon it to issue bonds allowed for the city developers to have direct access to the capital they needed without the public intervening. This arrangement undermined the people of the North End's ability to make their own decisions regarding their community, which left residents no choice but to simply accept the plans of those in positions of higher power than them such as government officials and developers. This situation appears all too familiar for North End residents, who are historically and contemporarily marginalized. Comments from the public forums confirmed this. "Why should we trust you (Hartford's government) with our money?" one woman questioned and others echoed (Office of Mayor Pedro Segarra 2014b). This demonstrates the level of distrust already present between Hartford residents and city leaders. Not putting DoNo's proposal to a city wide vote only exacerbated this distrust.

Hartford bypassed community involvement in the financing of DoNo for a simple logistical reason: money. Hartford, being a cash-strapped city, could not have afforded to finance the baseball stadium through their own tax revenue. Additionally, Hartford received no support from state and inter-municipal agencies that have the ability to finance redevelopment projects. For example, the State of Connecticut Bond Commission exists to facilitate the use of bond financing for redevelopment and public works projects. The commission approves financing projects, takes ownership of the property, and uses the authority of the state, and state taxpayers, as assurance for repayment (State Bond Commission). The Bond Commission is no stranger to redevelopment projects in Hartford, particularly stadiums. The state facilitated the redevelopment of Rentschler Field, where the University of Connecticut Huskies play football, Dillion Stadium, a soccer field attempting to attract a professional team, and the XL Center, home to Uconn's basketball teams (Carlesso 2018). In each case, the state led the development, allowing Hartford to reap the benefits of the project, but shielding them from having to bear the burden of bond repayment. Similarly, Capital Region Redevelopment Agency, a quasi-public entity that finances redevelopment projects in Hartford and surrounding towns and was established by the state of Connecticut, also chose not to aid in the financing of the stadium (Capital Region Redevelopment Agency). Finally, as stated previously, Connecticut's tax policies are governed by a system of "home-rule," meaning tax monies cannot be shared across county lines, ultimately keeping the tax money of those in the suburbs, who likely would be using the as well stadium, from aiding in the building of the stadium.

Taken together, the state of Connecticut and the Capital Region Redevelopment Agency made divisive decisions not to aid in the financing of the baseball stadium. This decision was made in spite of state and regional officials recognizing that the city's bond deal was a bad idea. Then governor Dannel Malloy admitted that he had "not been a fan of this transaction" and made no attempt to hide his discontent (Altimari 2016). Whether intentionally or not, by choosing non-intervention the state allowed its capital city, and its most economically precarious municipality, to assume a large amount of risk with no safety net. Meanwhile, people across the state would get to enjoy the benefits of the stadium once built. This aligns with Hartford County and the state of Connecticut's positionality regarding Hartford. The city gets used as the capitol seat and an insurance cluster, but the people living there remain overlooked. This illustrates how the financing arrangement mirrors pre-existing divisions, by existing without state or regional funding sources, and how, in turn, the financing left Hartford even more economically vulnerable. Given that the stadium could not have happened without a financialization scheme similar to this, this arrangement demonstrates a fundamental issue present within post-industrial redevelopment financing.

Deepening Divisions: Hartford's Misplaced Faith in DoNo's Future

DoNo's financing not only exposes previously created inequalities, it also exacerbates them. Plainly, the issuing of bonds places steep expectations on the city's future. Like Rachel Weber suggests, Hartford essentially sold its city's future. In the case of Hartford, the Stadium Authority issued bonds, and the city promised to pay the interest. These payments amount to a little more than four million dollars a year for the next twenty years after issuance, according to Hartford's then Treasurer (Haar 2015). Hartford intended to use the revenue from the stadium to make these payments. Given that the city ended 2014 in nearly a $14 million dollar deficit and the previous year with only a $265,000 surplus, the city banked on the stadium providing the revenue for these payments, as its financial situation remained precarious (DC Bonds 2015, 73).

