Postcolonial Negotiations of Neoliberalism & Revolution at the State University of Zanzibar

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Contents

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Abstract

Since the entrance of Arab intellectual culture onto Zanzibar, the Indian Ocean archipelago has long been recognized as a generations-deep haven for intellectually revolutionary dialogue and collectivism. Today however, in postcolonial Zanzibar, where revolutionary legacies once ushered in the hope of an emancipatory sociopolitical order characterized by progressive African socialism and egalitarian home rule, the impingement of a neoliberal global regime—the political economic order that supposes that human wellbeing and freedom are best advanced by industrial liberalization, private-market freedoms, unobstructed property rights, and free trade[1]—has thrown revolutionary dreams of governance, independent nationhood, and political identity into flux. While the neoliberal prioritization of "technological rationality" ("the quantification of life based predominantly on market productivity rather than social capability")[2] has promoted sociopolitical dislocation and alienation, Zanzibar's genealogical revolutionary ideology has once again come under threat.

Amidst these tensions, this thesis will examine the case of a prominent public institution of neoliberal birth, The State University of Zanzibar (SUZA), and ask whether it can meaningfully serve as a contemporary agent for Zanzibar's legacy of intellectual revolutionary dialogue. We examine SUZA not because its situation is isolated to the institution itself or even Zanzibar, but because the capacity of Zanzibari educational

[1] David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism,* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University, 2007), p. 2.
[2] Angela Chatterji. *Postcolonial research as relevant practice* (2001), p. 2.

spaces to mirror broader ideological negotiations fits into a larger, global pattern of university politics. By examining Zanzibar in focus, we can meaningfully address geographically-specific neoliberal developments while also better understanding Zanzibar's place in this present global political shift. Therefore, this thesis is questioning the capacity of SUZA and the East African university to host revolutionary dialogues in the age of neoliberalism, which allows us to consider implications for the revolutionary futures of Zanzibar and postcolonial East Africa. If this work is to find that a leading, ideology-setting university can no longer serve as a conduit of revolutionary discourse, then one is forced to grapple with the deep permeability of the neoliberal order—which leads us to the question (which will not be answered in this work) of where revolutionary thought may be found and fostered in the crisis era of globalized neoliberalism.

Introduction: On Identity

Given its historical space as a magnet of the diasporic system of Indian Ocean exchange, Zanzibar has oft been heralded as a cosmopolitan site of revolutionary dialogue, Islamic intellectualism, and globalized academic thought. That being said, these revolutionary moments and intellectual heights have long been filled with their own contradictions, as the diasporic network that Zanzibar sits within is fertile ground for the destabilization of ideologically entangled identities that have shifted throughout periods of colonialism, post-colonialism, nationalism, and neoliberalism. These have consequently brought conceptions of nationhood, political identity, and indigeneity into nearly perpetual states of unsettlement. Since the entrant of British colonists onto Zanzibar which introduced tensions not just between Swahili populations, but also between the Arab population that had previously colonized the territory, the meanings of "settler" and "native" have brought with them concurrently layered and contradictory notions of ethnicity, subjection, and power. The tensions undergirding these enormously unsettled statuses and identities have therefore rendered revolution an unfinished, generations-long process.

At certain points in the past 100 years (this thesis will elaborate on several of these key moments), Zanzibari spaces of intellectualism have reflected the complex statuses of these generations-long ideological negotiations. This thesis explores how intellectual spaces within the Zanzibari archipelago have historically witnessed and

experienced colonial co-optation while finding ways to express genealogies of revolutionary resistance. In the past 60 years, these globally significant revolutionary dialogues—noted by their once-great interest to American Black nationalist leaders, especially Malcolm X[3]—have again been co-opted; this time, by a globalized neoliberalism aligned with Western states and financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank.

The ideology of neoliberalism, which seeks to bring all human action—material and nonmaterial—into the realm of the private market[4] as a (primarily) US-imposed means of fighting off perceived threats of populist, socialist, and communist movements,[5] has touched all parts of human life across the globe. Not only have neoliberal policies completely reshaped global economic and political power structures, they've also been responsible for a marketization of "dominant set[s] of social practices, values, and norms"[6] that have cumulatively resulted in a spike in class and regional inequalities across the globe (a consequence that has been especially stark in southern Africa).[7] Today, the tension between a deeply-entrenched neoliberal order and revolutionary thought has (expectedly) migrated into the university, where it poses a threat to the capacity of this revered institution to serve as a conduit of revolutionary dialogues.

To be clear, revolution itself is a contested term. As this thesis will underscore, moments of revolution have not necessarily been exclusively progressive or emancipatory in nature. For one, an examination of the atrocities committed by the forces

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[3] Seth M. Markle, *A Motorcycle on Hell Run: Tanzania, Black Power, and the Uncertain Future of Pan-Africanism, 1964-1974*, (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University, 2017), p. 25.
[4] Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism,* p. 3.
[5] Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism,* p. 28.
[6] Jörg Wiegratz & Elge Cesnulyte, *Money talks: moral economies of earning a living in neoliberal East Africa*, (2016), p.18.
[7] Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism,* p. 203.

of John Okello, a leader of the Zanzibar revolution, unto the territory's Arab and Asian Muslims elucidates this principle. Although the revolution was one hailed by the likes of Malcolm X all the way across the world for its powerful expression of African power and agency, the same movement also witnessed a dark side. As the revolutionary movement raged, Arab families were murdered in the bush, Asian houses were pillaged, and non-European deaths rose into the several thousands.[8] As Okello and revolutionary parties fought to wrestle Zanzibari rule away from settler powers, there's a tragic irony in the fact that his forces oversaw a reinscription of massacres and burnings which "bore the character of the pogroms of European history."[9] [10] Future movements aiming to strengthen home rulership in the postcolonial era, which continued to invoke violence and mass expulsion, rode on the back of these atrocities. The violences of budding nationalist ideologies, which would eventually be narrated and debated in revolutionary Tanzanian university discourses, were therefore intrinsically linked to the racial and ethnically-motivated bloodshed carried out by Okello (amongst others). Therefore, to label "revolution," either in political practice or educational discourse, as inherently "emancipatory" would be false and inevitably glaze over threads of violence and injustice woven through contested moments of revolution. Thus, for the purpose of this thesis, "revolution" in education should not be thought of as an act of emancipation in and of itself, but as the provision of a platform for free intellectual ferment (as coined by

[8] Anthony Clayton, *The Zanzibar Revolution and its Aftermath*, (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1981), p. 81.
[9] Clayton, *The Zanzibar Revolution and its Aftermath*, p. 81.
[10] It's even more tragic to understand, as will be explained further, that these lethal racial animosities were—to a large extent—a product of the colonial mission of misconstructing convoluted racial categories through class terms. These sorts of misconstructions have proven to be some of colonialism's more sinister relics, as they leave generations-long ideological imprints complicating (as this thesis will explain) the inextricability of identity and political ideology in the Zanzibari context. T.O. Beidelman engages with these struggles that have made modern Tanzania unable to entirely escape this colonial imprint in his book *The Culture of Colonialism: The Cultural Subjection of Ukaguru*.

Mahmood Mamdani), which can act as its own catalyst for social and ideological emancipation.[11] This catalytic dispensation departs from the neoliberal co-optation of education, which offers a framework of knowledge maintaining imperial economic practice by prioritizing commercial productivity and "empire ideology" (as described by Nnanna Onuoha Arukwe)[12] over tenets of Mamdani's ideologically democratizing intellectual ferment.

As this thesis meditates on the central question of whether the Zanzibari university may still host anti-imperialist, subversive revolutionary ideologies amidst an entrenched neoliberal political order, it will consider three primary focuses within an examination of SUZA. First, it will historicize the intellectual legacy of revolutionism in Zanzibar before studying the university's interactions with Zanzibari party politics, which are marked by conflict between the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi and the challenging Civic United Front and ACT-Wazalendo, and are ultimately shaped by a decades-long legacy of Western-imposed fiscal conditionalities that have constructed the very foundation of the African liberal order and inform Tanzania's interactions with an increasingly globalized economy. While situating SUZA relative to the leaders of a neoliberal government, this study will elucidate the dissonance between the Revolutionary Government's historical rhetoric and platform, and by illuminating SUZA's close governmental relationship, work to position SUZA within Zanzibar's broader political negotiations of independence, revolution, globalized neoliberalism, and subjectedness. Second, the thesis will investigate SUZA's private and public overseas

[11] This being said, it should be noted that even in revolutionary educational contexts, broader political power dynamics have not necessarily been absent. For instance, in the next pages, as *al-Falaq* is explored, consider the impact of the publication with contextual understanding of the class-based preference that Arab elites often enjoyed over native Zanzibaris and mainland African migrants.

[12] Nnanna Onuoha Arukwe, *Teaching Emancipatory Postcolonial Knowledge: An African University Teacher's Experience*, (2014), p. 181.

financial partnerships that illuminate who (on a global scale) is narrating SUZA's institutional ideology. Understanding the global forces that narrate this ideology will aid in deciphering the ways that the Zanzibari university interacts with neoliberal dialogues that undercut the imperatives of the anti-imperial East African nation. Finally, it will examine who is granted access to those programs that are most privileged within the institution, as well as what knowledges those students are consuming. For what sake have the disciplines most conducive to substantive intellectual ferment and long-term measures of self-sustaining development been displaced, and what have they been displaced for? In this work, we uncover the dominant ideologies that SUZA is arming its students with as they equip themselves, in turn, to narrate the ideologies of other institutions of power across Tanzania.

At the end of the day, as this thesis will emphasize, there is no "final word" on the history, or current status, of revolutionary resistance in Zanzibar, nor within SUZA. The inequivalence of revolution to emancipation is an inevitable reminder of the incompleteness of resistance imperatives, and the exact extent of this incompleteness cannot be justly measured. Thus, this thesis will not act as a prescriptive body. Instead, it will act as a diagnostic tool to better recognize where the status of revolutionary resistance and intellectual ferment in SUZA and the East African university may currently stand.

Chapter I: A History of Zanzibar's Revolutionary Entanglements

The year is 1929, and the Arab Association of Zanzibar has just begun circulating *al-Falaq*, an Arabic newspaper that will soon become a prominent mouthpiece for the organization and a central press organ for Arab Muslims in Zanzibar.[13] It's been nearly 30 years since the territory became a British protectorate. In the present British colonial system, the territory, like many others, struggles under resource-limitation and is hamstrung by racist colonial frameworks for success measurement.[14] Needless to say, despite its long-held existence in Zanzibar, the preservation of a deeply-rooted Arabic academic tradition is not part of the European colonial mission, and the academic legacy that is so central to Arab Muslim influence in the territory is in high tension with colonial educational policies. To be clear, this isn't Zanzibar's first brush with the encroachment of settler politics, for even before British ships landed on East African soil, it was Omani Arabs of the Ibadi Muslim faith—who would come, for a long period of time, to constitute the ruling elite and intelligentsia class of Zanzibar[15]—that were imposing non-native rulership. There's a certain irony to the sociopolitical space that the Arabs occupied in Zanzibar, given their simultaneous engagement with globalized anticolonial dialogue and colonization of a native East African population, especially since even the Arab elite would eventually come under British colonialism. As these Arabs responded to

[13] Amal N. Ghazal, *The Other Frontiers of Arab Nationalism: Ibadis, Berbers, and the Arabist-Salafi Press in the Interwar Period*, (2010), p. 115.
[14] Peter Kallaway, *The Changing Face of Colonial Education in Africa: Education, Science, and Development,* (Cape Town, SA: African Sun Media, 2021), p. 47.
[15] Amal N. Ghazal, *Islamic reform and Arab nationalism : expanding the crescent from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean (1880s-1930s)*, (New York, NY: Routledge, 2010), p. 1.

significant victimization by the European colonial mission between the late 19th and mid 20th centuries, it's strikingly paradoxical, as Amal Ghazal recognized, that their prior governance had, in fact, been "centered on colonial policies of the Arab world — most specifically in Palestine."[16] [17] To illustrate, take the Zanzibari clove plantations owned by Arab settlers since the early 19th century: these plantations, which were to a great extent fueled by bustling transcontinental ivory and slave trades, drew on the same historically Middle Eastern antecedents that *also* undergirded global European plantation culture.[18] Before the British arrived en masse to Zanzibar and colonized its Swahili, Arab, and Asian populations, the archipelago was already negotiating an Arabic colonial process steeped in many of the same roots that were informing European colonization elsewhere. In understanding this, the complexity of Arab identity in Zanzibar becomes clearer: an identity characterized simultaneously by subjectedness and subjectation, one that complicates shifting notions of "settler" and "native."

This complication of settler and native identity in Zanzibar is critical to examine and recognize before moving forward, as Zanzibar's ideological negotiations actively interrogate the shifting, indefinite, and layered notions of settler versus native, revolution versus independence, and postcolonialism versus emancipation. With this comes the understanding that the identities that have been unrepresentatively generalized across historical time make understanding the process of identity formation in relation to economic development and political transformation an impossibility.[19] Combatting these

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[16] Ghazal, *Islamic reform and Arab nationalism*, p. 12.
[17] To cite Ghazal here is not to draw focus to questions of nativity in Palestine—for such an issue is another thesis in and of itself. Instead, this is merely meant to underscore the way that the Arab elite upheld their own colonialisms while engaging in subversive anti-colonialisms against the British.
[18] Sarah K. Croucher, *Capitalism and Cloves: An Archaeology of Plantation Life on Nineteenth Century Zanzibar*, (New York, NY: Springer, 2015), p. 3.
[19] Mahmood Mamdani, *Beyond Settler and Native as Political Identities: Overcoming the Political Legacy of Colonialism*, (2001), p. 97.

misconstructions requires addressing complex realities, one of these realities being the historical British colonial task of labeling racial groups in social class terms in order to fan the flames of future social unrest.[20] These realities, in turn, underscore an understanding that identity is political in nature. Identity must necessarily be qualified as an entity with political ramifications in the context of this thesis.

And so, it is amidst this system where settlers weaponized identity for the purpose of political oppression that *al-Falaq* provided for the spread of an Islamic literary tradition grounded in the directly anti-imperialist aim of undermining the British educational policies that sought to dismantle Arabic language education and popular local notions of Zanzibari national identity. *al-Falaq* was just one of the platforms that sought to undermine the European colonial mission, and is still regarded as a powerful subversive agent—although also as a controversial catalyst for the Arab-driven rise of ethnic Zanzibari nationalism. To be sure, the publication represented a population that experienced relegation to subaltern status by the European colonizer. Although impure in intention, the height of *al-Falaq* simultaneously represented an apex of the intellectual traditions of anticolonial resistance and instability of Zanzibar's revolutionary identities.

Revolutionary resistance in Zanzibar has never been total—always contested.

As such, it was only by 1961, a short 30 years later, that British governance was faltering. At this point, the colonial administration was experiencing such difficulty exerting control over the Zanzibari populace that for the first time, they allowed for an election that would be followed by the formation of an internal self-government (noting,

[20] Clayton, *The Zanzibar Revolution and its Aftermath*, p. 15.

however, that this was not an equivalent to independence). Still, this British effort to quell years of sociopolitical unrest too failed after a culmination of electoral uncertainties fueled by ideological tensions and ethnic animosities boiled over into marked violence and disarray. Finally, on January 12, 1964, Zanzibari rebels staged the revolution that would gain the archipelago complete independence. In this revolution, A.M. Babu and the leftist Umma Party galvanized an impressive cross-racial Arab base of support, which, unlike other revolutions (such as the Rwandese Social Revolution), allowed revolutionaries to stand as a unified front—with no one revolutionary identity group simply and exclusively standing on the imperialist side of privilege.[21] This anti-colonial solidarity was an impressively emancipatory moment.

What was *not* so impressive was the reality that despite the Umma Party's articulation that the aim of revolution was "not to kill, rape, or steal, but to change the country,"[22] decades-old anti-Arab sentiments amongst the East African indigeneity flared anyways in a conflict that left thousands of Arabs dead and countless Asian-owned properties pillaged—despite the truthful reality that most were not even members of the imperial elite, but of the working class.[23] While violent racial sentiments were not the central thrust of the revolution, the consequences of years of racial propaganda nonetheless came on full display.

After the revolution, the archipelago was governed by Swahili and mainland Africans for the first time in over 100 years. Although the desire for this African home rule was one that was founded within an anticolonial, emancipatory ideological space, it

[21] Amrit Wilson, *The Threat of Liberation: Imperialism and Revolution in Zanzibar*, (London, UK: Pluto Press, 2013), p. 48.
[22] Wilson, *The Threat of Liberation*, p. 47.
[23] Clayton, *The Zanzibar Revolution and its Aftermath*, p. 80.

also emanated from a ethnically-driven desire to expel and eliminate "non-native" populations of Arab and Asian descent. For ideological reasons, the value of the revolution was also controversial around the globe, and the swift revolution in Zanzibar inspired fear in the leaders of western nations who were anxious about the spread of communism to East Africa and then forcefully lobbied allied Tanganyikan President Julius Nyerere to control what was coined the "Zanzibar problem."