To ensure that the stadium would garner enough revenue, the city and developers envisioned a very particular look for the rest of DoNo. This look, in notable ways, diverged significantly from the actual landscape. The Hartford Planning and Zoning Commission's assessment of the Downtown North redevelopment bluntly states, "In the early phases, the housing proposed by the Developer will need to cater to young professionals based on market demand" (City of Hartford 2014, 6). City officials believed that the success of this project hinged on DoNo's ability to attract young professionals, which is a starkly different demographic than the one currently in the North End. This very closely aligns with Florida's suggestions on catalyzing urban growth. As a result, DoNo always appeared to be a vision bound up with the needs and wants of the young, urban class, as Hartford planned on paying for the rest of DoNo with their tourism. Integration with current North End residents is not explicitly mentioned in the plan. Given that the plan also requires the arrival of young professionals for market demand, the city demonstrates its emphasis on abiding by the pricing system of the housing market. There existed no explicit plans to combat this with affordable housing or rental ceilings in DoNo in its original plan. This illustrates how DoNo's vision includes a very specific group of people who the city hopes will bring wealth to the city, but is not reflective of North Hartford residents.

These priorities are reflected in noted changes to the Downtown North area. They exist specifically to accommodate the creative class. First, DoNo caters heavily to those with the means to drive there. DoNo's vision includes over eight hundred square feet of parking throughout the six parcels (City of Hartford 2014, 6). At first, this appears ironic, because Mayor Pedro Segarra sold this plan to Hartford residents as a way to mitigate the "sea of parking lots" plaguing Downtown North (Office of Mayor Pedro Segarra 2014b). From this statement to DoNo's vision, it appears that Mayor Segarra meant that he wanted to turn the capitalistically unproductive sea of parking lots into a money-making sea of parking lots.

Additionally, part of implementing DoNo's development plan includes realigning two streets and decommissioning one (City of Hartford 2014, 4). These proposed changes attempt to alleviate traffic congestion around the ballpark and streamline DoNo as a place (City of Hartford, 4). Overall, these two elements of DoNo's plan demonstrate that city officials and developers intend to use DoNo to attract outsiders. The fact that many people in the North End of Hartford do not have cars and usually rely on public transportation (Lindsey 2020) supports this work's assertion that DoNo is not intended to serve the populations of Hartford's North End. As Hartford's suburbs house the region's wealthiest, most mobile populations, it becomes evident that DoNo is catered towards igniting a back to the city movement, either to live or to visit, of the creative class that currently surrounds and works in Hartford. Unfortunately, this movement, if realized, would only exaggerate the divisions between North End residents and Hartford's more affluent areas.

Finally, a large selling point of DoNo that reappears across planning documents and public forums is DoNo's emphasis on the streetscape. Streetscapes refer to the buildings, walkways, and general visual experience of a landscape (Merriam-Webster Dictionary). The Downtown North Redevelopment Plan mentions improving facades and streetscapes (City of Hartford 2014, 10), while the plan's renderings include manicured streets and walking paths lined with trees (City of Hartford 2014, 6). This creates a space that is pedestrian friendly and aesthetically pleasing. The official goal of this vision is to create more traffic for local businesses in the area (City of Hartford 2014, 10). The logic is that someone coming to watch the Friday night baseball game will be enticed to look around and spend time and money in local businesses.

These modifications produce a landscape with a very specific purpose. While the original intention of DoNo was to act as a bridge between the North End and Hartford's more economically advantaged Main Street, DoNo's vision lends itself to acting more like an enclave, than a bridge. The work of Boyer helps to illuminate why. Boyer, in talking about modern day cities, introduces the concept of the city tableaux. The tableaux is a pocket of development existing in a larger city (Boyer 1992, 184). Boyer argues that cities do not develop as a whole, as in with one plan in mind, but instead develop in fragments, creating areas of neglect and areas of profitability (Boyer 1992, 184). The areas of high profitability, tableaus, act as such because they have been carefully curated to evoke certain emotions and memories (Boyer 1992, 191). Within the tableaux, architecture, storefronts, and walkways, are all specifically curated to generate narrative patterns, or memory devices that help to establish meanings within places (Boyer 1992, 188). In this way, the goal of a tableaux is for a person to step inside and experience a sort of alternative reality where people feel relaxed, but also curious. In doing so, the tableaux becomes set aside from the city as a whole. It exists as its own entity, with its own emotional and economic significance from the rest of the urban landscape.

DoNo's vision intends to create a tableaux. Through its beautiful streetscapes and charming businesses it hopes to attract, DoNo attempts to build a landscape completely separate from that of the North End, which, in the minds of outsiders, evokes feelings of fear and images of poverty. Using this framework, the metaphor of DoNo as a bridge between Main Street and North Hartford falls apart. As a tableaux, DoNo will create an experience for outsiders contained within the six parcels of land it will develop. Within that boundary, DoNo will work hard to curate that specific image. Tied together with the previous discussion of automobiles, people will move from the private spaces of their cars to the privatized public space of DoNo, where all aspects of the landscape are carefully attended to. In this way, outsiders will never need to, nor have the desire to leave because the emotions and desire created from the tableaux wear off once one steps outside of it, and venture into the North End. As a result, DoNo, in constant pursuit of the young, urban market due to the burdens placed on the city by interest payments, will never succeed in integrating the North End community with Downtown North. This is because it mirrors previous attempts at development, such as the Bishops, by isolating enclaves of productive and unproductive Hartford. In the case of this project, Downtown North becomes a productive space, while little is done to do the same for the marginalized community of North Hartford. Overall, this arrangement only stands to exacerbate inequalities already plaguing the city.

A Future Foretold?: DoNo's Current Predicament and Reimagination

After raising sufficient funds to start the project, DoNo LLC broke ground on the baseball stadium in 2015. Quickly, problems began to emerge. The project, which was expected to be completed in time for the spring 2016 baseball season, was chronically over budget and behind schedule. The completion date came and went in Hartford, with no sign of the finish line. Eventually, the Stadium Authority revoked the developer's insurance bond, fired them, and finished the stadium with a different company (Carlesso and Gosselin 2017). Dunkin Donuts Stadium finally opened in the Spring of 2017 (Carlesso and Gosselin 2017). In its three years of play, baseball games at the stadium have become quite popular, even selling out many games. However, the revenue generated from the full capacity of the stadium fails to cover the $4 million interest payments (Carlesso 2019). Meanwhile, the rest of DoNo, which would have helped make up the difference, stood at a standstill for three years while DoNo LLC and Hartford ligated over the firing (Carlesso 2019).

This outcome says a lot about financing agreements and public-private partnerships. The developer's inability to deliver a stadium on time and one budget reflects an ever present danger with public-private partnerships: the added risk of the private sector. In Hartford's case, the city assumed the risks, the interest payments, of the stadium on the promise that the developers would execute their end of the deal. When the developers did not deliver, they received the consequence of being fired and sued. While this clearly hurt the company, it does not equal the consequences borne by the city of Hartford. In the three years since the firing, Hartford continues to spend money it cannot afford to make interest payments on the stadium. The rest of DoNo remains unmaterialized. Because the two sides battled in court, the sea of parking lots remained just that. This illustrates one of the largest inequalities that exists in public-private partnerships, that the private entity will never be asked to sacrifice as much as the municipality.

This outcome also further demonstrates how the financing agreement widens pre-existing inequalities. First, Hartford's indebtedness made DoNo's vision of the historical tableaux even more of a necessity, as opposed to a desired outcome. Because Hartford's financial situation remains worse than when the project started, it requires the wealth of the creative class even more now. In turn, this heightens the city's desire to cater to Hartford's productive corridors over the less productive areas, such as the North End. Additionally, the state of Connecticut in 2018 bailed out Hartford because the city faced imminent bankruptcy (Carlesso 2019). Because of its large debt obligations, partly including the interest payments, Hartford remained in real danger of default. To prevent this, the state of Connecticut assumed Hartford's general obligation debts (Carlesso 2019). However, it refused to assume the debts from the baseball stadium and further denied the city the ability to use taxes on ticket sales from games to pay the debt (Carlesso 2019). This reflects the profound inequality between the state of Connecticut and its capital city. The state allowing Hartford to continue to pay for the stadium only further inhibits the city's ability to improve its economic situation.