As Don Petterson notes in his book *Revolution in Zanzibar: An American's Cold War Tale*, Joseph Stalin once proclaimed that:

> *In the course of further development of the international revolution, there will emerge two centers of world significance: a socialist center . . . and a capitalist center. . . . Battle between these two centers for command of the world economy will decide the fate of capitalism and of communism in the entire world.*[24]

As a newly-organized Zanzibar sought to establish its political identity amidst a contentious Cold War-era struggle for ideological legitimacy, it necessarily situated itself within a struggle between the socialist and capitalist ideologies that Stalin himself named above. To the disappointment of Petterson—an American Foreign Service officer—Zanzibari President Abeid Karume's desire to maintain balanced East/West relations were inflected by the generous promises of aid and diplomatic allyship from nations such as the Soviet Union, East Germany, and China, helping to set independent Zanzibar on a socialist political course.[25] Nonetheless, the influence of foreign powers who saw the relatively more Western-aligned mainland nation of Tanganyika as a valuable ideological foil, eventually drove the formation of Tanzania—a merger of the

[24] Don Petterson, *Revolution in Zanzibar: An American's Cold War Tale*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002), p. 157.
[25] Petterson, *Revolution in Zanzibar*, p. 161.

mainland nation Tanganyika with Zanzibar—in an attempt to reign in Zanzibari leftism with Nyerere's more moderate leadership. Of course, this only intensified conflict between the more moderate factions, led by Nyereyre and Karume, and leftist leaders such as Babu. As Zanzibar and the rest of Tanzania worked through the complex process of self-identification with the eyes (and influence) of the world upon it, it was also locating itself within a contentious set of global power struggles that would continue to define the global political order for decades to come.

But meanwhile, the urgency of these ideological negotiations—especially surrounding Nyerere and the familyhood-based, African socialist ideology of Ujamaa—was compounded by an infrastructural developmental crisis. This crisis was caused, in part, by a vacuum of technical expertise, resultant of the British administration's dismantling of local institutions of higher education. As Tanzania entered into an "independent" political era, ideological developmentalism was built around the imperative to overcome the ethos of forced dependence which Britain imposed on the territory through a dismantling of intellectual spaces. Thus, the local construction of the postcolonial East African university would become a forceful expression of independence. It was at this time of political contestation that newly formed, postcolonial universities were forced to grapple with the oppositional forces of Nyerere's more moderate calls for African socialism and leftist ideological declarations of Babu.[26] To be clear, each camp was largely supportive of a break from Western geopolitical dominance. But in Nyerere's eyes, this break meant embracing the principles of a pre-colonial "classless" society grounded in the pooling of agricultural production

[26] Mahmood Mamdani, "The African University," *London Review of Books,* July 19, 2018.

and total public ownership of industry.[27] For Babu, this meant constructing a national economy of well-rounded, self-sufficient production that, by meeting all citizens' basic needs, would circumvent the need to rely on foreign welfare that exposed the nation to the injustices of the world market.[28] These broader ideological negotiations came to be closely mirrored in debates about the future of the Zanzibari and East African universities themselves. In newly-established universities, radical camps pushing for an interdisciplinary abolition of industry-based academic departments warred with conservative insistences on the separation of disciplines into more neatly formed, career-focused trajectories.[29] Intellectual order was surely not anywhere close to being settled (nor was Zanzibar's broader ideological landscape), for better or for worse. That being said, the capacity of these dialogues to exist as a postcolonial reality in the African university was a powerful sign of, in the words of Mahmood Mamdani, meaningful "intellectual ferment,"[30] or in other words, an ability for critical, non-hegemonic sociopolitical discourses to enjoy open discussion. This is not to say that the postcolonial, nationalist university was a utopian institution, for its politicization sometimes came at the expense of academic freedoms and agency,[31] and the unresolvedness of the university's roadmap brought the deeper unresolvedness of Tanzania's political order into stark display. Nonetheless, the postcolonial Tanzanian university represented a split from the European colonial mission—one that regarded the intellectual function of these very institutions warily, at best, and aimed for total elimination at its worst.

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[27] Wilson, *The Threat of Liberation,* p. 74.
[28] Wilson, *The Threat of Liberation,* p. 74.
[29] Mamdani, "The African University."
[30] Mamdani, "The African University."
[31] Mamdani, *Beyond Settlers and Natives*, p. 88.

And yet, this blip of intellectual ferment in the university was a brief one. Within the very same decade, a wave of ethnic nationalism ushered in a collapse of free speech, travel, and due process—a political slippage that brought on what George Triplett would coin "revolutionary inequality." As Karume rid himself of his most powerful dissenters (namely, Babu), he marched straight into an eight-year era of despotic rule characterized by bloodshed and total disregard for democratic law. Zanzibar's Constituent Assembly was indefinitely postponed, political opponents were murdered, and any and all people's organizations were banned.[32] Crackdowns on political agency and individual human rights drove a mass exodus from Zanzibar to the mainland—this exodus was so dramatic that the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar invoked a slate of policies meant to stop the bleeding, including requiring a deposit equal to today's US$54,000 from any individual seeking travel documents to the mainland and imposing harsh legal penalties on the families of those who fled illegally.[33] The effects of this culture hit the Zanzibari university hard as qualified instructors continued to flee. This exodus and the necessity for university aid that it resulted in provided the opportunity for government co-optation of the institution, and thus, was accompanied by an entrance of nationalist politics into the university. Resultantly, the free academic thought was once championed in the postcolonial university ebbed. In order to avoid the embarrassment of a declining educational system, the government withdrew Zanzibari participation in the East African Certificate of Education and the East African Advanced Certificate of Education, an isolationist move that made it increasingly difficult for those educated in Zanzibar to find employment in mainland Africa.[34] Not only was the Zanzibari university's brief period of

[32] Wilson, *The Threat of Liberation*, p. 77.
[33] George Triplett, *Zanzibar: The Politics of Revolutionary Inequality*, (1971), p. 613.
[34] Triplett, *Revolutionary Inequality*, p. 614.

intellectual ferment deflating, it was also coming detached from the larger project of postcolonial East African development.

By the 1980s, market liberalization was engulfing the region. Abroad, the global economic superpowers led by US President Ronald Reagan and UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher cemented what would be called neoliberalism: the manifestation of an ideology that believed that freedom of the market guaranteed the status of a nation's individual freedoms.[35] As they did so, the world's major financial institutions (the World Bank, IMF, etc) became key centers of neoliberalism's global diffusion. In so, they strong-armed countries into submission to the West's neoliberal orthodoxy by way of cuts to welfare, loosening of labor laws, and industrial privatization in return for much-needed debt rescheduling.[36] Thus, "structural adjustment" was born. As a result, Nyerere—who himself had driven the Tanzanian adoption of African socialism in the postcolonial era[37]—was coerced into liberal reform amidst crisis-level shortages of consumer and capital goods and the wills of foreign donors who made their continued support contingent on the adoption of a liberal economic agenda.[38] In 1984, faced with the prospect of a total economic collapse, Nyerere initiated trade liberalism—what he thought would be a temporary measure—and the next year, began talks of privatizing large commercial firms.[39] Under strict neoliberalism, which the country was moving towards, public sector interventionism in markets must only occur when said market does not yet exist and must be created by the state (in short, the state must pull out of the

[35] Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism,* p. 7.
[36] Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism,* p. 29.
[37] Fr. Innocent Simon Sanga & Ron Pagnucco, *Julius Nyerere's Understanding of African Socialism, Human Rights, and Equality,* (2020), p. 16.
[38] Aili Mari Tripp, *Changing the Rules: The Politics of Liberalization and the Urban Informal Economy in Tanzania,* (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1997), p. 81.
[39] Tripp, *Changing the Rules,* p. 82.

market whenever possible).[40] Armed with this ideal, Nyerere's successor, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, accelerated the country's liberalization initiative with the launch of the World Bank and IMF-approved Economic Recovery Plan and a soon-followed IMF structural adjustment plan which doubled down on trade liberalization and market privatization.[41] In just a few short years, the era of public-sector interventionism (the good and the bad) was supplanted by what leaders hoped would be the private-sector's golden age. Despite the difficulties that the university faced in the nationalist era, this burgeoning neoliberal political order entangled the postcolonial, nationalist university with a new set of challenges burying the conservation of a so-called intellectual ferment. The challenge? An increasingly hegemonic class of "democracy promoters, armed with the 'right' democratic knowledge, [proposing] a Western-centric conception of democracy lauding liberal democracy and free-markets as the medium through which the "good society" will eventually come to life."[42] In other words, the ideological hegemony inherent to the diffusion of neoliberalism actively stamped out alternative conceptions of good governance, a weapon that worked to make critical ideological dialogues a rarity.[43]

This challenge of neoliberal globalization was not one isolated to Zanzibar, and examining the impingement of this globalized order on the Ugandan university may aid in assessing early implications of neoliberalism in the educational sector. At this point in time, the World Bank was administering Makerere University in Uganda and forging what would quickly become a new model for the East African university:

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[40] Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism,* p. 2.
[41] Ed. Peter Gibbon, *Liberalised Development in Tanzania,* (Uppsala, SE: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1995), p. 12
[42] Jeff Bridoux, *Shaking off the neoliberal shackles: "democratic emergence" and the negotiation of democratic knowledge in the Middle East North Africa context,* (2019), p. 807.
[43] Bridoux, *Shaking off the neoliberal shackles*, p. 796.

> *The Bank proposed a threefold reform premised on the assumption that higher education is a private good. First, it argued, given that the benefit from higher education accrues to the individual, that individual should pay fees. Today, nearly 90 per cent of students at Makerere are fee-paying. Second, the university should be run by autonomous disciplinary departments and not by a centralised administration. This was achieved by means of a simple formula, requiring that 80 per cent of student fees go to his or her disciplinary department or faculty. The Bank had managed, very effectively, to starve the central administration of funds. Third, the curriculum should be revised to make it market-friendly and more professional: the geography department began to offer a BA in tourism, and the Institute of Linguistics a BA in secretarial studies.*[44]

By the time 1999 rolled around, this "new model" of the East African university—one rooted in industrial marketability and institutional profitability—was a regional standard. This is also when the State University of Zanzibar was formed in Act No. 8 of 1999 in the Zanzibar House of Representatives.[45] SUZA was thereby established as a public university, one whose grants and loans would be (and continue to be) approved by the House of Representatives.[46]

SUZA is not only a product of the neoliberal state, it is dependent on it for its survival. By this point, most postcolonial states had begun to withdraw from prior developmentalist aspirations centering around Ujamaa and collective wellbeing, instead coerced by the demands of international capital.[47] SUZA exists as part of this trend. Neoliberal thought was taking on a diffusatory character within local and global discourses, and the imperatives for "home rule" which was established (bloodily) after the revolution was increasingly being called into question as western governing entities

[44] Mamdani, *The African University*.
[45] Act No. 8 of 1999 of the Zanzibar House of Representatives.
[46] Act No. 8 of 1999 of the Zanzibar House of Representatives, p. 27.
[47] Dorothy L. Hodgson, *Being Maasai, Becoming Indigenous*, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University, 2011), p. 1.

and western financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund & World Bank again exerted imperialist influences on systems of Zanzibari governance within their programs of structural adjustment. The close of the 20th century thus marked a newfound tension between the imperatives of African postcolonial thought and the demands of a neoliberal political order. The Revolutionary Government is subject to this tension, and by extension, so is the public educational system that SUZA sits atop—SUZA is caught in the crosshairs. As John Gledhill once put it, "the deep logic of neoliberalization [is] the transformation of life itself into a marketable commodity and the imperative for us all to market ourselves."[48] As this deep logic of neoliberalization becomes the logic of the state, it becomes the logic of SUZA.

Between these periods of colonialism, post-colonialism, nationalism, and neoliberalism, conceptions of governance, nationhood, and political identity in Zanzibar have been in perpetual flux. And yet—at least up until this point—revolutionary resistance, often manifesting within intellectual spaces, has taken the helm of these negotiations. Zanzibar's intellectual centers have sometimes come to meaningfully reflect these moments of revolutionary thought—as the establishment of *al-Falaq* and the post-revolutionary intellectual fermentations in the East African university just begin to help us understand. Amal Ghazal animates the impact of this legacy in her affirmation that resistance "is conceived and formulated as being part of a complex genealogy of struggle."[49] This genealogical structure of resistance is consequently a vital piece of the

[48] Hodgson, *Being Maasai*, p. 1.
[49] Ghazal, *Islamic Reform*, p. 18.

revolutionary ideologies that have long transformed Zanzibar's political, and often, academic landscape. Here lies the crux of this thesis: the strain that the neoliberal order has put onto this legacy.

This is a tension between a sometimes progressive, sometimes destructive revolutionary ideology that has withstood institutional, social, and political tests of time and a neoliberalism threatening to consume the roots of revolutionism. The establishment of SUZA as a manifestation of contemporary neoliberal, commercial values begs the question of whether this revolutionary ideology, or genealogy of struggle is, in fact, still intact and whether—in the age of neoliberalism—revolutionism can be seriously expected to take up residence in spaces of learning. Has the capacity of the State University of Zanzibar, and to a broader extent, the Zanzibari university to host anticolonial revolutionary ideologies been broken by the neoliberal political order? It can be argued—given the activity of dissenting parties such as the Civic United Front and ACT Wazalendo—that these genealogies are still alive across the territory. Perhaps this grassroots separatism can, at least in part, be attributed to working class dissatisfaction with a neoliberal agenda that has gradually disintegrated the social contract that previously ensured popular political support for the order. It's possible, then, that neoliberalism has also necessitated the continuance of a revolutionary genealogy while also repressing it.[50] But still, this is no evidence that the dissatisfaction has significantly made its way into an establishment-governed institution such as SUZA.

Recognizing the intellectual decline of not only the Zanzibari but also the East African university necessitates the reader to take seriously the insistence of global forces to renege on postcolonial promises of democratic home rule, developmental

[50] Jeff D. Colgan & Robert O. Keohane, *The Liberal Order is Rigged: Fix it Now or Watch it Wither*, (2017), p. 27.

independence, and ideological contestation. If one of the colonizer's historically sinister goals was constructing an impossibility of development via the ideological and structural deconstruction of the university, we may consider the possibility that neoliberalism, by obliterating the university's capacity for true intellectual ferment, provides for a similarly sinister (if not more dangerously covert) phenomenon. Therefore, recognizing the contemporarily stunted capacity of the university to negotiate revolutionary, anticolonial discourses necessitates the reader to then consider the threat that the neoliberal order has to genealogies of resistance that have persisted through periods of European colonialism, revolution, and nationalism. Although the status of the university is not at the nonexistent state that it was at the period of revolution—when the entirety of Tanzania was left with only two trained engineers and 12 doctors[51]—we are still left to wonder whether a neoliberally-driven intellectual decline will have a comparably negative effect on the university's capacity to drive development.

Today, the words of James V. Schall, who in 1969 affirmed the role of the university as a site of revolutionary discourse and insisted that "The *élite* of tomorrow are not to be capitalists or bureaucrats, but information gatherers and knowledge manipulators"—no longer seem to ring true.[52] Yet, sweeping waves of leftist resistance to neoliberal globalization have generated significant organizational and academic enthusiasm surrounding the concept of "resistance from below," or "globalization from below."[53] By questioning where SUZA may be engaging in neoliberal "globalization from above" as opposed to revolutionary "globalization from below," this thesis attempts

[51] Mamdani, *Beyond Settlers and Natives*, p. 87.
[52] James V. Schall, *The University, Revolution, and Freedom*, (1969), p. 115.
[53] Jasper Abembia Ayelazuno, *Neoliberal Globalisation and Resistance from Below*, (New York, NY: Routledge, 2019), p. 2.

to be just one step in a difficult process of dissection in order to better recognize how the tension between postcolonial and neoliberal agendas may be met.

CHAPTER II: SUZA as an Agent Within Zanzibar's Political Order

"We will call millions of our people onto the streets who will take mass democratic and peaceful action to defend the integrity of the election, to defend their voice – if it comes to that," said Tundu Lissu,[54] an opposition-party Tanzanian presidential candidate ahead of the 2020 election—a solemn, if not hopeful, nod to violence that had come out of disputed election processes of years' past. Lissu's words, tragically, would prove to be of more than just a historical nod after the country's political dissidents once again found themselves under siege on election day.

Shortly ahead of the 2020 election in Tanzania, leaders from ACT Wazalendo—a major opposition party more formally named the "Alliance for Change and Transparency"—asserted that at least nine citizens had been shot dead after they discovered police distributing pre-marked ballots to voting locations.[55] On election day, ACT Wazalendo's Zanzibari presidential candidate, Maalim Seif Sharif Hamad, was arrested on his way to vote, other citizens were reportedly wounded by police forces, and others still were afflicted by tear gas as they defied stay-at-home orders.[56] By the end of 2021, Human Rights Watch determined that the Tanzanian government had failed to hold the roughly 10,000 security forces and government-aligned militia present in Zanzibar during the 2020 election accountable for a total of at least 14 killings and 55 civilian

[54] "Tanzania presidential election: Who are the main candidates?" *Al Jazeera*, October 26, 2020.
[55] Cara Anna, "At least 11 shot dead ahead of Tanzania's presidential vote," *AP News*, October 27, 2020.
[56] Anna, "At least 11 shot dead ahead of Tanzania's presidential vote."

injuries.[57] After interviewing 57 Zanzibari residents, HRW also found that during the two day election period, these security forces had "harassed residents and beat them, brandishing guns and chasing them away from public spaces, broke into homes, and indiscriminately fired teargas and live bullets. They imposed and enforced curfews, beating those who did not comply, and arbitrarily arrested residents, detaining some in unofficial sites for weeks," while for many others, internet connection was shut off so as to discourage communication.[58]

To elucidate this legacy of electoral strife isn't to say that there have not been attempts at reconciliation. In 2010, a legislative referendum established a Zanzibari Government of National Unity (GNU), a power-sharing agreement which, to its credit, did succeed in introducing a relatively unprecedented bipartisan check on the House of Representatives, which was long dominated by the ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM). However, as unity governments often find, these structures often fail to ultimately shift the dynamics baked into the local politic, and in the Zanzibari context, this meant that local elites within the ruling CCM retained the power to act as legislative veto players. As it experimented with a unity government, Zanzibar faced a difficulty hybrid of both the Kenyan and Zimbabwean attempts to do the same. In Zimbabwe, the use of both physically and rhetorically violent tactics with militarized policing policies created an impossibility of meaningful power sharing down to a grassroots level, resulting in what was coined *politics of continuity.*[59] In Kenya, on the other hand, the tendency for smoke-filled-room-style deals between leaders prevented any real

[57] "Tanzania: No Justice for Zanzibar Election Violence," *Human Rights Watch*, November 29, 2021.
[58] "Tanzania: No Justice for Zanzibar Election Violence."
[59] Nie Cheeseman & Blessing-Miles Tendi, *Power-sharing in comparative perspective: the dynamics of 'unity government' in Kenya and Zimbabwe*, (2010), p. 203.

democratization of power in what was called the *politics of collusion*.[60] Uniquely, Zanzibar suffered from both during implementation of the GNU, marking itself as a politic of *continuity and collusion*. This eventually doomed the GNU by holding hostage the mechanisms necessary to stifle the will of the incumbent political elite.[61] At the end of the day, CCM leaders prevented the GNU from fundamentally altering the power structures that for decades have lent CCM nearly unrestricted power, and the GNU collapsed after the 2015 elections. To this day, Zanzibar's multiparty political culture still paints a picture that's strikingly similar to that of the multiparty elections held under the British Protectorate Government in 1961: one characterized by factionalized and "exclusive politics and identities, rather than the inclusive political culture which emerged on Tanzania mainland under the *ujamaa* ideology of [Nyerere]."[62]

Knowing this, we arrive at an understanding of how the ruling CCM's display of violence during the 2020 election is part of what has become an often-violent political culture that's been around since the transition to a multi-party system in 1992. This violence has surfaced numerous times since then, especially during attempts to challenge CCM's leadership and surface alleged election fraud (just one of these instances was when the Civic United Front rejected their 1995 0.4-point loss to CCM in the first Zanzibari presidential election since the transition to a multi-party system).[63]

See, even in the postcolonial age, Zanzibar has seen no shortage of electoral uncertainty, a reality that reminds us that postcolonialism has not spelled the end of emancipatory initiatives. Needless to say, although the territory's British administration

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[60] Cheeseman & Tendi, *Power-sharing in comparative perspective,* p. 203
[61] Sterling Roop, Kjetil Tronvoll & Nicodemus Minde, *The politics of continuity and collusion in Zanzibar: political reconciliation and the establishment of the Government of National Unity*, (2018), p. 246.
[62] Roop, Tronvoll & Minde, *The politics of continuity and collusion in Zanzibar,* p. 248.
[63] "Zanzibar: 1995 Elections," *African Democracy Encyclopaedia Project,* n.d.

has long since been supplanted by an East African-led government, the destabilized tensions between revolutionary and establishment politics are still alive and well in Zanzibar—and within the sphere of party politics, SUZA sits squarely within these tensions.

At the end of the day, this contemporary political culture is baked deeply into Zanzibari society, and SUZA was born of this culture. To clarify, the University was first established by the Zanzibar House of Representatives in a 1999 piece of legislation, and since then, has been further amended in Acts No. 11 of 2009 and No. 7 of 2016.[64] Within these acts, the legislature essentially seated itself and the university Council—an internal body consisting both of presidential and ministerial appointees[65]—as the final authority on the University's fiscal and budgetary matters, while establishing the procedures and guidelines for both academic and infrastructural administration of SUZA. Essentially, University grants and loans are approved by the House, which are then managed by the Council.[66] Top administrators are selected by the president and/or his appointees, and these administrators then are empowered to select teaching personnel within a set of guidelines set by the House (for instance, certain teaching positions require prior experience at a select set of other institutions that are pre-approved by the Revolutionary Government[67]). Given the structure of the school's administration, many organizational decisions impacting the school's academic offerings are made not by academic professionals, but by CCM-affiliated legislators—one such move being the 2016 action to replace the Institute of Continuing Education with the more commercially-oriented

[64] "Home," *The State University of Zanzibar*, n.d.
[65] Act No. 8 of 1999 of the Zanzibar House of Representatives, p. 25.
[66] Act No. 8 of 1999 of the Zanzibar House of Representatives, p. 25.
[67] Act No. 8 of 1999 of the Zanzibar House of Representatives, p. 18.

Institutes of Tourism Development and Maritime Studies.[68] To be clear, this construction of such overtly political administrative levers is not a phenomenon entirely unique to SUZA, or even Tanzania as a whole. In a recent report, it was found that over 60 countries—including neighboring Rwanda, DRC, Kenya, and Ethiopia—are also experiencing noticeable declines in university autonomy as governments increasingly intervene in administrative efforts, an occurrence that has been linked to a measurable decline in academic freedom.[69] The West hasn't been immune either, as evidenced by recent book banning efforts spreading quickly through the United States[70] and anti-vaccination efforts taking hold in a rising number of UK schools.[71] It's important to note the contradiction that this presents: despite existing in a political order that emphasizes non-interventionism, the preservation of this order has necessitated increased ideological interventionism in the educational sector. This is not new news, as scholars have pointed out that the neoliberal state, at its very heart, is a strikingly contradictory political form.[72]

Although SUZA was born of this government, it's even more important to make clear that the University is entirely dependent on the government's administration for its continued survival. Not only does this dualistic relationship welcome hegemonic top-down ideological molding, it also discourages the opportunity for bottom-up resistance. After all, musn't we consider how any substantial form of bottom-up resistance can just be held hostage by the House's airtight legal grip on SUZA's

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[68] Act No. 7 of 2016 of the Zanzibar House of Representatives, p. 6.
[69] Kirsten Roberts Lyer & Aron Suba, "Closing Academic Space: Repressive State Practices in Legislative, Regulatory and Other Restrictions on Higher Education Institutions," *ICNL,* n.d., p. 4.
[70] Elizabeth A. Harris & Alexandra Alter, "Book Ban Efforts Spread Across the U.S," *The New York Times,* January 30, 2022.
[71] Laura Smith-Spark, "Schools are new battleground in war of disinformation over Covid-19 vaccines," *CNN*, October 12, 2021.
[72] Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism,* p. 64.

pursestrings? If so, do pockets of revolutionary ideology exist within SUZA, and if so, do they have the space for ferment?

First, we turn to the University's chancellorship, one of the most visible signals of the university-government relationship. That is, it is visible given that the President of Zanzibar, Hussein Mwinyi, occupies the post. Mwinyi's status within the University is no unique one—and is the same as his predecessor—which is unsurprising given that the Act originally establishing the university stipulates that the University Chancellor will either *be* or be appointed *by* the President (meaning that even if the Chancellor is not the Zanzibari President, it will inevitably be an ally).[73] Vice Chancellors, who administer discrete areas of the University, are chosen based on presidential nomination and legislative approval.[74] Given that only CCM has risen to victory in presidential and legislative elections since the establishment of SUZA[75], we can say, then, that the entire administrative leadership of the University has also been (or been appointed by) the most visible talking-pieces of the entire ruling party. The highest-level narrator of SUZA's institutional ideology is also that of Zanzibar's most elite political incumbency.

To illustrate this closeness, one can turn to the presidency and chancellorship of Dr. Ali Mohamed Shein, who was at SUZA's helm prior to the 2020 election—during the tail end of his 10 year presidency. In fact, the 2020 violence detailed on the previous page took place in the election—overseen by Shein's administration—that would determine his successor. In June 2020, Shein made the decision to dissolve the House of Representatives prior to the October elections, which would later be scrutinized for

[73] Act No. 8 of 1999 of the Zanzibar House of Representatives, p. 7.
[74] Act No. 8 of 1999 of the Zanzibar House of Representatives, p. 7.
[75] This is a contested claim. During past elections with close election counts and accusations of electoral irregularities, opposing parties have claimed victory. However, because CCM has assumed the dominant posts in all instances, CCM has—for all practical intents and purposes—been victorious.

allegedly falling behind the standard of free-and-fair.[76] The day after dissolving the House, Shein gave a speech lasting more than four hours where he, at one point, assured viewers that the impending election results would be untainted—supposedly guaranteed by 2018's Election Act No. 4—while issuing a strong warning to dissenters, noting that he was "watchful" and that "any conduct against the agreed rules will amount to unnecessary commotions and violence."[77] To be clear, the dissolution of the House is not an uncommon move, however, Shein's dissolution of the House was in and of itself in violation of the Election Act, as the Act stipulates that this dissolution may not occur longer than 90 days away from the General Election[78]—in this case, it was more than 120. There's an irony that Shein weaponized the Election Act as proof of a free-and-fair election while violating that very act himself. In the end, Shein's ally Hussein Mwinyi would triumph, assume the presidency, and go on to fill SUZA's chancellorship. That is not to say that Mwinyi necessarily rose to victory *because* of Shein's actions (such a direct claim would be far beyond the scope of this thesis), but the potential impact is not nonexistent. And going on, one can hardly argue that a state-funded institution led at the highest level by a regional political leader may be satisfactorily divorced from the ideology of the political incumbent—who happens to be deeply entrenched in the neoliberal political economy.

This inability to divorce politics from educational administration can also be demonstrated by looking *within* the Election Act of 2018. The Act actually stipulates—as one of its many regulatory guidelines—that political campaign rallies or meetings may not be held inside educational institutions and may only be held outside (i.e. on the

[76] "Mwinyi wins Tanzania's Zanzibar presidential election," *XinhuaNet*, October 30, 2020.
[77] Masato Masato, "Tanzania: Zanzibar Makes Epic Gains," *AllAfrica*, June 21, 2020.
[78] Act No. 4 of 2018 of the Zanzibar House of Representatives.

grounds of) such institutions outside of working hours.[79] Here, the Act essentially stipulates that the school must be, at least in the realm of electoral dialogue and dissension, an apolitical space. At the very least, it is protected from significant political disturbance. But, for an institution funded by the CCM and subsequently administered by the party's highest-profile leaders, the question is begged of *whose* presence constitutes disturbance. For CCM candidates, whose electoral success is all but guaranteed within the current system, restriction upon the freedom to expand already vast evangelization efforts is hardly a threatening handicap. But for dissenting parties, whose fight for electoral success is above all else a steep uphill battle, this is not the case. If SUZA's day-to-day is one prescribed and narrated by CCM, then it is worth considering that the definition of a "disturbance" is not necessarily dissimilar from that of "dissention"—and that the Election Act's stipulations are very clearly intended and weaponized to protect the survival of the incumbent political elite.

As the stipulations outlined in the Elections Act imply, SUZA takes the position of silence on overtly political topics—or at least ones of political disagreement. Simply look to the "University News" page, where institutional press releases detail educational developments laced with less-than-controversial sociopolitical commentaries. Aligning with the governing party on easily reconcilable topics, Tanzanian Vice President (and now President) Samia Suluhu Hassan of CCM's latest visit to campus is applauded,[80] the University's latest presidential appointments are shared excitedly, and visits from Tanzanian governing ministers are reported proudly.[81] See, political visitation by the political *incumbency* is not categorized in a de facto interpretation of the Elections Act as

[79] Act No. 4 of 2018 of the Zanzibar House of Representatives, p. 28.
[80] "Vice President Hon. Samia Suluhu Hassan visits SUZA," *The State University of Zanzibar*, March 12, 2020.
[81] "Prof. Ndalichako pays a visit at SUZA booth," *The State University of Zanzibar,* July 21, 2019.

a disturbance. On the news page, no explicit mention of the elections, electoral violence, or other partisan strife is made.

That being said, the ethos of the political incumbency—that which is categorized as "non-disturbant" is not one that can simply be boiled down to partisan lines. That is, the very heart of dominant, incumbent political dialogue in Zanzibar is one that is inextricably linked to a globalized neoliberal order that's deeply permeated both across partisan and geographic boundaries. That is, established governance ideologies operate with a commercial logic whose profit-motivated markers of success are dictated (predominantly) by the Western entities that stimulate the global flow of capital. This globalized phenomenon, one where external dynamics dictate internal governance, is especially clear in the educational sector, where in the last five years, educational funding from the government dropped to less than 10-percent of the total education budget.[82] That leaves 90-plus percent of the educational budget to come from external sources. External sources with competing—often divergent—ideological interests, and above all else, the capacity to withdraw support at any given point in time. Sure, Tanzania is not facing identical infrastructural and professional shortages as it was in the immediate years after independence, but 60 years later, it has not shaken its principal dependence on outside governments and organizations, namely the World Bank, USAid, and the IMF, amongst others, for the maintenance of its educational systems. These entities, as has been established, generally work as a part of the political neoliberal project of "re-establishing the conditions for capital accumulation and [restoring] the power of economic elites."[83] Despite aspirational platforms that would utilize indigenous political ideologies such as

[82] Education Budget Brief 2018: Zanzibar," *UNICEF*, 2018, p.18.
[83] Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, p. 19.

African socialism and Nyerere's *ujamaa*, implementation of indigenous governance strategies risks spooking external donors. And because those same donor funds fill critical budgetary gaps, losing external support becomes a non-option. Thus, the subaltern governments are trapped in a deadly cycle—one of forced dependency. A relationship therefore exists where the role of local political actors is not simply to govern (as total self-governance is an impossibility), but to court the reception of large-scale external donors.

The predicament of Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi clearly illustrates the all too common tensions between East African administrations and global pressures in the neoliberal era. Zenawi's administration, one that managed to make a name for itself in its relatively successful subversions of the neoliberal Western consensus,[84] independently set the groundwork for a relatively successful developmental roadmap within Ethiopia. By most measures, Zenawi had build a strong macroeconomic foundation in Ethiopia: there was no inflation (prices were even falling), output was growing, and the government was redistributing funds in "pro-poor"[85] directions, such as cutting weapons funding for the benefit of rural development.[86] And yet, despite securing Ethiopia's status as one of the fastest developing infrastructures in the region, Zenawi nearly lost $127 million of support from the IMF's Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) program.[87] Why? The decision to direct foreign assistance towards robust rural development, as opposed to keeping those funds in reserves—an expectation which essentially prevents foreign governments from spending the funds that they have been granted—meant the

[84] Alex de Waal, *The theory and practice of Meles Zenawi,* (2013), p. 148.
[85] Elena Rotarou, *Tourism in Zanzibar: Challenges for pro-poor growth*, (2014), p. 252.
[86] Joseph Stiglitz, *Globalization and Its Discontents*, (New York, NY: WW Norton, 2002), p. 125.
[87] Stiglitz, *Globalization and Its Discontents*, p. 125-6.

loss of those funds. In essence, the IMF's logic implies that low-income countries cannot spend money (in any practical sense) on initiatives that they are receiving donor funding for—a reality that bolsters economist Joseph Stiglitz's belief that the IMF, amongst other institutions, is not interested in project sustainability, but instead, in the preservation of the present economic order. As governments like Zenawi's have found, western organizations demonstrate a lesser interest in results (which Ethiopia was delivering), than the mechanisms that lead to whatever these economic and developmental results may be—*the means overpower the ends*. Once again, neoliberal governance is acting not as a true governance strategy, but as a safeguard against the West's most feared political buzzwords: "fascism, communism, socialism, and authoritarian communism."[88] As Stiglitz himself put it, "To Ethiopia, such intrusiveness smacked of a new form of colonialism, to the IMF, it was just standard operating procedure."[89] Learning from the hard lessons that these other administrations have learned, others are faced with a hard decision: maintain the status quo, the politics of continuity, the neoliberal forms of governance that will inevitably fail to recognize and replicate meaningfully sustainable strides in development (but keep the lights on, so to say), or move back to older forms of African socialism that set the stage for locally-suited development mechanisms, but risk reigniting Cold War-era socialist and Marxist ideological panics that would initiate the withdrawal of overseas donors—without which, capacity to provide basic services crumbles. Thus, the ideology of the ruling CCM elite cannot be viewed in a vacuum. Going even further, it's critical to ask whether dissenting parties' political victories would mend these fundamental problems; despite their revolutionary ideals, a non-incumbent

[88] Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, p. 69.
[89] Stiglitz, *Globalization and Its Discontents*, p. 127.

government would still be forced to reckon with the likely withdrawal of international support if they were to substantially implement an ideologically revolutionary, anti-imperialist platform. Understood through this lens, the establishment imperative to politicize the university and control its revolutionary capacity is not just one born of partisan divides, but one aimed to maintain the neoliberal order that is responsible for the resilience of the modern colonial project of forced dependency.