While Hartford's relationship with DoNo caused the city political and economic turmoil, the project remains ongoing. In fact, as of 2021, the first part of DoNo, including restaurants and housing, just broke ground. The city selected a new developer, and seems to have reimagined DoNo with more care for the pre-existing landscape. Now called North Crossing, the project will largely be financed by the Capital Region Development Authority (Gosselin 2021). This injection of money also means that the city will be able to put more affordable housing in the space, which would not have been possible otherwise (Gosselin 2021). This is a positive sign for the project and the city. By harnessing capital and dispersing risk more equitably across Hartford's metropolitan area, the project becomes less risky for Hartford residents. Additionally, adding affordable housing to the plan shows a desire to aid, rather than further ostracize Hartford's low income residents, which illustrates a greater care for overcoming the large economic divide present in the city. This creates a bit of optimism. It now appears as though both the developers and the city are more seriously taking into account Hartford's landscape, and are being more particular about how to best finance and construct the project to avoid the mistakes of the past. Hopefully, this will result in more meaningful development for the residents of Hartford.

Conclusion

Overall, the financing of DoNo held little regard for Hartford's landscape. This meant that the injection of finance, via bonds, simply mapped over the landscape, exposing and threatening to widen inequalities that previously existed. I argue that the project introduced risk into communities that were already marginalized, while promising benefits to communities that already benefit from Hartford County's spatial arrangement. This attempt at redevelopment, unfortunately, ended poorly for Hartford. Only through reimagining the development project with a greater eye towards Hartford's particular contexts, can the city hope to create positive change and sustainable economic growth for those who need it most

Chapter 5

"Stop Dividing the City": Reimagining Post-Industrial Urban Finance

Here, I have attempted to answer the questions raised at the beginning of this work by the residents of Hartford: what will DoNo do for Hartford and its North End communities? In its original form, I argue, not much, I argue. Analyzing the particulars of the financing arrangement within the city's public-private partnership reveals that little attention was paid to Hartford's pre-existing spatial inequalities. This proved to be a fatal mistake for the project. As Hartford and the Stadium Authority began financing the baseball stadium, it became clear that the project kept open and threatened to widen these economic and social divisions.

This case study allows me to articulate a greater point about financing in the post industrial city. Not every city experiences intense inequalities like Hartford, but every city remains steeped in local institutional, social, and racial contexts. This work argues that these contexts matter a lot. In fact, as seen in Hartford, a city's pre-existing landscape might just be a determining factor in understanding how effective a financed-based redevelopment project can be. Theorists like Smith, Theordore and Brenner emphasize that local situations remain paramount in interpreting large phenomena, such as neoliberalism, on the urban scale. This work takes that assertion a step further to argue that, without taking local contexts into account, the private sector will not be able to create meaningful, positive differences for the local community. Ultimately, the devil really is in the details. If left unchecked, financial arrangements distribute the risks and rewards of projects across all too familiar lines of privilege. As seen in Hartford, the city assumed more risk than the surrounding cities and the North End assumed more risk than the city's Central Business District. The private sector simply does not provide protections for marginalized groups within the public-private partnership framework.

Why Should We Care?: Contextualizing Hartford in the Greater Post-Industrial Struggle

Cities like Hartford, Detroit, Pittsburgh, etc., continue to ponder the best way to emerge from their post-industrial slumps. As urban entrepreneurs, they are forced to reckon with how to finance their redevelopment projects most effectively. This becomes particularly precarious in poorer cities, who are forced to engage in riskier arrangements to attract private investment. Meaningful scholarship into how financial markets interact with the post-industrial landscape can help give municipalities the tools and language necessary to understand the risks they are assuming and how those risks distribute themselves across groups of people. This can allow urban governments and residents to balance the power within the public-private partnership. Private entities hedge their investments with high interest rates and diverse portfolios, whereas cities do not have that luxury. Knowing the implications of these arrangements allows cities to have more knowledge and negotiating power when creating a public-private partnership.

Meanwhile, these projects and their financing create profound changes on the landscape. Whether positive or negative, the effects remain significant. For example, a project meant to create wealth for the city often involves attracting wealthy people to the city. This can lead to gentrification, rising rents and changing demographics, or enclaves, where benefits remain concentrated among a certain group of people. For underserved populations, this can make living in the city unpleasant or even unattainable. When these changes become noticeable, it may be too late for municipalities to impose rent controls or other measures to stop their rapidly transforming neighborhoods. Having a greater understanding of how these projects, especially their financing, can help municipalities better decide which projects to fund and how. Additionally, it can allow municipalities to get ahead of these transformations to selectively plan to at least better control their outcomes so as to not exclude previous residents from assuming the benefits of these projects.

The Future of Development Projects: Can They Ever Be Sustainable?