Understanding this, we can better understand the relationship of SUZA to the factionalized political dynamics in Zanzibar. Let's look again to late 2020, in the run-up and aftermath of the year's violent, contested General Elections. No mention is explicitly made by SUZA of these timely political events, even in regard to the school's operations (i.e. student safety)—the University's position is silence. The only overtly political remarks made on the University News page during this period, in fact, are in a blog summarizing former Chancellor (and President) Shein's speech encouraging newly matriculated students to focus on their studies. Shein told the students that in their mission to contribute to the development of the nation, they must ignore all "non-essential" distractions outside of their academic disciplines and emphasized the strict following of SUZA's (disturbance-averse) regulations.[90] These materials seem to act as a broader effort to tacitly disincentivize engagement with divergent interests and dialogues. While not necessarily *directly* referencing the political climate, broadly pressing students to not stray from narrow, established academic paths or cause "trouble" will invariably have that effect.

The government would like SUZA to be seen as an apolitical body—one that eschews open political dissent, scholarly disciplines that encourage intellectual political

[90] "Wanafunzi wapya waaswa kuzingatia masomo," *The State University of Zanzibar*, November 19, 2020.

ferment, and recognition of Zanzibar's most polarizing revolutionary entanglements in the present day. Silence is often interpreted, wrongly, as absence. But to be apolitical is to be political. To be apolitical is an inherently political action of enormous weight. To be normative—undisruptive—is to be political. By performatively positioning itself as apolitical, or at the very least, politically normative, the University is in fact engaging bluntly and forcefully with partisan entanglements. To uphold, encourage, and present normative, established ideologies is a tool of the ruling system to sustain the ruling system. Thus unfolds the picture of how SUZA, in its inaction, becomes a political agent.

That being said, these complex interests can be narrated much more vocally—especially when it comes to the roles of individual actors who are representatives of the institution. In just one of the most recent and high profile instances, SUZA Professor of Economics Haji Semboja spoke to The Citizen, a major Tanzanian publication, advocating for the acceleration of East African development through the harmonization of national and regional interests with international (Western) standards, saying that attracting efficient, overseas investors from the public and private sectors is "the most important thing."[91] The very same month, SUZA Prof. of Natural Sciences Ali Makame Ussi also spoke with The Citizen, referring to the 2020 election that left dozens dead or injured in Zanzibar at the hands of the ruling party as a sign of maturity standing "on the principles of humanity, patriotism, unity, and solidarity."[92] Also during the same month, the Tanzania Daily News published coverage of SUZA's 17th graduation ceremony, citing Vice-Chancellor and Prof. Mohamed Makame Haji as having thanked

[91] Louis Kalumbia, "How businesses in Tanzania have benefited from reforms in the past six years," *The Citizen,* December 22, 2021.
[92] Louis Kalumbia, "Tanzania: Smooth Transition of Power in Tanzania, Lesson for Other Countries," *The Citizen*, December 12, 2021.

the president and government for their ongoing support "to ensure the university provides quality education as part of the mission to create patriotic youth in their country."[93] Note: *patriotic youth*.

In these three instances—all pulled from news clippings published within a short 10-day span—faculty narrate the ideology of an institution standing in solidarity with a neoliberal government and surviving off of globalized profit motives in the eventual goal of producing graduates who will *also* stand in solidarity with the political ruling class. Perhaps the University would like to believe that institutionally-affiliated professionals speaking politically *outside* of SUZA are at least somewhat detached from the school's institutional political ideology. But that is not so. Even the willingness of faculty to attach their academic title to their name in said interviews implies a comfort tying their individual ideologies to that of the institution. And that willingness of association, in turn, implies at least a certain degree of alignment.

The words of these professors act as a stirring reminder that institutional political ideologies will inevitably permeate even the academic disciplines that are seemingly the farthest removed from sociopolitical dialogues. Indeed, Prof. Ussi, who referred to 2020's bloody election as a sign of "maturity" is a natural sciences professor specializing in biological oceanography and marine ecology.[94] At first glance, Ussi's academic disciplines appear to be some of the most divorceable from the world of politics, or at the very least, agreeable. Easy for even the most cynical of minds to romanticize. Afterall, the simple thought of biological oceanography and marine ecology evokes beautiful images of gentle scuba divers in Zanzibar's sky-blue waters rebuilding once-vibrant coral

[93] "Tanzania: Mwinyi Promises Further Investment in Education," *AllAfrica*, December 30, 2021.
[94] "Dr. Ali Makama Ussi," *OceanExpert,* n.d.

reefs, saving the whales, et cetera. Who could have a problem with that? Still, since 2016, Ussi has served in the Zanzibar House of Representatives as a member of CCM.[95] Ussi lives meaningful dual academic and political lives, and given his willingness to speak on the latter while simultaneously identifying with the former, it is clear that his political legacy will invariably interact with the academic (and vice versa). Neither identity is independent from the other, and whether he is speaking to a major news outlet or hypothetically teaching a course on marine conservation strategies, Ussi cannot reasonably be expected to divorce his scientific interests from the political. Although other professors may not have as obviously political affiliations, the same can be said of them—as even passive political associations are meaningful ones with vast ideological implications. And, to reiterate, all are either directly or indirectly appointed by elected CCM leaders. SUZA's programs may not reflect a desire to engage with overtly political dialogue (especially political disagreement), but even scientific, touristic, hospitality, or language-based programs possess enormous political agency and cannot be considered as disconnected from Zanzibar's broader partisan political entanglements.

Going forward then, the question must be addressed of this political agency's nature. Frankly, coming to the bare understanding of SUZA's tacit alignments with CCM and the incumbent political elite could likely be inferred simply given the University's status as a product and dependent of the House of Representatives. What is less obvious is whether SUZA's positioning within the partisan tensions between neoliberalism and revolution is simply passive, or whether it is active. We understand that SUZA quietly acts to uphold CCM ideology by creating an environment disadvantageous for the fermentation of dissenting, revolutionary ideologies. But, if instances of dissenting

[95] "Member of the House CV," *Zanzibar Assembly*, n.d.

intellectualism are to arise within the classroom—will they be actively tamped down, and when? In short, we know that SUZA acts to support establishment leadership by simply making revolutionism inconvenient, but when these dissenting moments *do* come to life, does the political administration allow them to survive?

We can begin to unpack this point by examining the presence of resistance from below at the University. That is, from the students themselves. We first turn to a prominent institutionally-affiliated student group, The State University of Zanzibar Student Organization (SUZASO), which proudly announces its intention of being a "catalyst for social changes."[96] Although section 10(2) of the SUZASO constitution stipulates that the organization shall comply not only with the laws of Zanzibar & greater Tanzania but also with the policies, procedures, and practices of the University[97] (as would be expected from an institutionally affiliated organization), the students' group offers some provoking points. Of interest are several bullets of the organization's objectives and functions:

> *"[a] to promote and maintain respect for learning and the pursuit of truth, and to ensure that every student understands his responsibility to educate at the best of his capabilities and to search knowledge for the betterment of human kind and in so doing cherish and promote academic freedom as an inalienable right of student at the University;*
>
> *[b] to facilitate student participation in contemporary issues in which the Organization and University are interested;*
>
> *[c] to mobilize funds raising and sponsor students in academic fields in order to promote creativity and originality on matters of intellectual interest to the scholarly community"*[98]

[96] "SUZASO: The State University Of Zanzibar Students' Organization," *Facebook,* n.d.
[97] "The State University of Zanzibar Students' Organization Constitution," n.d., p. 12.
[98] "The State University of Zanzibar Students' Organization Constitution," p. 9-10.

There can, of course, be quite a distance between ideals and realities. This paradox plays out across a number of the actions in this thesis, including the aforementioned Elections Act, which was assured to prevent what turned out to be an enormously bloody 2020 General Election. The Elections Act was coated in similarly egalitarian language, and yet, was still weaponized by party leaders including Shein to uphold unclean election practices and justify reckless bloodshed. Democratic words are not equivalent to democratic outcomes. Revolutionary words are not equivalent to revolutionary outcomes. But yet, every student is a voting member of SUZASO,[99] and although the organization is bound to University regulation (which would still outlaw political campaigning, for instance) and must operate with complete physical visibility to the Dean of Students,[100] SUZASO leaders are elected by a critical mass in a process entirely distinct from the partisan selection process of administrators and could in theory birth an organization with a relatively greater level of autonomy than administrators and faculty, whose terms of employment are directly tied to the ruling establishment, enjoy.

Particularly provoking are the terms "pursuit of truth" and "betterment of human kind" in Bullet A. Convoluted are the politics of "truth" and "betterment"—for there is no objective, universal measure of such. Understanding the inclusion of this language alone offers little insight into the ambitions of SUZASO, for we can only infer what ideologies and practices constitute these definitions in this context. Bullet B, which aims "to facilitate student participation in contemporary issues in which the Organization and University are interested" may offer marginally more insight if we are to remember that

[99] "The State University of Zanzibar Students' Organization Constitution," p. 10-11.
[100] "The State University of Zanzibar Students' Organization Constitution," p. 33.

the prior point emphasized the value of academic freedom—these two motives in conjunction could imply that this facilitated participation at least seeks to underscore ideological diversity. And yet, these are aspirational values that may or *may not* be animated with revolutionism at heart. What is, however, more concretely helpful for understanding the potential discursive value of SUZASO's existence is the contents of Bullet C, which stipulates that the organization holds power to independently fundraise and manage sponsorships. The University's institutional ideology isn't just tied to the ruling party because of the President/Chancellor's administrative weight—which doesn't necessarily make resistance from below an impossibility—but because of the legislature's financial control of SUZA, which serves to hold the institution's ideology hostage to fiscal necessity. Even if otherwise revolutionary faculty members are able to successfully facilitate dialogues that challenge CCM platforms and power, couldn't the House simply refuse funding of any academic program that prescribes to the dissenting rhetoric in question (forcing a choice between conformity and institutional evaporation)? With financial independence, SUZASO on the other hand, is not as *directly* subject to the government's politics of financial ransome. While they are constrained within the bounds of University law (which is, of course, created and manipulated for the convenience of the political establishment), revolutionary *student* dialogue, if taking place under the wing of SUZASO, has only an indirect link to the school's financial survival, and therefore, could make subversive, bottom-up dialogue possible where higher-level administrative resistance is nearly impossible.

That being said, it would be dishonest to ignore the political legacy of intolerance surrounding student revolution in postcolonial Tanzania. As far back as 1966, some of the

first contemporary precedent was set in harsh terms. In October of that year, students protested at the University of Dar es Salaam on the mainland over the introduction of a mandatory National Service requirement for new university graduates—birthing what would later be coined the National Service Crisis of 1966.[101] In an address to demonstrators, President Nyerere summarily expressed his regard for the student revolutionaries by asking in disbelief: "The nation says to its youth, 'We want your service.' And the youth does not turn to the nation and say, 'For how much?'"[102] Later, Nyerere expelled nearly two-thirds of the university's students. Protests erupted again at the University at Dar es Salaam in 1990 surrounding a controversy having to do with the government's failure to raise the minimum wage. In response, Tanzanian President Ali Hassan Mwinyi flippantly lamented that the students were "really disrespecting me" and closed the university for a full seven months. Even upon the university's reopening the next year, over a dozen of the student organizers from the previous year were still not allowed to return. Mwinyi made it clear that he continued to harbor resentment towards the students in his memoir, where he complained that "[the students] hated me so much that they did not invite me at their next year's labour celebrations."[103] Although it's been three decades since the protest, Mwinyi's very own son, Hussein Mwinyi, is now the sitting president of Zanzibar and chancellor of SUZA. Moreover, there's evidence that across Tanzania—and in all levels of education—political ideologies are tied closely to the dictation of who is and isn't permitted within educational spaces. Just one example of this politicized gatekeeping is a recently repealed policy that barred tens of thousands of

[101] Andrew M. Ivaska, *Of Students, "'Nizers," and a Struggle over Youth: Tanzania's 1966 National Service Crisis*, (2005), p. 83.
[102] Ivaska, *Of Students*, p. 83.
[103] Jacob Mosenda, "Workers', students' strikes a pain in the neck: Mwinyi," *The Citizen*, May 15, 2021.

women and girls from educational institutions across Tanzania as a result of the country's ban on pregnant women and mothers in school.[104] This ban went so far as to permit compulsory pregnancy testing in schools across the country.[105]

Having discussed these political affairs through this chapter, it should still be noted that navigating partisan political relations are not an exclusive or complete means of foamenting revolutionary thought. The very nature of the neoliberal order is defined by its deep entrenchment—an entrenchment that, whether it be in Tanzania or the United States, cuts across party lines. In the U.S., even the relatively more liberal Democratic Party establishment has deep roots in the neoliberal order, and in Tanzania, even the more progressive political wings are steeped in neoliberal logics. The educational policy platform of ACT-Wazalendo—the Zanzibar-headquartered party known for a left-wing democratic socialist ideology—may help to illustrate. The party's progressive election manifesto claimed that an ACT-Wazalendo government would pursue a number of progressive measures, including retroactive higher education loan forgiveness, free university tuition, internship compensation, and the establishment of two new national universities in Zanzibar with the capacity to enroll at least 40,000 students.[106] For reference, Zanzibar currently has three universities: SUZA, Sumait University, and Zanzibar University with a total cumulative enrollment of roughly 5,000 students.[107] Clearly, ACT-Wazalendo's platform is an expansive (and progressive) one. The election manifesto highlights vocational programs, especially medicine, teaching, and agriculture as areas of focus going forward.[108] Of course, these sorts of vocational programs are

[104] "Tanzania: Pregnant Student Ban Harms Thousands," *Human Rights Watch,* October 6, 2021.
[105] "Pregnant Student Ban," *Human Rights Watch*.
[106] "Tanzania: Act-Wazalendo - We will enhance education sector," *AllAfrica,* September 3, 2020.
[107] "The State University of Zanzibar," *Unipage*, n.d.; "Sumait University," *Unipage*, n.d.; "Zanzibar University," *Unipage*, n.d.
[108] "Act-Wazalendo - We will enhance education sector," *AllAfrica*, September 3, 2020.

imperative for the revolutionary aim of fostering sustainable development. And, as Mamdani himself has outlined, financial accessibility is an essential tenet of decolonizing the university. Rhetorically, ACT-Wazalendo's assurances align with a revolutionary desire for well-rounded academic freedom—one encouraging development while simultaneously enabling freedom of ideological thought and political subversion.

Nonetheless, these campaign promises are far from the current reality, and offer little assurance that such bold plans would necessarily come to fruition, even if the ruling CCM's power was toppled. This tension between progressive promises and underwhelming electoral realities is a sobering reminder of the limits that partisan politics offer in the realm of revolutionary organizing. Take a look at the U.S, for example, where President Joe Biden, who campaigned on a promise to "immediately" forgive $10,000 of student loan debt per borrower, has yet to take meaningful steps towards following through.[109] And this doesn't even consider whether overseas donors would continue financial support of a government enacting a progressive platform more closely empowering indigenous intellectual dialogue.

As we conclude what is our most direct discussion of Zanzibar's electoral and party politics—with an understanding that the ruling establishment's relatively autocratic administration of SUZA and other educational institutions sits amidst a far reaching global neoliberal order—it may help to turn to the words of Elsie Eyakuze, a Tanzanian writer. Eyakuze, who joined the nation in collectively celebrating the Nobel Prize awarded to Zanzibari writer Abdulrazak Gurnah, found herself considering the reality that most of Gurnah's Tanzanian supporters (herself included) had little to no exposure to

[109] Cory Turner, "Biden pledged to forgive $10,000 in student loan debt. Here's what he's done so far," *NPR,* October 7, 2021.

his work. The prize was a collective win for Zanzibaris, but generally, she says, they know little of the localized conversations of race, belonging, nativity, and revolution that Gurnah centers his work around. She wonders: "if these stories became part of our public curriculum, what fires might we light in young Tanzanian minds, and what else might they discover? No, no. The government prefers to tell us that we are an oral culture and that too much reading is an elite pursuit of the leisured class."[110] But despite whatever tragedy it is that Gurnah's work—amongst other ideologically stirring writings—may not permeate the echelons of Zanzibari society in the near future, Eyakuze is clear to clarify that she is not calling Zanzibar an anti-intellectual society (nor should it be considered one), and this intellectual vacuum cannot be filled simply by pointing fingers at the political elite. No, she says:

> *Perhaps it's unfair of me to accuse us of being an anti-intellectual society. The work that is required to shape a post-colonial, modern nation-state is so overwhelmingly vast that it's no wonder we often fail at it. But the anti-intellectualism used by the government in suppressing critical thinking and dissent is part of the design, and as such literature has been severely constrained. Yes, this is in part by circumstance, because as a poor country we really do have trouble delivering basic literacy to citizens, but it is also on purpose, because what we choose to consider appropriate literature has already—by being deigned appropriate—been censored and curated for us. What use, then, do we have for the likes of Gurnah, an exile who writes about the difficult interstices, the questions, the memories, and the longings?*[111]

Eyakuze powerfully elucidates several critical and nuanced realities: that political anti-intellectualism does not arise in a vacuum, nor has the political administration of

[110] Elsie Eyakuze, "Tanzanians are Very Proud of the Nobel Winner We Haven't Read," *Foreign Policy,* October 30, 2021.
[111] Eyakuze, "Tanzanians are Very Proud of the Nobel Winner We Haven't Read."

SUZA. The ruling party politics and electoral agendas at the heart of the University's administration exist as products of decades, even centuries of negotiations between colonialism, postcolonial nationalism, and neoliberalism. Zanzibar and Tanzania's politics exist as products of their place in a global neoliberal political economic order—and these places themselves are products of colonialism's legacy and contemporary remnants. This understanding should act as a reminder of both the importance and the limits of this chapter's findings. While progressive political and electoral dispensations certainly open up opportunities for revolutionary dialogue, they do not inherently ensure it. At the end of the day, as Mamdani commented in "The African University," the modern African university has less to do with truly African institutions than it does its colonial predecessors— it "takes as its model the discipline based, gated community that maintained a distinction between clearly defined groups: administrators, academics and fee-paying students."[112] The bottom line: the revolutionary work necessary to break the African university from its colonial and commercialized neoliberal roots is vast. The solution to such a deeply entrenched order cannot be a singular one. Thus, while SUZA's close relationship to Chama Cha Mapinduzi and Zanzibar's high political elite is surely a daunting obstacle in the development of revolutionary knowledges within the University's campuses, the removal of this relationship would not simply and uniformly establish SUZA as a revolutionary proving ground. This is why the next chapters are of such importance: to fully understand SUZA's capacity to facilitate the dispensation of revolutionary knowledges, it must be located within a global, historical sociopolitical landscape and pedagogical genealogy.

[112] Mamdani, "The African University."

CHAPTER III: SUZA and the Global Educational Economy

Upon arriving back home to Boston University (BU) after attending an academic program abroad in Zanzibar, Grace Condon reflected wistfully on the "surprisingly global cultural punch" that she had experienced during her time studying overseas. As part of BU's Swahili Language and Culture in East Africa Study Abroad program, Condon spent six weeks at SUZA, where she encountered "gentle African hospitality" and "a lesson in cross-cultural empathy and respect."[113] Journaling Grace's time abroad, Bostonia, a BU student publication, relayed her experiences:

> *Dressed in a caftan and loosely arranged headscarf as she strolls Zanzibar's Forodhani gardens, Grace Condon is a world away from home. But she is happy and relaxed in this far-flung place, snacking on fresh-grilled corn, horsing around with her little 'brother,' and calling 'Jambo' (hello) to friends as the sun sinks into the Indian Ocean and fishermen drag their dhows along the beach below. These are the balmy late July days after the rainy season, leading up to the monthlong fast of Ramadan, on Zanzibar, the east African archipelago that has become synonymous with the exotic.*[114]

Synonymous with the exotic. The Bostonian also quotes Peter Quella, Adjunct Professor at BU's Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies, who impresses upon readers the charm in "how well Zanzibar conceals the encroachment of modernity," and Derek Hartnett, another BU student, who chuckles over his challenge learning to use a squat toilet and his observation that his stay with a Zanzibari host family was "just as much of a learning experience [for them] as it [was] for us."[115] Perhaps you'd applaud

[113] Susan Seligson, "Study Abroad Zanzibar: Swahili and Spice," *Bostonia,* September 11, 2015.
[114] Seligson, "Study Abroad Zanzibar.*"*
[115] Seligson, "Study Abroad Zanzibar.*"*

Condon and Hartnett for venturing to gain perspective of a culture outside of their Bostonian bubble— "expanding their horizons" as many would surely say. Or, you may be caught on Quella's words, wondering how a faculty member at such an esteemed institution could publicly speak so condescendingly of Zanzibar's infrastructural development process, veiling condescension behind feigned excitement at an old-world type charm. Or, as I admittedly was, you may be rolling your eyes at Hartnett's suggestion that a Zanzibari host family should stand to learn from any and every American interloper—reinforcing "othering" boundaries while bifurcating the naive perception that the global south can expect to benefit from learning the ways of the westerner.

Regardless of your reaction to the group's romantic, perhaps exoticising response to their time in Zanzibar, a simple fact remains: Condon, Hartnett, and Quella are far from unique, as are their experiences. Every year, resources dedicated to the globalization of education continue to grow, and that growth continues to have a defining impact upon institutions such as SUZA. For Grace Condon, the globalized educational economy allows for an exciting semester in an "exotic" Indian Ocean archipelago. For SUZA, the same economy of overseas educational exchange is just one part of the broader global neoliberal order that defines Zanzibar's political economy, intellectual dialogue, and capacity for self governance.

Two years into the COVID-19 pandemic, borders are reopening, and students like Grace Condon are returning to overseas programs. By 2025, The Economist expects there to be up to 8 million students studying outside of their home country globally, nearly double from just nine years earlier in 2016[116]—and the industry has experienced

[116] Montana Hirschowitz, *Brains without borders; International students,* (2016), p. 57.

(notwithstanding the interruptions associated with the COVID-19 pandemic) an average 10-percent annual growth rate.[117] The sources of these international students vary, with a mix of long-term travel into "hub" countries such as the U.S., U.K., China, and Australia, hub countries establishing branch campuses overseas, and short-term study abroad programs focused more heavily on campuses like SUZA's (which are often accompanied by longer-term research partnerships). To power these various educational models, institutions are also building strong financial partnerships overseas to bolster their globalized pedagogies and developmental processes— and the parties involved in these partnerships often bring perspectives to the table not dissimilar from the travelers at BU. Either way, it's clear that "excellence" within the educational sphere is coming to rely more and more heavily on institutional capacities for overseas growth.

Like so many others, SUZA demonstrates pride in its global educational partnerships and programming opportunities. In this chapter, we will focus on just a few of SUZA's overseas financial and partnerships in order to explore the role of SUZA's global positioning, and whether the overseas educational network that the University situates itself within is a reincarnation of the intellectually revolutionary Indian Ocean Islamic diaspora that branded Zanzibar as a revolutionary epicenter to begin with, or whether it ultimately acts to amplify the broader North-South inequities inherent to the neoliberal mission.

In the past decade, government funding of higher education in Zanzibar reached an all time low, with donor spending making up an average of 83-percent of total educational-sector development spending in the archipelago.[118] Within the last five years,

[117] "International Trends in Higher Education 2015," *The University of Oxford*, n.d., p. 15.
[118] "Education Budget Brief 2018: Zanzibar," p.18.

total government contributions to the sector dropped to as low as seven percent, and although this drop has been part of a longer-term trend, it's important to note that this particular dip was directly attributable to the U.S.-based World Bank's decision to double its funding of a major educational project in Zanzibar (from roughly US$4,330,000 to US$8,700,000).[119] Currently, the largest contributor to the Zanzibar educational development budget is the World Bank, which provides 25-percent of all donor contributions.[120] Although the World Bank is the largest contributor, it also serves as an important case study due to its role as a critical bellwether amongst major Western donors. In other words, understanding the World Bank's disbursement practices can help to illuminate the basic patterns of other large donors, as well. For the purpose of this case study, let us take the bank's Higher Education for Economic Transformation (HEET) Project, which in 2021 allocated US$425 million to a total of 14 universities between Tanzania mainland and Zanzibar.[121] Condensed, HEET has three main objectives: "(i) Component 1: Transforming universities with a focus on priority disciplines for economic growth; (ii) Component 2: Strengthening the management of the higher education system; and (iii) Component 3: Support for project coordination and management."[122] In light of these goals, HEET stipulates a number of factors that contribute to funding allocation, but two in particular stick out. The first is that special funding priority is given to institutions working especially diligently to expand private partnerships, and the other is that all university beneficiaries will sign performance-based funding (PFB) agreements in order to continue receiving funds.[123] The latter is significant because it establishes a

[119] "Education Budget Brief 2018: Zanzibar," *UNICEF,* 2018, p.18.
[120] "Education Budget Brief 2018: Zanzibar," p.18.
[121] "Appraisal Environmental and Social Review Summary Appraisal Stage (ESRS Appraisal Stage)," *The World Bank: Higher Education for Economic Transformation Project*, March 18, 2021, p. 2.
[122] "ESRS Appraisal Stage," *The World Bank*, p. 3.
[123] "ESRS Appraisal Stage," *The World Bank*, p. 3.

relationship where the major source of funding in question, usually originating in the global North and informed by Western standards of success, is empowered to hold mission-critical funding hostage in the event that the receiving institution pursues divergent success indicators (and regionally-suited strategies for development will often diverge). PFBs will often impose standards of success that are ill-suited for the development of the recipient—again, the imposition of an orthodox neoliberal regime is not driven by tailored governance but instead by the West's most feared political buzzwords: "fascism, communism, socialism, and authoritarian communism"[124]— and thus, the recipient in question will be forced to choose between critical funding and effective governance. In the event that the university's needs differ from the donor's standards of success, funding and effective governance become mutually exclusive priorities. In short, PFBs will often assume that the neoliberal measures of development that enjoy marketable success in the West will also do so in the South—a false assumption of the utility of a one-size-fits-all approach. It is through this process that PFBs work to stamp out attempts at indigenous ideologies and governance. While research on the efficacy of PBFs in the East African context is scant, other global research has demonstrated that PBFs such as the Bank's fail in several regards: they falsely assume that institutions will not care to improve performance unless specifically incentivized to do so (which implies that educational mismanagement is willful, and thus, so-called poor performance is a result of neglectful governance) and presume that instructors will whole-heartedly adopt the success indicators that leadership agree to.[125] To be clear, this so-called "mismanagement" in reality tends to be a misalignment on

[124] Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, p. 69.
[125] Jussi Kivistö & Vuokko Kohtamäki, *Impacts of performance-based funding on higher education institutions: A literature review,* (2015), p. 9.

what success looks like between the north and south—simply because differing regional contexts demand differing solutions. Regardless, the larger point to take away is the simple reality that an aggregate of studies examined in our cited research have demonstrated unanimously that PBFs do not positively impact institutional performance, and thus, donor contingencies on PBFs in north-south relationships are bound to construct ill-suited developmental goals.[126]

The former qualification from the World Bank, that is, preference towards funding institutions who are emphasizing the development of private partnerships, bifurcates the impact of the previous contingency. First, it sheds light on the extent to which aforementioned contingencies are constructed out of commercialized conceptions of development (those that tie developmental success to private, profit-based viability). The neoliberal indicators of success informing PBFs ultimately rest on a dependence on (and trust in) investments in the private market. At the end of the day, pinning university success to the private commercial market works to transform the role of the school from a space of education to an ecosystem of industrial development. Furthermore, by predicating critical levels of overseas funding (which institutions like SUZA rely on in the absence of meaningful or reliable public funding) on investment in other private entities, the contingency works to ensure that SUZA and other public institutions will remain even more deeply reliant on commercial interests. That is, by asserting that the University builds its reliance on private institutions in order to receive bank funds, it ensures that new educational programs will be built upon *different* private funds, and thus, even those other programs will continue to be reliant on profit politics if they are to retain the funding necessary for maintenance and further growth. If we are to revisit the

[126] Kivistö & Kohtamäki, *Impacts of performance-based funding on higher education institutions*, p. 10.

concept of "forced dependency"—a project of European colonialism that extracts power and resources to make independent self-governance impossibility (so as to reinforce an artificial need for Western control)[127]—we can understand how this process of contingency is little more than a modern reincarnate of the forced dependency that left Tanzania mainland with a scarce handful of university students, doctors, and engineers in the immediate wake of its independence. As Stiglitz asserted: this stinks of colonialism.[128] At least at their worst, these arrangements have the capacity to act as colonialism's contemporary reincarnate.

Oftentimes, these overseas partnerships are overtly political or government-affiliated in nature. Let us take a look at three of those that the University has publicized in recent years as a sample. The first was publicized in 2020, when SUZA announced the restoration of the Oman Academic Fellowship Programme (OAF), administered by the Omani Sultanate, at the University.[129] The relationship of OAF to SUZA was reportedly brought about as part of a broader mission of support from the Omani Ministry of Higher Education to Zanzibar's, and as of the announcement, was set to fund the education and training of 20 SUZA students per year.[130] Just two years earlier, in October of 2018, the University announced a new direct partnership with the French government. Interestingly, the partnership (as described by Ambassador of France to Tanzania Frédéric Clavier) did not refer to SUZA as a "partner" but as a "focal point of collaboration"[131]—a simple syntactic shift potentially indicative of the broader power dynamics between the two bodies. "Partner" connotes equal status, but the latter

[127] Mamdani, "The African University."
[128] Stiglitz, *Globalization and Its Discontents*, p. 127.
[129] "OAF Programme restored at SUZA," *The State University of Zanzibar*, February 27, 2020.
[130] "OAF Programme restored at SUZA," *The State University of Zanzibar*, February 27, 2020.
[131] "France and SUZA to forge comprehensive partnership," *The State University of Zanzibar*, October 18, 2018.

categorization would implicitly assume SUZA's more passive place as the "subject" in the North-South dynamics of the relationship. Moreover, Clavier and university administration made little visible effort to present the partnership as more than an opportunity for commercial (as opposed to intellectual) development which will cater primarily to the interests of the French. These interests include bolstering French language education at SUZA (so as to equip students to participate in the globalized French economy), along with an imperative to develop joint tourism management programs with a number of French universities as an effort to boost the infrastructural means of the Zanzibari tourism industry[132]—an industry that has not demonstrated capacity for "pro-poor"[133] growth and leaves the archipelago dependent on the interest of European tourists and hospitality conglomerates for income. The French government's focus on French private-sector development through this relationship leaves one necessarily asking whether the role of the University in this context is *really* to educate or if it is to act as a player in the commercial market. Other governmental partnerships less directly aligned with economic "superpowers" include the University's relationship with the Cuban government. In this partnership, bilateral support with Cuba is expected to involve a long-term transfer of resources and information regarding agricultural development and health education,[134] and although much deeper analysis would be required to do justice to these three relationships, it is worth noting that at a high level, the industry-focused motives of these partnerships vary greatly.

The Cuban partnership offers a particularly fascinating case study, given the credit that Cuban internationalists earned for collaborating in the independence movements of

[132] "France and SUZA to forge comprehensive partnership," *The State University of Zanzibar*, October 18, 2018.
[133] Rotarou, *Tourism in Zanzibar,* p. 252.
[134] "SUZA and Cuba vow to strengthen ties in higher education," *The State University of Zanzibar*, October 1, 2019.

several African countries during the Cold War era.[135] Since the decades-ago period where Cubans went overseas to fight on behalf of Angola and other African nations while young Africans came to Cuba to study, there has been a strong generational legacy of Afro-Cuban revolutionary culture between much of the African continent and the Cuban nation.[136] This cross-cultural legacy was one of scale, too, and garnered global attention, as evidenced by a 1964 New York Times report which disclosed that several hundred East African men, including close aides of John Okello, were being trained in guerrilla warfare tactics in Havana.[137] Okello's controversial politics aside, it's clear that the cross-continental revolutionary exchange was a lively one. What characterizes this Afro-Cuban legacy? For one, a shared desire to collectively detach from *la Yuma* (a Cuban term for the idealized concept of the U.S. and its capitalist topographies) and a deep nostalgia for the Cold War-era revolutionary *conciencia* (conscience).[138] While SUZA's French partnership focuses on developing industry that is rooted in and dependent on French capital interest and investment, the Cuban relationship offers a connection to a generation-old, anti-colonial union of revolutionary exchange. The gulf between the French and Cuban examples illuminates the necessity of evaluating not just the existence of these specific partnerships, but also their intellectual, ideological, and commercial implications.