The work of this thesis brings to light an important question regarding the viability of development projects. Following the argument presented here, one might be wondering if financed based development projects can enact positive change in their communities. Can financing ever be a sustainable way to redevelop a city? Unfortunately, there exists no concrete answers to this question. Many urban scholars and policy makers continue to develop analyses and best practices for urban development. This work closes out by suggesting some ways in which cities can generate wealth and improve the lives of their citizenry without experiencing all of the risks associated with public-private partnerships.

First, and seemingly most obviously, public-private partnerships must include the public. Community members must feel included, listened to, and respected throughout the process. As seen in Hartford, DoNo remained largely unpopular among residents, which led to resistance and increased distrust between government officials and the population. However, most residents were interested in discussing alternative forms of development. Many concerned residents voiced their opinions regarding where funding and energy should go. For example, one resident talked of renovations and increased resources to the public libraries instead of the baseball stadium. When a redevelopment project does not heed the concerns of the people, but is built anyway, it sends a clear message that the project is not for them.

DoNo actually did respond to community feedback in one particular instance, which serves as a positive example for how governments should be listening to community voices. DoNo's original plan presented at Hartford's first community meeting did not include a grocery store (Office of Mayor Pedro Segarra 2014b). Subsequently that night, many residents spoke passionately about the North End's food desert and advocated that the DoNo, if created, include a grocery store. In the next meeting, a town council debate, the project included a grocery store (Office of Mayor Pedro Segarra 2014c). At that meeting, a representative from the grocery store chain spoke to many of the citizen's concerns, including its size and offerings (Office of Mayor Pedro Segarra 2014c). While developers remain skeptical that "grocery stores do not drive growth," community activists held the developers accountable for keeping a grocery store in the plans (Office of Mayor Pedro Segarra 2014b). Governments should put aside their growth and profit generating mindset to, above all, care for the residents surrounding the development. In the case of Hartford, this did only come after significant backlash from the original plan. Ideally, citizens would be involved at every stage of the planning process. Focus groups, community discussions, and even community led-projects all are great avenues for increasing resident involvement from the beginning.

Second, as mentioned above, the public should not assume the most amount of risk in a public-private partnership. This arrangement causes tremendous harm to municipalities, whose citizens ultimately bear the costs of redevelopment regardless of whether or not benefits will materialize. The public-private partnership can be reimagined, allowing the private agent to assume more of the risk. Perhaps, the interest payments to the private sector from the public sector can become more fluid. This might mean that if a project underperforms, a municipality can opt to pay less in interest until it has the ability to do so. In this arrangement, the city will not put its own credit ratings, tax rates, and overall health of its budget at risk to be able to make interest payments. Additionally, governments should be able to better control how their neighborhoods change as a result of redevelopment. For example, they could impose rent controls to prevent luxury housing complexes from increasing fair market values on apartments. Governments and citizens can also work together to assert more control in deciding which businesses can operate in which neighborhoods. This can help to ensure that residents are getting their needs met and voices heard, and are not simply made to watch their neighborhood become gentrified for wealthy outsiders. Finally, public-private partnerships can mandate that the private entity invest in the urban landscape in some meaningful way other than the redevelopment project. To use the example of Hartford, perhaps the developer, in addition to being paid to build the stadium, offers to spend a certain amount of their revenue on library renovations. This gets the private entity more involved in the urban fabric and provides a benefit for the city.

Hartford as the Spark

Ultimately, I decided to study Hartford to help conceptualize my own experiences living in Hartford County, and to understand why Connecticut's own capital city remains such an enigma. In this way, I designed my project to contribute not only to the growing body of literature on post-industrial cities, but also to study Hartford in a meaningful way. Throughout my research, the word "spark" came up alot. Developers consistently argued that the baseball stadium was the spark the city needed to redevelop Downtown North. However, after studying Hartford, I believe the city's brightest spark is its own people. Looking past Hartford's reputation in the media, one will see a vibrant city, filled with businesses built with love, passionate activists, and many people who simply care about the city and its residents. In other words, will baseball be the spark to redevelopment in Hartford? No. Can Hartford achieve meaningful development that benefits North End residents as much as wealthy suburbs? That answer depends on the willingness of the local and state governments to ignite the spark that already exists within the city.

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