This understanding applies meaningfully to SUZA's partnerships with specific educational institutions and private entities, as well. One of SUZA's prominent

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[135] Ed. Guilia Bonacci, et al, *Cuba and Africa, 1959-1994 : writing an alternative Atlantic history*, (Johannesburg, SA: Wits University, 2020), p. 68.
[136] Lauren Derby, *Cuba: Beyond cuban waters: África, la yuma, and the island's global imagination. by paul ryer,* (2019), p. 725.
[137] "Cuba Began Role in Zanzibar in '61: Havana's Part in Revolution Outlined in Washington—Guerrilla Course Cited," *The New York Times,* January 23, 1964.
[138] Derby, *Cuba*, p. 726.

institutional partnerships is with Københavns Universitet (KU) in Denmark, which actively endows the University with grant money and materials for environmental public health and marine ecosystem health services research.[139] In 2018, KU's total annual funding for SUZA totalled 6,581,512 Danish Krone—or just over US$900,000.[140] The purposes of both research areas are varied. On the one hand, the key value of studying Marine and Coastal Ecosystem Health and Services is listed as being for the support of fisheries and aquaculture development. However, this support is qualified as being primarily for the benefit of environmentally sustainable private sector tourism development.[141] Addressing the partnership's Environmental Public Health imperatives, KU registers the need to address urgent Zanzibari health challenges including "poor solid waste management, poor sanitation, pressure on the water resources, insufficient food hygiene, and an increasing risk of urban and waste related mosquito borne diseases and frequent outbreaks of cholera"—especially in coastal communities.[142] But once again, private sector partners linked to tourism management are listed clearly as the intended research partners and beneficiaries (as opposed to the local communities that suffer from the consequences of these public health risk factors). As in the French context, the partnership is clearly intended to buttress SUZA's position as a commercial partner as opposed to an agent of intellectual development or public engagement. Going further, it should be clarified that tourism development has little to no linkage to poverty reduction in the region (an issue at the heart of the aforementioned public health and environmental challenges). Although upwards of 65,000 Zanzibaris are employed in the tourism sector,

[139] "The State University of Zanzibar (SUZA) & Partner Consortium of Danish Institutions," *Department of Public Health & University of Copenhagen (UCPH)*, February 2018, p. 5.
[140] "SUZA & Partner Consortium of Danish institutions," p. 5.
[141] "SUZA & Partner Consortium of Danish institutions," p. 9.
[142] "SUZA & Partner Consortium of Danish institutions," p. 9.

these jobs are predominantly low-paying and offer no benefits or prospects of advancement, as most large hotels are foreign owned and prefer to hire foreign managerial staff.[143] So, although KU cites its relationship with SUZA as an opportunity to provide "basic income generating services to private and government stakeholders,"[144] it's worth clarifying that these opportunities are not intended for the general Zanzibari public, and as we know, providing this type of income generating service to private stakeholders is not linked to growth of local income or poverty reduction. As a result, the aforementioned health and environmental challenges that disproportionately impact poor communities (and are dire: for instance, in 2016, 68 Zanzibaris died of cholera[145]) continue to go unsolved. At the end of the day, this well-funded environmental health research is being conducted (and funded) with express intent to buttress overseas tourism and corporate private sector development. If anything, KU's partnership with SUZA further bifurcates the imperialist North-South capital relationships that have survived 60-plus years since independence.

On a higher level, we can look to the Global Partnership for Education, a private Washington, D.C.-based organization which in 2018 allocated US$8.28 million to the Zanzibar Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MoEST) and was more recently considering an increased annual contribution of US$9.24 million.[146] Continued funding by the Partnership has been made partially contingent on PBFs similar to those dictated by the World Bank, namely, on strong standardized test scores across all levels of education. These standardized examinations (the results of which determine financial

[143] Rotarou, *Tourism in Zanzibar*, p. 257.
[144] "SUZA & Partner Consortium of Danish institutions," p. 10.
[145] "Zanzibar Comprehensive Cholera Elimination Plan (ZACCEP) 2018 - 2027," *Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar*, n.d., p. 5.
[146] "Zanzibar ESPIG Program Document Multiplier Fund Additional MCA Finance Fixed and Variable Tranche 2020 - 2022," *Global Partnership for Education*, 2019, p. 6.

disbursements) are to be developed in accordance with an options paper developed by a UNICEF-affiliated consultancy—effectively excluding regional organizations with localized understandings of educational needs from the testing process. A committee established by the Partnership will have visibility of test results and if necessary, advise MoEST on remedial pedagogical strategies.[147] Continued funding from the Partnership is, of course, contingent on the cooperation of MoEST with these aforementioned externally-drafted performance enhancing strategies. Again, while SUZA is not an expressly named beneficiary of the Zanzibari relationship to the Global Partnership for Education, the partnership illustrates the same broader North-South dynamics, contingencies, and mechanisms of forced contingencies present in both larger scale donations (e.g. from the World Bank) and more micro ones (such as KU).

In order to assess whether these partnerships' have any capacity to enable sustainable, indigenous, and independent development, we can also take a deeper dive into SUZA's partnerships with fellow East African universities, which could potentially enable the utilization of regionally-informed ideological and scientific dialogues. For one: the agreement signed in 2017 between SUZA's Department of Computer Science and the African Center of Excellence in Internet of Things (IoT) at the College of Science and Technology at University of Rwanda. With US$310,000 allocated for a five year time period,[148] the two institutions are engaging in a six-pronged partnership involving faculty & student exchange programs, joint research projects, a coordinated graduate degree program, joint academic activities & events, and mutualistic administrative activities

[147] "Zanzibar ESPIG Program Document Multiplier Fund," p. 31.
[148] "Partnership Agreement Between Department of Computer Science at State University of Zanzibar and African Center of Excellence in Internet of Things, College of Science and Technology at University of Rwanda," *African Center of Excellence in Internet of Things*, 2017, p. 3

(such as the exploration of further institutional partnership opportunities and supporting the accreditation of new Master's programs).[149] The purpose of said partnership is stated (albeit vaguely) as being to recognize "the importance of the universities' role in the promotion of international collaboration, equality and increased contribution to the development of society."[150] At first glance, the promotion of East African IoT infrastructure may not sound terribly political (after all, IoT describes the data exchange between physically discrete physical systems in a network—such as refrigerator sensors across a grocery store reporting real time temperature fluctuations to a central data store). But in an age where data architectures drive nearly every system around us, data colonialism, a combination of "the predatory extractive practices of historical colonialism with the abstract quantification methods of computing," is providing the preconditions for a stage of capitalism that appropriates human life through data,[151] nurturing the capacity to build homegrown data architectures could be instrumental in supporting independent East African sustainability. In other words: technical and intellectual collaboration independent of Northern interests offers a context for the potentially revolutionary, anti-imperial end of producing indigenous technological self-governance.

Similarly, we can consider the contributions of the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA)—which is cited[152] as a primary contributor of infrastructural development at SUZA—as a possibility of how southern development bodies may offer futures for pan-African structures of extra-governmental economic support. BADEA, a Sudanese-based financial institution established by an alliance of 18

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[149] "Partnership Agreement Between SUZA and ACEIOT," *African Center of Excellence in Internet of Things*, p. 2.
[150] "Partnership Agreement Between SUZA and ACEIOT," p. 1.
[151] Nick Couldry & Ulises Mejias. *Data colonialism: rethinking big data's relation to the contemporary subject*, (2018), p. 1.
[152] "Education Budget Brief 2018: Zanzibar," p. 19.

Arab countries, operates with the goal of "strengthening economic, financial and technical cooperation between the Arab and African regions and for the embodiment of Arab-African solidarity."[153] Just one of BADEA's contributions to SUZA includes a grant of US$190,000 to enhance the capacity and reach of the University's Kiswahili teaching programs.[154] This funding includes several components of technical assistance, including updating physical infrastructure, a language teacher training program, and development of an online learning platform for the department.[155] Recalling Mamdani's assertion that one prong of decolonizing the African university involves nurturing non-Western intellectual traditions,[156] it's clear that the funding of a robust indigenous language program holds enormous power. In Zanzibar, Kiswahili scholarship is lacking, as the government has long held a (recently expanded) ban on instruction in pupils' mother tongue. Currently, instruction shifts to English at Grade 5, meaning that only early education takes place in indigenous languages.[157] This shift, of course, is intended to better enable mass integration with an anglophonic economic climate, and for this reason, expanding opportunities to engage with higher-level intellectual materials in indigenous languages and creating opportunities to produce new intellectual products in one's mother tongue is a powerful tool of anti-imperialist means.

Also of note is the fact that this particular grant was given in a one-time, nonrefundable lump sum payment. Of course, it should be assumed that BADEA's satisfaction with SUZA's performance will have relevance to the disbursement of future grants (meaning that we cannot entirely discount the influence of PBFs). Still, the

[153] "About BADEA," *Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa*.
[154] "Annual Report 2014," *Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa*, 2014, p. 69.
[155] "Annual Report 2014," p. 69.
[156] Mamdani, "The African University."
[157] Haroun Ayoub Maalim, *The Replacement of Swahili Medium of Instruction by English from Grade 5 in Zanzibar: from Complementary to Contradictory,* (2015), p. 45.

reception of BADEA's grant in a one-time, lump-sum payment is a potentially empowering departure from the contingencies that other entities, such as the Global Partnership for Education, use to avoid *full* payout of grants until PBFs are met (so that they can then get away with only a partial payout to and avoid investment in noncooperative institutions). At least to a certain extent, BADEA's practices represent a shift away from the heavy reliance on funding contingencies that often distort and shrink the ability of the East African university to self-govern amidst forced reliances on overseas funding pipelines.

But to be clear, partnerships between southern or peer East African universities do not inherently spell a through-and-through dissipation of the neoliberal imperialism more overtly present in HEET or KU, for instance. One example is the Partnership for Enhanced and Blended Learning (PEBL)— a four-year project involving six partnered universities across East Africa: SUZA, Makerere University, Strathmore University, Kenyatta University, Open University of Tanzania, and University of Rwanda.[158] What is especially intriguing about PEBL is that—despite its leadership by the London-based Association of Commonwealth Universities and funding by the UK Department for International Development—its goals focus on digitally-empowered educational accessibility and institutional capacity-building and largely avoid addressing ideological pedagogical or subject-related markers for learning. In Riara University in Kenya, for instance, implementation of a new online learning platform allowed the university to handle an admissions increase of 50-percent while dealing with blended learning challenges in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic.[159] At Kenya Methodist University,

[158] "Partnership for Enhanced and Blended Learning (PEBL)," *The State University of Zanzibar*.
[159] Daniella Hu, "The impact of PEBL: key takeaways from an external evaluation," *The Association of Commonwealth Universities*, September 17, 2021.

which had already been teaching partially-remote since 2016, the time that instructors were spending to optimize digital course options was draining their capacity for pedagogical innovation. PEBL claims that as a result of the digital innovation brought about by the partnership, professors have a heightened capacity to focus on the development of student-centered, accessible approaches for their courses.[160] While exciting, the impacts of PEBL still bring to light overlooked issues of digital accessibility: after all, how inclusive can digitally-empowered educational access initiatives truly be in a country where under 20-percent of the population has internet access?[161] Although speculative, one would wonder if a version of PEBL divorced from its British stakeholders and purely in the hands of its East African partners would have more effectively considered alternative strategies for increasing educational access in an area where internet access and digital literacy is a significant roadblock.

One on end, the instance of bilateral relations between SUZA and Cuba, as well as the peer IoT program, offers insight into foreign fiscal relationships that are not necessarily subtractive of (and may even contribute to) the East African university's capacity for revolutionary dialogue. On the other hand, relationships such as the French partnership, UNICEF's heavily-contingent funding of educational administration in the region, and SUZA's relationship with Københavns Universitet uncover the imperialist and exploitative underbellies of many of these other relations. Looking at these instances in contrast to one another, it's clear that there is no one definitive, singular answer to the relationship of an overseas financial partnership to the University's capacity for nourishing revolutionary ideologies, for within each relationship—even those of

[160] Hu, "The impact of PEBL."
[161] Max Roser, et al.,"Internet," *Our World in Data,* n.d.

South-South geographic status—there is significant implicative nuance. Perhaps one of the most useful illustrations of this complex reality is the nature of South Korean disbursements, whose overseas development assistance (ODA) to Africa reveals how this form of new imperialism can simultaneously reinforce and contradict the neoliberal, capital logic of power.

Just between 2006 and 2019, South Korea's provision of ODA to Africa skyrocketed from US$64.1 million to US$501 million, transforming it into a major emerging donor on the African continent.[162] South Korea's status as an emerging donor is significant, given that recent aid recipients have named emerging donors as offering qualitatively less exploitative assistance and being able to better recognize and understand regional development concerns and needs.[163] Because of this, emerging donors' ODA has come to be viewed by some leaders as a positive alternative to dominant aid funnels originating from Western development paradigms—a trend that's been especially welcome at a time when African leaders are increasingly calling Western development agendas into question (inspiring a growing "Look East" orientation to aid).[164] That being said, the highlights of the South Korean context do not negate the reality that the country's aid objectives are, of course, closely tied to national interest. This is of commercial significance given that South Korea's trade with Africa has consistently been weighed in favor of Korean exporters.[165] This exercise of national interest can be applied in noncommercial issues of soft power as well—notably, this

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[162] Office for Government Policy Coordination, "What We Do: By Region," *Korea Official Development Assistance*; Korea Eximbank, "ODA Statistics" and "Development Co-Operation Profiles: Korea," *Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.*

[163] Soyeun Kim & Kevin Gray, *Overseas development aid as spatial fix? Examining South Korea's Africa policy*, (2016), p. 651.

[164] Kim & Gray, *Overseas development aid as spatial fix?* p. 651.

[165] "Recent Trends in Import and Export," *KOTRA,* n.d.*, p. 25.*

happened in the mid-2000s when South Korea strategically dispersed aid to support Korean diplomat Ban Ki-Moon's eventually successful campaign for United Nations Secretary-General.[166] As such, despite the divergence of South Korea's ODA disbursements from Western development paradigms, funding approaches that "look east" or collaborate primarily with emerging donors can still be subject to the imperialist dimensions that proliferate even more successfully within Western neoliberal models. This is to say that no source of funding that SUZA is involved with, or that we discuss in this thesis, is simply either "revolutionary" or "nonrevolutionary." This is because national and commercial self-interests make total separation from the imperialist underbelly an enormous challenge (if not an outright impossibility), although relationships to this underbelly will inevitably vary greatly in degree.

Perhaps, then, the conflicting implications of South Korean ODA disbursement—which speak volumes to the challenges posed by other funding pipelines specific to SUZA and other peer universities—parallel the long and contested state of the revolutionary ideologies that we've set out to study in Zanzibar. Those invoking these moments of Zanzibari revolutionsim oft point to the impact of Arab intellectuals in the archipelago amidst the period of British colonial rule. But as we've discussed, we know that these trails of revolutionary anti-imperialism haven't been without their contradictions. As has been echoed by the scholar Amal Ghazal, Zanzibar under the sultanate was viewed as an apex, or "paradise" of Arab rule—earning a reputation of economic and intellectual tolerance and prosperity.[167] Intellectual progressivism characterized a society with a flourishing culture of anti-British anticolonial subversion,

[166] Kim & Gray, *Overseas development aid as spatial fix?* p. 651.
[167] Ghazal, *Islamic Reform and Arab Nationalism*, p. 1.

but yet, East African intellectual cultural traditions were were still being forcibly displaced by Arab entrance onto Zanzibar and the islands' dominant sociopolitical institutions and thus, suffered. And then, in the postcolonial era, a time of revolutionary triumph, nationalist leaders such as John Okello oversaw the massacre and exile of countless Arab and Asian families—most of whom were not in positions of wealth in the first place.[168] Revolution in Zanzibar (or anywhere, for that matter) has never been pure. And so while the situation of overseas funding in the educational sector may not resemble a pure form of revolutionary administration, it could be argued that the contested, often imperfect relationships between SUZA and some peer southern and East African institutions do in fact fit into the generations-long legacy of revolutionism in Zanzibar. Thus, the reception of funding by peer African organizations may be a meaningful step towards decolonizing the East African university for the sake of enabling revolutionary intellectual dialogue, but in order for the fulfillment of this vision to be realized, these organizations must too be freed from the neoliberal, profit-motivated pedagogical logics that plague others.

This uncertain point of conclusion is not intended to appear as equivocation, but a frank assessment of the complexity, variance, and unresolvedness of these relationships. At the end of the day, the conclusions that we arrive at within this chapter can offer a less definitive explanation of whether or not these relationships are revolutionary in and of themselves than whether they allow SUZA the agency to engage with intellectual and administrative paradigms of revolutionary, anti-colonial, and anti-imperialist means that are at the heart of the university's decolonization. So, do they offer this allowance? As Mamdani defines in "The African University," besides our own project of nurturing

[168] Clayton, *The Zanzibar Revolution and its Aftermath*, p. 80.

intellectual ferment, there are several ways to decolonize the African university, but one of the most easy to articulate is the imperative to essentially do the opposite of Western universities. That is, foster inclusivity by reducing the cost of education through state grants and subsidies while nurturing non-Westernized intellectual traditions "as living vehicles of scholarly and public discourse" alongside the project of making other Western traditions linguistically accessible.[169] Mamdani's emphasis on indigenous pedagogical accessibility summarily points to the rest of this thesis: that, in our project of nurturing revolutionary spaces of learning, individuals must be watchful for how Westernized (often vocationally-focused) programs work in tandem with—and not exclusively from—the non-Westernized intellectual traditions that work to broadly engage with native scholarly and public discourse.

[169] Mamdani, "The African University."

CHAPTER IV: The Pedagogy of the University

The partnerships and administrative mechanisms studied in the previous chapter don't operate in a vacuum—their relationship to the decolonization and revolutionism of the classroom necessarily interacts closely with what is actually happening *inside* the classroom. Perhaps it sounds obvious, but it should be made clear: neither SUZA's administrative apparatus nor classroom pedagogies operate discretely from one another. It is with this knowledge that we are brought to our next point of exploration. As it has grown into maturity, SUZA has simultaneously found itself—like many others—grappling with equally important questions of access and educational dispensation. Sure, the regional educational landscape has changed over the years, and in many ways for the better. Only 13 students were enrolled in higher education in Tanzania in 1961, but roughly 60 years later, that number hovers at roughly 120,000.[170] Today, the educational supply issue may no longer be as immediately dire, but we are still left to question *who* it is who is going forth out of these esteemed institutions, and which pedagogical knowledges they are leaving with—armed to narrate the identity and ideology, in turn, of the nation.

Elsie Eyakuze, the writer who spoke of Abdulrazak Gurnah's Nobel Prize win, put it quite simply: in a country divided over identity and language, literature can be tricky.[171] Identity—language, nativity, et cetera—comes with knowledge, and contested identities come with contested knowledges. As Eyakuze put it, that makes these knowledges quite tricky, indeed. And we have seen this trickiness. At the end of the day,

[170] Samson John Mgaiwa, *The Paradox of Funding Public Higher Education in Tanzania and the Fate of Quality Education*, (2018), p. 4.
[171] Eyakuze, "Tanzanians Are Very Proud of the Nobel Winner We Haven't Read."

the academic dispensations—or the study of *who* is consuming *which* academic and intellectual knowledges at SUZA—that this final chapter will discuss are a culmination of our previous work (that which has explored the complex interactions of subjection, nativity, and political ideology across all levels of the regional sociopolitic). These knowledges sit amidst, as a result of, and also perpetuate the local, regional, and global cultural political economies that we've worked to illuminate.

As it happens, SUZA's fourth campus, the Teachers' Training College, is named after Benjamini Mkapa—the third post-independence President of Tanzania. Mkapa, who was the first Tanzanian leader to be elected after the return to a multiparty electoral system, oversaw the country's transition from Nyerere's socialist system of development to a free-market, capitalist economy.[172] His 10-year administration, ending in 2005, put a heavy priority on industrial privatization (read: the adoption of market neoliberalism), and, by the end of the administration, had paved the way for the establishment of 30 commercial banks and 100 private nonbank institutions in Tanzania.[173]

Moreover, Mkapa's influence on educational policy is quite complex. To his credit, his administration oversaw a rise in primary educational attendance resulting from the abolition of attendance fees for public schools and a ballooning number of universities nationally, stemming from his government's allowance of NGOs and religious organizations to establish institutions of higher education.[174] This meaningful

[172] Abdi Latif Dahir, "Former President of Tanzania Benjamin Mkapa Dies at 81," *The New York Times,* July 25, 2020.
[173] "Mkapa leaves a socialist state more liberalised," *The New Humanitarian*, December 13, 2005.
[174] "Mkapa leaves a socialist state more liberalised," *The New Humanitarian*.

extension of educational access is, of course, a powerful endeavor. The connection of education, not just to income, but to overall well-being, is not to be overlooked: while the correlated return between income and happiness is a quickly diminishing one, the relationship between education and happiness is stronger.[175] According to a Princeton University study, the "educational system not only 'channels people into two different life cycle tracks characterized by higher and lower income trajectories' [...] Education also seems to open up possibilities for leading happy lives that go beyond extending the consumption-possibility frontier."[176] From this basis, there is a capacity for communal fulfillment that comes from educational access, and from this lens, Mkaka's contributions to the educational sphere are noble ones. And yet, the story told by such esteemed statistics don't truly illuminate the implications of the neoliberal transformation of the educational sector (overseen, in part, by Mkapa) or the intentions of an institution with noted reverence for Mkapa's political mission.

This is because not all educations are created equally—that is, not all, especially in the neoliberal era, are productive sites for the intellectual fermentation that has enabled other ideologically-generative dialogues in eras past. To be very clear: these spaces do not have analogous intentions as those offering commercially-focused educational space. Given Princeton's findings that the happiness and social wellbeing promoted by education go beyond the consumption-possibility frontier, we must necessarily remember that the benefit of education extends far beyond consumerist motives. This is not to say that poverty reduction shouldn't be centered within institutional intentions, but a reminder that the profit-motives of the neoliberal university are not necessarily

[175] Erich Striessnig, *Too Educated to be Happy? An investigation into the relationship between education and subjective well-being*, (n.d.), p. 28.
[176] Striessnig, *Too Educated to be Happy?* p. 28.

"pro-poor."[177] Thus, this chapter asks who has access to SUZA's knowledges today (and, of course, what those knowledges are) while necessarily questioning what educational benefits that access promotes. Here, we work to identify the "neoliberal pedagogies" of the University, that is— "the uncritical promotion of values of enterprise and entrepreneurship through approaches that lead to greater 'frontline' business involvement in schools, helping to normalize free market values and 'neoliberal commonplaces.'"[178]

As Henry A. Giroux aptly put it, while "the forces of neoliberalism and corporate culture gain ascendancy in the United States, there is an increasing call for people to either surrender or narrow their capacities for engaged politics in exchange for market-based values, relationships, and identities."[179] Since the establishment of the postcolonial East African university, the spaces occupied by humanities and social sciences courses that inspired and hosted dialogues on concepts of governance, national identity, engaged politics, and power relations have generally been eschewed in favor of tourism, business, and other marketable industrially-focused tracks. In the neoliberal age, it may even be worth going so far as to say that the role of the university has become more that of an industrial preparatory center than as a site of well-rounded intellectual growth—the new mandate of the university is the economization of productivity.[180] To even begin to understand these pedagogical mechanisms, we must consider issues of access within SUZA.

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[177] Rotarou, *Tourism in Zanzibar,* p. 252.
[178] Patricia Mccafferty, *Forging a 'neoliberal pedagogy': The 'enterprising education' agenda in schools*, (2010), p. 1.
[179] Henry A. Giroux, *Neoliberalism, corporate culture, and the promise of higher education: The University as a Democratic public sphere*, (2002), p. 426.
[180] Igea Troiani & Claudia Dutson, *The Neoliberal University as a Space to Learn/Think/Work in Higher Education,* (2021), p. 6.

Looking to Zanzibar's most recent statistical abstract (CY 2020), pressing issues of this access come to the foreground. On a positive note, in just the last decade, the number of primary and secondary schools in the archipelago ballooned. Since 2011, the number of public secondary schools has grown from 95 to 210, and the number of private secondary institutions has risen from 9 to 13.[181] Keep in mind, however, that the majority of private facilities (which have also seen the highest growth rates) are in the nursery, primary, and middle levels.[182] This prioritization of private education in the earliest levels of education can be attributed to a number of factors, but perhaps most notably, language of instruction. In Tanzania, public primary schools usually teach in Kiswahili or other indigenous languages only until Grade 5, while private primary schools teach principally in English.[183] However, both public and primary secondary schools (or any level above Grade 5) teach in English.[184] This means that those students who have enjoyed a private education since early levels will more likely have the language skills to succeed in an English-language classroom setting once they transition to secondary school, whereas those children attending public schools will often not. This, of course, implies that public students may be entering into secondary school less-equipped to thrive in classroom settings, when it comes to non-quantitative disciplines. Given that admission to SUZA is dependent on a slate of grade-point-average and standardized testing requirements[185] (all of which are tied to this ability to thrive in the secondary school's classroom), early attendance in private schools is likely tied to one's capacity to enter into higher education in Zanzibar. Perhaps then it should not be surprising that during this same 10 year period,

[181] "Zanzibar Statistical Abstract, 2020," *The Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar,* May 2021, p. 21-22.
[182] "Zanzibar Statistical Abstract, 2020," p. 21-22.
[183] Mari C. Yogi, *Kiswahili or English: A Policy Analysis of Language Instruction in Tanzania*, (2017), p. 10.
[184] Maalim, *The Replacement of Swahili Medium of Instruction*, p. 45.
[185] "Entry Qualification - Bachelor's Degree Programmes," *The State University of Zanzibar,* n.d.

total public school enrollment rose by roughly 62-percent, while private enrollment skyrocketed by a much larger 274-percent.[186]

And yet, while the number of secondary and pre-secondary facilities continue to grow, higher educational capacity has not. Although more and more students continue to attend these schools, there are still only three higher education institutions—unchanged over the last decade—in Zanzibar with a total enrollment capacity of roughly 5,000. This is only 4-percent of the current total secondary school enrollment.[187] To put it more clearly, there is an ever growing number of students making it through the secondary level and competing for a comparatively static number of seats within the archipelago's sparse higher education institutions, SUZA included. Take this reality with the fact that private school enrollment is growing at a much faster rate than that of public schools, and suddenly, it appears that less-affluent students will continue to have a more difficult time gaining entry into university (especially when considering the reality that Tanzanian private schooling has not been found to narrow learning inequalities for those few poor students who are able to attend[188]).

Moreover, annual cost for SUZA's Bachelor's programs currently ranges from roughly US$750 to US$960.[189] For the median earner, these programs cost approximately 4.75 and 6.1 months of yearly income, respectively.[190] Although the postcolonial era saw an explosion of new universities in Tanzania (from one to 62 between 1961 and 2015), the onset of the neoliberal era in the 1980s saw the abolition of fee-free higher education as universities began admitting students on a tuition-charging basis in order to offset the

[186] "Zanzibar Statistical Abstract, 2020," p. 24.
[187] "Zanzibar Statistical Abstract, 2020," p. 29.
[188] Benjamin Alcott & Pauline Rose, *Does private schooling narrow wealth inequalities in learning outcomes? Evidence from East Africa,* (2016), p.2.
[189] "SUZA - Harmonized fee structure for the academic year," *The State University of Zanzibar*, n.d.
[190] "Anker Living Income Reference Value: Rural Tanzania 2020," Global Living Wage Coalition, n.d.

increasingly unreliable lines of funding from the state.[191] Especially for a middle-low income country where the average earner will enjoy access to less discretionary spending, enrollment fees of this scale are often prohibitive, or at the very least, require incurring significant debt. Therefore, entrance to institutions of higher education is not only gatekept by early access to private education, it is also (perhaps unsurprisingly) linked closely to socioeconomic status—which is also a primary determinant of early access to early private education. Clearly, for both socioeconomic and academic reasons, SUZA's admittance and attendance is tied closely to one's capacity to pay for early private education. Right off the bat, then, we can understand—at least to a certain extent—that the average SUZA student will likely have enjoyed an above-average level of socioeconomic status. Of course, this status will inevitably favor those in dominant loci of incumbent power. If the University plays a role in narrating Zanzibar's collective ideological narratives and those who are granted access to the high educational space skew towards incumbent power-players, it's well worth considering that this ideological identity narrated through the University will likely be politically dominant, disencouraging the institution's disposition for intellectual subversion.

As a result of these financially exclusive admittance practices, 50% of Tanzania's public higher education budget is spent monitoring and facilitating the Higher Education Students Loans Board's issuance of loans[192]—a reality that calls into question whether the bureaucratic cost of maintaining tuition-charging institutions actually negates the fiscal benefit of abolishing fee-free university education. At the end of the day, the withering of public funds for higher education as a result of increased government funding allocation

[191] Mgaiwa, *The Paradox of Funding Public Higher Education in Tanzania*, (2018), p. 2.
[192] Mgaiwa, *The Paradox of Funding Public Higher Education in Tanzania*, p. 4.

for commercial institutions and bureaucratic bodies such as HESLB has meant that more and more public universities, SUZA included, have been forced to seek out various other funding pathways. These will often materialize in the form of Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) (as contracts or research cooperation agreements) and North-South partnership-grabbing for research and development funds.[193]

As has been discussed, these partnerships will then play a role in determining the pedagogical slant of the University, and thus, this acknowledgement of development agreements brings us closer to understanding exactly which knowledges—or disciplines—SUZA is prioritizing. Not only do these South-North ideological relationships inform the University's teaching, they also bring SUZA into closer alignment with Zanzibar's commercial landscape. To illustrate: in recent years, Zanzibar has experienced a gradually lowering capacity (an average of -1% per annum) to produce manufactured goods, putting it in a less-equipped position to participate in manufacturing sectors than mainland Tanzania and a host of peer countries including Mauritius, Seychelles, Maldives, Comoros, and Madagascar.[194] As a result, the Tanzanian government says that Zanzibar must take "drastic measures" if it hopes to become a semi-industrialized economy (a goal stated in Zanzibar Vision 2020, a national poverty reduction framework).[195] [196] As a part of this, both mainland and Zanzibari governments have stated their intention to double-down in the educational sector on the disciplines that will aid in the materialization of Zanzibar Vision's recommendations. This has meant

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[193] Mgaiwa. *The Paradox of Funding Public Higher Education in Tanzania*, p. 4.
[194] "Tanzania Industrial Competitiveness Report 2015. Tanzania at a Crossroad: Shifting Gears Towards Inclusive and Sustainable Industrialisation," *United Nations Industrial Development Organization*, n.d., p. 13.
[195] "Tanzania Industrial Competitiveness Report 2015," p. 14.
[196] Keep in mind that the same source cites Zanzibar's commercial deficiencies as a 25-plus year long historical problem—notable considering that the government is citing roughly 1990 as the beginning of this commercially weakened era, which happens to coincide with the liberalization of the market in Tanzania (but I digress).

principal emphasis on programs complementing the North-South lines of tourism and hospitality, as well as bolstering local capacities for participation in overseas commercial activity.

This emphasis brings us to a discussion of discipline at the University. At its establishment, SUZA opened schools of Education, Arts & Sciences; Engineering; Business; Agriculture; Health & Medical Sciences; and Law. The University also contains five institutes, those of Policy Studies & Research; Continuing Education (since replaced by Tourism Development & Maritime Studies); Kiswahili & Foreign Languages; and Environmental Studies.[197] Sure, given the industrially-driven systems of imperialist forced dependency that existed coming out of the colonial era, these professionally-tracked programs have an educational legacy of counteracting the British policies of forced dependence, and thus, could be construed as being meaningfully anti-imperialist in nature. That being said, the simultaneously-existing identity-building opportunities that were, for a period, encouraged within the postcolonial university are no longer as obviously present within these programs.

More specifically, SUZA's current educational dispensations fail to deliver non-Westernized intellectual traditions that promote self-governance and local agency on two counts: their observed tendencies towards orienting industry-specific programming towards northern commercial needs (a product of framing Zanzibar's own needs around an attachment to overseas "superpowers'), and a lack of educational tracks emphasizing the liberal arts, social sciences, or humanities. On the first count, programs such as the Institute of Tourism demonstrate this pattern more obviously. However, an examination of other, less obviously commercial programs still illuminate a similar pattern. Take the

[197] Act No. 8 of 1999 of the Zanzibar House of Representatives, p. 16.

University's Department of Natural Sciences, which has adopted increasingly climate and sustainability-focused objectives. Building collective knowledge and expertise in this area is critical for paving Zanzibar's future, especially considering that 70-percent of natural disasters in Tanzania are attributable to climate change.[198] The archipelago is even more susceptible to this change than the mainland— with low elevation levels that rely on the protection of historically-robust coral reefs and mangrove forests, both of which are increasingly threatened.[199] Thus, the University's climate and sustainability programs have an enormously meaningful capacity to build Zanzibar's ecological resilience, a key to its future development and survival. If we are to look back to SUZA's climate partnership with Københavns Universitet, however, we will recall that the generously-funded program aims to explore climate and environmental-health solutions primarily for the benefit of the islands' tourism industry. That is, the research enabled by the Dutch partner university has been funded for the purpose of sustaining the archipelago's draw towards mainly-European groups of tourists, thereby failing to meaningfully focus on solutions that will make future generations of Zanzibar's *own* citizens capable of withstanding (and achieving development amidst) inevitable climate change emergencies. And KU's program is not alone. Another climate-focused program at SUZA is funded through the Building Stronger University project, which categorizes community sustainability as a large-scale project of mass importance.[200] But yet again, this concept of "community sustainability" is principally focused on "[improving] the public health and [enhancing] the sustainable growth of the tourism sector" and other

[198] "Climate Next: How data and community can save Zanzibar's mangroves," *MarketScreener*.,November 30, 2021.
[199] "Climate Next," *MarketScreener*.
[200] Vibeke Quaad, "Sustainable tourism: BSU3 launched at the State University of Zanzibar," *Danida Fellowship Centre, February 27, 2018.*

"key economic sectors."[201] Again, local public health and safety is omitted from the plan, and recalling that the Zanzibari tourism industry has little to no impact on local poverty reduction, we cannot expect the program to encourage the anti-imperialist mission of self-sustaining infrastructural governance. Once again, neoliberal profit-value is extracted from the program, as opposed to genuine community development.

In another seemingly innocuous vein, SUZA recently merged with the Zanzibar Journalism and Mass Media College (ZJMMC). This move signals enormous potential for future revolutionism within the University, as a powerful journalism program within an institution welcome to political subversion would offer the potential to equip builders of subversive, revolutionary ideologies with the skills necessary to disseminate these revolutionary logics across Zanzibar and even East Africa. However, it is unlikely that this would be able to happen within an institution closely governed by CCM, and at the time of the merger, its purpose was explicitly named as being "a move to employ the idea of the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar to connect its higher learning institutions"[202]— that is, a move to employ the CCM-led government to equip students to disseminate its own globalized neoliberal logics which will further entrench Zanzibar's systems of forced dependence on global superpowers in relationships reminiscent of the period of imperialist rule.

Slightly earlier, SUZA established a food technology program in conjunction with the China National Research Institute of Food and Fermentation Industries (CNRIFFI) in order to problem-solve in the areas of microbial resource utilization, new food resource

[201] Quaad, "Sustainable tourism."

[202] "ZJMMC becomes part of SUZA," *The State University of Zanzibar*, August 30, 2020.

development, food safety assurance technology, and more.[203] In Zanzibar, where only 16-percent of residents[204] live with minimal risk of food insecurity (72-percent are living in "stressed" status and another 11-percent are experiencing either "emergency" or "famine" food insecurity situations),[205] a robust food science program committed to the study of under-utilized food resources suggests overwhelmingly positive implications for building the capacity to improve basic quality of life and self-sufficiency for the archipelago, a meaningful anticolonial goal. But again, this program has been established with the express intent of bolstering SUZA's Institute of Tourism Development, and more broadly, strengthening political ties with China.[206] In this instance, a well-funded program with the potential to help break the colonial cycle of forced dependence is being utilized not to do so, but instead, to develop an inaccessible culinary culture that will build a tourism network more appealing to travelers and strengthen wealth-building opportunities for stakeholders in large hospitality conglomerates. Profit-motive over communal development. While the commercial university downsizes the humanities in favor of these evolving research opportunities, development consistently fails to evolve in pro-poor directions, or those directions that fund research into services (such as public health) that operate for the benefit of the regional public or those who cannot pay for them.[207]

As these journalism, environmental health, and food technology programs (amongst others) demonstrate, foundations for potentially revolutionary disciplines often already exist within SUZA. The challenge, therefore, is maintaining these programs with

[203] "CNRIFFI seeks to set up collaboration with SUZA," *The State University of Zanzibar*, September 30, 2017.
[204] Note: not all regions of the islands have been surveyed, results may not be entirely representative.
[205] "Tanzania: Acute Food Insecurity Situation in Zanzibar July 2017 – September 2017 and Projection for October - December 2017," *Integrated Food Security Phase Classification.*
[206] "CNRIFFI seeks to set up collaboration with SUZA," *The State University of Zanzibar,* n.d.
[207] Giroux, *Neoliberalism, corporate culture, and the promise of higher education*, p. 434.

relative independence of the globalized neoliberal political economic mechanisms that have shifted the university away from intellectual pedagogies and towards commercial efficiency. Or, even more actionably (and crucial for the previous point), this could involve splitting Revolutionary Government power away from unilateral CCM control, so as to allow for real ideological negotiation in the administration of the government and University. This, then, could potentially offer regenerated space for the fermentation of non-incumbent intellectual and social dialogues that would proffer the opportunity for revolutionary ideologies to sprout within the University and find homes within these preexisting programs.

The deconstruction of the humanities, social sciences, and liberal arts academic pathways at the University leads us to the same conclusion. By removing access to non-industry specific programming that encourages independent intellectual ferment, the inherently political university cements incumbent ideological power by removing contexts where students can engage in potentially dissenting discourse. This is not to say that these spaces are *entirely* nonexistent. Currently, the University houses a small Department of Social Sciences with programs including social work and history which are taught with an embrace of "multidisciplinary [approaches] in knowledge provision."[208] Moreover, as discussed in the previous chapter, the Department of Kiswahili studies has experienced robust growth as of late thanks (in part) to relationships with peer East African institutions. Providing students the opportunity to engage with high educational dialogues—and go forth narrating these dialogues outside of the University gates—in native languages poses enormously important potential for access to developmental strategies. But nonetheless, it is clear that these programs are not

[208] "Department of Social Sciences," *The State University of Zanzibar*, n.d.

at the forefront of SUZA's educational mission (at least to the same extent as its Tourism and Business programs, for instance), and further development of these sorts of programs in conjunction with the self-governance of other, commercially focused programs will play a necessary role in equipping future leaders to engage in non-incumbent discourses.

At the end of the day, though, the bottom line is that these educational dispensations signal a drift away from the core objective of educating (if we're to define "education" closely to "intellectual growth") and towards the goal of infrastructurally transforming the community that it sits within. With the entrant of the "development university," the university that is expected to directly and practically contribute to regional private development projects,[209] and the more contemporary legacy of neoliberalism, which has facilitated a retreat of public sector educational spending,[210] there has been left a vacuum in the ways that the university interacts with its community, and that vacuum has been filled by private sector interests. No longer does the university involve itself in community development efforts through the projects of intellectual development or poverty reduction, it contributes via industry-oriented projects of private-sector transformation. A community molded by the neoliberal development university will be equipped to manage existing, externally-governed industry, but the university in this case is not contributing towards this community's ideological capacity for truly independent self-governance.

And yet, as in the context of partisan political mobilization, there is room for dissident movements within these spaces of incumbent dialogue. Countless theorists such as Ruud Koopman have suggested various cyclical patterns to illustrate the nature of

[209] Daniel N. Sifuna, *Neoliberalism and the Changing Role of Universities in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Case of Research and Development,* (2014), p. 113.
[210] Sifuna, *Neoliberalism and the Changing Role of Universities in Sub-Saharan Africa*, p. 126.

revolutionary movement—in Koopman's case, a three-phase undulation between the expansion of contention, transformation of contention, and finally, contraction.[211] What is implicitly presumed through this cyclical state, and has been demonstrated time and time again (even in the Zanzibari context),[212] is that these final, contractive stages do not spell the end of revolution. What goes unsaid, then, is that for contraction to lapse into expansion, perhaps revolutionary seeds can germinate within otherwise nonrevolutionary spaces. For one, a review of SUZA's DSpace Repository—the University's online store of Masters' dissertations—lends credence to the capacity of students to make space for revolutionary, anti-imperial, and politically dissenting dialogue within their work.

Sabri Idrissa Muslim, who in 2019 submitted a dissertation for his Master of Environmental Sciences titled "The Effectiveness of Management of Alternative Livelihood Options for Local Communities Adjacent to Jozani Chwaka Bay Biosphere Reserve," honors this ability. In his work, where he explores the noncooperation of communities local to the Chwaka Bay Reserve with larger scale conservation efforts, Muslim directly critiques popular conservation platforms supported by the government and NGOs. These, he explains, often "ignore the needs of the local development" and fail to respect communities' human rights, "which include right to access basic living needs."[213] In his findings, Muslim underscores the failure of the government and private-sector partners to integrate local actors in conservation dialogues—stressing that long-term efficacy, which requires the buy-in of local communities, necessitates that those communities retain agency and self-governing power over the environmental

[211] Ruud Koopmans, *Protest in Time and Space: The Evolution of Waves of Contention*, (2004), p. 22.
[212] Take, for instance, periods of settled Arab or British rulership of the archipelago.
[213] Sabri Idrissa Muslim, "The Effectiveness of Management of Alternative Livelihood Options for Local Communities Adjacent to Jozani Chwaka Bay Biosphere Reserve," Master's thesis, *The State University of Zanzibar,* (2019), p. 1.

preservation process.[214] Taken at face value, Muslim's assertions may not look exactly what we imagine revolution to resemble, especially when contrasted with the revolutionary moments of the expansion eras (such as the globally visible 1960s push towards independence). But in reality, Muslim's work takes up the inherently revolutionary act of disrupting a dominant governance ideology perpetuated by disproportionately dominant power structures by instead constructing an alternative governance strategy that fulfills basic, collective needs while delivering on anti-imperial desires for indigenous self governance. The conservationist knowledges that Muslim creates stand in direct contrast to those perpetuated by the Københavns Universitet-affiliated conservation research at SUZA, for instance. KU's research, which meets environmental challenges while upholding imperialist, neoliberal governance strategies that have not been show to engage with or economically lift local communities, departs sharply from Muslim's.

Siti Juma Abdalla, a candidate for a Master of Education Degree of Youth Gender and Development at SUZA, addressed the contemporary mechanisms of imperialism discussed in this thesis even more directly in her dissertation titled "Prospects and Constraints of E-Learning Utilization at State University of Zanzibar (SUZA)." In this research, Abdalla cites a number of factors as limiting the efficacy of widely-used e-learning technologies at SUZA, one being lack of sufficient infrastructure—a direct consequence of funding shortcomings. In Abdalla's illustration of these shortcomings, she takes the step of including the testimonies of a number of students who participated in her research that criticize the University's funding structure as harmfully

[214] Muslim, "The Effectiveness of Management of Alternative Livelihood Options," p. 72.

donor-dependent.[215] Setting aside the real extent to which the University relies on the unreliable, contingent funding of outside donors—as opposed to the government—the fact stands that Abdalla's research calls into question the efficacy of the public education funding structure that has been strong-armed into dependency on outside donor sources.

These two pieces of student research alone are, of course, not an exhaustive enumeration of the revolutionary moments of intellectual work springing from SUZA, but their existence, amongst others', offers meaningful revelations. Revolution need not germinate solely within spectacular, grand gestures. Although we've been acclimated by the present day media culture to expect student revolution to present itself with the same fanfare as Wes Anderson presents the archetypal student protest movement in *The French Dispatch* (2021)[216]—this is not necessarily so. Revolution can exist in small, mundane forms, and these forms can find life even in spaces narrated nearly unilaterally by dominant power structures and their stakeholders. Perhaps then, while there isn't necessarily such a thing as a purely revolutionary space, there also isn't such a thing as an entirely *un*revolutionary space. SUZA's pedagogies, although reflective of a deeply-entrenched neoliberal order that necessarily works to stamp out non-hegemonic dialogues on democratization,[217] offer glimpses of revolutionary agency on an individual level.

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[215] Siti Juma Abdalla, "Prospects and Constraints of E-Learning Utilization at State University of Zanzibar (SUZA)," Master's thesis, *The State University of Zanzibar,* (2019), p. 59.
[216] Georgia Smith, "Wes Anderson's 'The French Dispatch': Confronting Satire and the Immutability of Youth Political Experience," *Retrospect Journal, n.d.*
[217] Bridoux, *Shaking off the neoliberal shackles*, p. 796.

CONCLUSION

Clearly, the State University of Zanzibar's place within its community and the broader East African context is one riddled with contradictions. Located in a territory hailed for its generations-long revolutionism, administered by a so-called "Revolutionary Government," but deeply entrenched in and narrated by the imperialist power structures of the globalized neoliberal order—it's complex. It is difficult, if not impossible, to ethically quantify the revolutionary sentiment within SUZA, especially without an insider's perspective, so this is not what this thesis has done. Instead, it has elucidated the expansive mechanisms that have held the University reliant on a problematic ruling regime and a global educational network that buttresses unequal North-South economic dynamics inherent to the globalized neoliberal order. At its present, the dominant sociopolitical ideologies narrating SUZA's pedagogies and arming students for their own ideological dissemination have not appeared to be of revolutionary or subversive means, instead, they predominantly operate to uphold hegemonic knowledge structures. SUZA was born amidst the Tanzanian shift to neoliberalism, and as such, has operated as an extension of the regional political dispensation—a departure from the intellectual, revolutionary ferment observed by scholars such as Mamdani in the East African university closely following the movement towards independence. As a result, SUZA as a neoliberal development university has eschewed many avenues of well-rounded intellectual ferment in favor of commercially-motivated academic and research tracks

that operate to cement the dominant developmental ideologies in the region. For this reason, SUZA has not operated as of late as a primary continuant of Zanzibar's revolutionary legacy that has played out in educational spaces in generations past. This isn't to say that revolutionary consciousness at the University is an impossibility—for history has shown us that revolution can grow out of even the most inhospitable spaces, and moreover, we've recognized the visible capacity for individual acts of revolutionary thought at the University, even on a small scale. Furthermore, this also is not to say that Zanzibar's genealogic culture of revolution is dead. The very conflict that fell upon the 2020 election, for instance, demonstrates that (despite the continued dominance of an oppressive regime) dissension is still alive and well in the territory. Perhaps, then, the power shifts that have come as a result of the neoliberal order cementation have not stamped out revolution entirely, but redefined where these ideologies can most productively and freely thrive.

Because this thesis has not—and does not intend to—serve as a prescriptive work, we cannot and will not speculate on where revolutionary thought may flourish elsewhere. That being said, Ali Amour El Maamiry's work studying self-efficacy in the information seeking behavior of SUZA students offers a certain level of hope. In her research, she noted the wider range of information-seeking platforms that are available today due growing telecommunications and technology infrastructure.[218] Granted, her work cites this shift as a negative one in regards to students' self-efficacy, as it is increasingly difficult for students to judge informational quality, and as we know, individual access to telecom infrastructure is limited in the Zanzibari context. Yet, if we are to expand on El

[218]Ali Amour El Maamiry, *Self-efficacy in the Information Seeking Behaviour of State University of Zanzibar Students: A case study*, (2016), p. 101.

Maamiry's conclusions, we may also consider that—in the context of encouraging revolutionary thought—today's wide, multi-contextual access to internet (differing from when the university was the only site of communal internet access[219]) may allow students to engage with divergent ideologies in settings outside of the school, and irrespectively of their school's institutional ideology. In other words, we are no longer living in a world where consistently accessible platforms for information seeking exist exclusively within the highest-funded spaces of education. Access to revolutionary literature, rhetoric, media, and other forms of information can be engaged irrespective of the university's ideological positionality. And thus, while we can lament the present demise of the university as a reliable site of revolutionary intellectual ferment in the age of neoliberalism, there may be a certain truth to the claim that revolutionary thought may no longer rely on the support of the university for survival to nearly the same extent as it did in the early years of the postcolonial era. Although the struggle to sustain meaningful revolutionary intellectual ferment in the university—a space so consequential to development—may surely be considered a handicap, perhaps the ever-faster spread of information outside of school walls mean that the rise of the neoliberal university is not necessarily the end of the line for Zanzibar's revolutionary ideologies.

Other work fruitfully springing from this thesis' findings may engage with questions of what sites of active revolution look like in Zanzibar today: where do they flourish, and why? We may no longer be able to count on their consistent existences within the university, but this surely does not mean that they have vanished altogether—the persistence of opposition groups, such as ACT-Wazalendo, are proof of this. Thus, our somewhat bleak findings are not necessarily representative of an ending,

[219] El Maamiry, *Self-efficacy in Information Seeking Behaviour*, p. 101.

but instead, an ideological relocation. Future mappings of this relocation will surely have meaningful implications for our capacity to understand what subversions of the globalized neoliberal order can look like, and how we may accomplish them both at home and abroad.

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